A new Levant: The rise of Eastern Mediterranean gas

The Iran ceasefire came to the edge of collapse this week after the U.S. Navy attempted to escort container ships through the Strait of Hormuz and Iran fired warning shots. Trump quickly announced he was calling off the operation.

He also said, again, that a deal is close.

In Libya, the picture is one of slow political progress and escalating pressure.

Sources indicate that at least five Libyan individuals have been recommended to the UN Security Council for possible international sanctions, with member states currently reviewing the information.

According to the information we have received, some of the names that have been allegedly included on this list are individuals that are currently active in various sectors of Libya’s economy, including prominent players in the energy sector.

And in India, Narendra Modi's BJP won 205 out of 294 seats in a state assembly that has traditionally been opposition territory, a signal that last year's national setback has not slowed the party's structural consolidation at the regional level.

GPD also published an analysis this week examining the data on rising political violence in America and what it reveals about a society that is increasingly normalising violent confrontation as a mode of political expression.

Let's get into it.

The U.S.-Iran ceasefire nearly collapsed, but Trump says a deal is close

What happened: The U.S. Navy this week attempted to escort container ships through the Strait of Hormuz, which remains effectively closed since the ceasefire. Iranian forces fired warning shots at U.S. vessels. Trump announced he was calling off the escort operation. He subsequently stated that a deal with Iran is close.

Why it matters: Warning shots between U.S. and Iranian naval forces in the Strait represent exactly the kind of incident that ceasefire agreements are supposed to prevent. The fact that it happened and that Washington chose de-escalation by withdrawing the operation rather than holding its position says something important about the current balance of leverage. The Strait remains closed. The U.S. has not reopened it by force. And every week that passes without resolution, the economic and political cost of the stalemate compounds.

What this means: Trump's assertion that a deal is close has become a recurring feature of this conflict, repeated at intervals that do not appear to correspond to actual diplomatic progress. The warning shots episode suggests that the operational situation in the Strait is less stable than the ceasefire language implies, and that the gap between a managed pause and a durable settlement remains considerable. Watch the next round of reported talks carefully for any sign that the two sides are actually narrowing their positions rather than managing the appearance of doing so.

Background reading from the archive:

Iran war: scenarios, conflict pathways and market implications

This report provides scenario mapping of the ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran war, analysing potential regional escalation pathways, Strait of Hormuz disruption risk and the likelihood of further attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

The threat of sanctions on Libya's elite

What happened: Western Libya's political and military fragmentation continues to hamper both the U.S. and UN political tracks. UNSMIL is pressing ahead with its "mini-table" negotiations and has reportedly recommended personal sanctions to the Security Council. Both rival governments have committed to upholding the Unified Budget Agreement as the Central Bank begins direct distribution of foreign currency, a technical step with significant political implications.

Why it matters: The sanctions recommendation is one of the most significant developments in Libya's international diplomatic track in months. If approved by the Security Council, personal sanctions would represent the most direct external pressure applied to individual Libyan actors in years. The Unified Budget Agreement commitment, meanwhile, is a fragile signal of economic pragmatism that could lead to further progress on the political track.

Read the full analysis:

Libya Weekly Update (May 8, 2026)

This report covers political and security updates in Libya between May 01, 2026 and May 07, 2026. Clients can download the full report at the end of the page.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Modi's BJP wins an opposition stronghold

What happened: Narendra Modi's BJP won 205 out of 294 seats in a state assembly election that has traditionally been opposition territory, a decisive result that continues the party's pattern of consolidating power at the state level even as it navigates the aftermath of a more difficult national election in 2024.

Why it matters: State-level dominance is how durable political power is built in India's federal system. The 2024 national setback created a narrative of BJP vulnerability that this result significantly complicates. A party that can win 205 seats in hostile territory is not a party in structural decline, it is a party with organisational depth and message discipline that transcends the national cycle.

What this means: The BJP's state-level consolidation suggests that Modi's political model remains robust. The question going into the next national cycle is whether the opposition can translate state-level resilience of its own into a coherent national alternative — and on the current evidence, that project remains incomplete.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

India is calibrating its tilt to a fragmented West

India’s energy relationship with Russia has forced New Delhi to look westward, but the current fracturing of the western system is allowing India a chance to balance its relationships.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Are Americans normalising political violence at home?

What happened: Our analysis this week looks at the data behind rising political violence in the United States, moving beyond the headline incidents to look at what the underlying trends reveal about the country's political culture. The findings are not reassuring.

Why it matters: The two assassination attempts on Trump this term, the January 6th legacy, the accelerating rhetoric across the political spectrum reflect a broader normalisation of political violence as an acceptable mode of expression, and a media and political environment that has struggled to push back against that normalisation consistently. The data shows that Americans are not simply more polarised than they were a decade ago, they are more comfortable with the idea that political opponents represent an existential threat, which is the cognitive precondition for violence rather than disagreement.

What this means: The implications run well beyond the domestic political environment. A United States in which political violence is rising and being partially normalised is a less reliable partner, a less stable market and a less predictable actor in every crisis it is involved in.

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

More than 2 months in, the war in Iran continues to reshape the geopolitical landscape in ways that extend far beyond the immediate theatre of operations. This week, several of those downstream consequences came into sharper focus.

In Iraq, a new prime minister designate has emerged. Ali al-Zaidi, a political newcomer and a compromise candidate acceptable to Washington, has been tasked with forming a government after the U.S. blocked multiple other contenders deemed too close to Tehran.

It is a telling moment: Iraq, a country that has spent two decades navigating its position between American power and Iranian influence, is now being asked to make that choice more explicitly than ever.

Earlier this week we published an analysis of exactly that dilemma, examining how the Iran war is pulling Iraq in two directions at once, and what the consequences of that tension could be for one of the region's most fragile states.

In the Gulf, the UAE made a decision that has sent shockwaves through energy markets after Abu Dhabi announced it was leaving OPEC, citing long-standing frustration with production restrictions that it says have prevented the country from meeting market demand.

The timing, