Iran war update, Ukraine-Russia negotiations, Israeli coalition talks.
▸ 🇺🇸🇮🇷 Low intensity war, high-intensity squeeze
▸ 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Ukraine-Russia talks in the Gulf
▸ 🇮🇱 Opposition leader Eisenkot starts coalition talks.
After several months of escalation across the globe this past week was marked by several attempts to de-escalate existing conflicts.
U.S. Secretary Marco Rubio told the press on Tuesday that the US sees no need for the time being to launch another major military operation against Iran, dispelling fears such an attack would be coming following the midterms. Yet, a deal remains highly unlikely and low-intensity war resuming in the Gulf means escalation remains on the table.
Representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the US met in Abu Dhabi, attempting to seek a way out of the conflict.
And in Israel president Herzog tasked opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot with forming a new Israeli government, bypassing Benjamin Netanyahu, whose coalition won the most seats.
Now,
Lets get into it
Low-intensity war, high-intensity squeeze
What happened: A low-intensity conflict has resumed in the Gulf since 6 November, with the U.S. striking radars as well as launchers in southern Iran and the IRGC-N intensifying its attacks on tankers. The IRGC said it had also hit U.S. navigation systems in Oman that guide vessels through the southern Strait of Hormuz, and radars in Bahrain on Friday and Sunday; the U.S. and Bahrain respectively said those drones were intercepted. Washington’s strategy of economic strangulation escalated further as the Iron Gate Task Force became operational to restrict Iran’s land trade, adding to a naval blockade and severe restrictions on Iranian airlines. Canada also reimposed sanctions on major Iranian energy institutions, while France accused Iranian state hackers of sabotaging fridges at around 700 retail sites, including Carrefour and Intermarché supermarkets, causing tens of millions of euros in food losses. Franco-Iranian relations have deteriorated further, with French diplomatic staff and institutions in Tehran under mounting pressure, which could force the closure of the French School of Tehran, already a shadow of its former self.
Why it matters: Oil prices fell from $115 to as low as $92 after the Republicans’ defeat in the U.S. midterms, on hopes that Trump’s appetite for war with Iran would fade and that he would come under pressure to reach a deal with Tehran. Trump, however, said there was no need for a deal and remains intent on keeping up economic pressure on Iran, further undermining the tireless work of Qatari mediators and pushing oil back up to around $96. Tehran, for its part, has remained diplomatically inflexible and grown more assertive, reiterating that its enriched uranium will not leave the country and saying it is ready to strike U.S. bases in Europe if they are used to launch attacks on Iran. The Pentagon has since moved refuelling tankers out of the UK’s Mildenhall base over an alleged Iranian threat, the second such withdrawal this year.
What it means: The U.S. has kept the renewed fighting low-key to avoid drawing further domestic attention to an unpopular war. Washington may be content with the status quo, but it hurts most Gulf states and leaves Israel feeling that more could be done to be rid of its archenemy. Israeli strikes on Iran therefore remain a strong possibility and would likely draw a U.S. follow-up, most probably against Pickaxe Mountain. In Tehran, the internal debate is likely to shift towards whether to strike first to break the harmful blockade. Beyond the Gulf, Washington’s strategy is also stoking avoidable tensions in Iraq, where the government is under U.S. pressure to close most of its border with Iran while powerful Iran-aligned armed groups increasingly see it as an American Trojan horse, raising the risk of domestic strife.
Risk metre (Medium-High): Barring a surprise Israeli strike on Iran, a high-intensity war does not appear imminent. The situation nonetheless remains highly volatile, with tankers increasingly targeted and Tehran under growing pressure to push back against its economic strangulation, while no clean exit from the standoff looks likely before 2029
Read more from our latest Iran piece:
The Geopolitical Desk
Delegations meet for peace talks, but can only agree on prisoner exchange
What happened: Ukrainian, Russian, and U.S. delegations held two days of trilateral peace talks in Abu Dhabi, the first direct three-way negotiations since February. In the end, the parties could only reach an agreement on a large-scale prisoner exchange. Moscow had already rejected an energy ceasefire last month and continued to insist on its territorial claims as preconditions for any peace deal, demands Kyiv has called unacceptable. On Thursday, U.S. envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff met both Vladimir Putin in Moscow and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Dublin, claiming that both sides agreed to another round of negotiations. Both U.S. envoys also stated they agreed on the inclusion of European nations in the peace talks, but criticized the Europeans for being unable to put forward a single envoy representing the entire block.
Why it matters: Including European envoys directly in the next round of talks marks a modest diplomatic win for Brussels, allowing the negotiations to address European concerns in a broader postwar security architecture. Moscow's position, however, has remained rigid. Russian chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky has repeatedly stressed demands for full Russian control over the four annexed Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, including territory Russian forces do not occupy. As such, Putin continues to reject Western security guarantees and foreign peacekeepers, while holding to his key demand that Ukraine needs to be fully demilitarized.
What it means: While diplomatic channels remain open and humanitarian steps like prisoner swaps offer some hope, a comprehensive peace settlement remains very distant. Russia stands accused of using the Ukraine talks to push for a sweeping revision of post-Cold War European security and NATO's posture. Bringing European leaders to the table gives Kyiv stronger diplomatic backing, yet heavy overnight strikes immediately following the talks demonstrate that Moscow intends to keep leveraging military force while negotiating.
Risk metre (High): Despite diplomatic efforts by the U.S. and steps on future European participation, Russia’s maximalist territorial demands, outright rejection of ceasefires, and ongoing strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure keep the immediate risk of prolonged conflict and further escalation high.
Israeli opposition begins its government juggle.
What happened: Israeli President Isaac Herzog officially tapped Israeli opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot to try to form a government within six weeks. By law, the Israeli President is supposed to give the mandate to the Member of the Knesset whom they believe is most likely to form a government. The newly elected Israeli Parliament has opened, with Netanyahu continuing to lead the interim government. Meanwhile, Eisenkot has begun negotiations within his own party to establish its red lines and has reached out to the Arab and Haredi parties to explore coalition options.
Why it matters: Eisenkot cannot easily become Prime Minister without the support of either the Arab or Haredi parties, and each potential coalition will come with difficult trade-offs and negotiations. Eisenkot has found willing allies among the Arab parties despite increased racist sentiment in the country, but other members of his coalition have threatened to withdraw if the Arab parties are brought into government. Eisenkot has explored having the Arab parties support his coalition while remaining outside it, an arrangement that has found greater acceptance within the anti-Netanyahu bloc. However, the Arab parties have indicated that they want a genuine partnership in exchange for their support. To try to get around this catch-22, Eisenkot has explored forming a coalition with the ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties. Previous backers of Netanyahu’s government, and initially kept away from Eisenkot due to the anti-Netanyahu bloc’s support for mandatory military service, some of the Haredi have been frustrated with Netanyahu's failure to pass draft evasion legislation. There has been a recent opening to pull United Torah Judaism (UTJ) away from Netanyahu, but the other Haredi party, Shas, has publicly refused negotiations, complicating efforts when Eisenkot needs both.
What it means: Eisenkot has multiple paths to forming a government, but any anti-Netanyahu bloc would likely be an unusual amalgamation of differing causes and ideologies that would be difficult to maintain. Regarding the Arab parties, work has been done on both sides to try to make an agreement possible, with the Arab party Ra'am saying it accepts Eisenkot's precondition of designating Hamas a terrorist organisation, while Eisenkot has issued a public statement denouncing Netanyahu's recent racist remarks. Yet despite these inroads, internal pressure within Eisenkot's coalition still appears likely to result in a rejection of such an arrangement. Regarding the Haredi parties, UTJ's willingness to talk indicates that there is a way forward, but there is still lingering distrust between them, with UTJ unwilling to offer support without guarantees that the draft exemption will remain. Additionally, UTJ support is not enough alone, and without pulling Shas away from Netanyahu, Eisenkot is back to square one. There are reports, however, that UTJ and the Arab parties have been in communication with each other regarding their talks with Eisenkot, with UTJ and the Joint List finding common ground on some legislative priorities. This has also opened up an unexpected route, with the Arab parties potentially backing an Eisenkot minority government alongside UTJ.
Risk metre (Medium): The main risk remains the possibility of another election. Eisenkot has options, but none of them are straightforward and all require extensive internal and external negotiations. Additionally, any government formed, whether with Arab parties, Arab support, Haredi parties, or a combination of Haredi participation and Arab support, would be defined by a high level of mutual distrust and internal tension. Eisenkot has a chance of making it work, but there is an equal, and likely greater, chance that these options could fall apart. Eisenkot's last option remains a unity government with Netanyahu, but that remains unlikely. While both sides are set to negotiate, Netanyahu has said he wants to remain Prime Minister, a red line for Eisenkot, while Eisenkot refuses to accept the support of Netanyahu's far-right ally, Itamar Ben-Gvir. If Eisenkot cannot form a government within the deadline, however, Netanyahu will get a chance to do so, although he is even less likely to succeed, and new elections would then be called.
🇲🇲 Myanmar: Resistance fighters belonging to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and People’s Defense Force (PDF) launched a coordinated assault against junta forces on the state border between Kachin and Sagaing. Three junta camps in the villages of Si Pein, Hpar Pant and Pin Wai were overwhelmed, cutting the road between the two states and resulting in the capture of dozens of enemy soldiers.
🇸🇩 Sudan: The SAF continued to march on Darfur as it made key gains in the Kordofan region over the past week. On Friday SAF troops captured the villages of Sareef Ankoush and Al-Khuwai in West Kordofan, cutting a critical road to the RSF-held town of En Nahud. In the same week the RSF suffered a number of key defections. The most prominent of which was Omar Osman Jabura the paramount chief of the Misseriya, one of the RSF’s most important tribal allies.
🇨🇩 DR Congo: Rebels of the newly formed FRN, the rebel alliance which is led by former president Joseph Kabila, and includes M23, launched a major offensive in South Kivu this past week. Rebels swiftly overwhelmed government defenses in the mineral-rich region, seizing control of the towns of Bitale, Bulambika and Kambali.
🇾🇪 Yemen: Houthi rebels launched a new counter-offensive in southeast of the Lahij governorate on Wednesday. The push appears aimed at seizing government-held high ground in the mountains in order to establish fire control over the Mokha–Aden road. The larger objective would be to isolate government forces along the Red Sea coast, leaving them vulnerable to attack. By Friday the Houthis had advanced to within 20 kilometers of the road.
Westerlies: Mediterranean energy politics in an age of competition
Libya’s House of Representatives has unanimously ratified the controversial 2019 maritime agreement with Turkey, cementing a rare domestic consensus that locks future Libyan governments into expansive offshore boundary claims. As these contested zones push westward into acreage awarded by Greece, Egypt, and Malta, long-standing eastern Mediterranean energy friction is rapidly shifting into the central Mediterranean.
The Geopolitical Desk
Algeria’s one-gate investment portal and the chase for investors
Algeria is unveiling its new One Investment Portal, a system designed to entice foreign investment by cutting through the bureaucratic red tape at the local level. For Algiers, attracting increased foreign investment is key to its new economic plan. However, bureaucratic hurdles have only ever been one part of the problem, and more work will be needed to truly unlock the country's investment potential.
The Geopolitical Desk
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See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
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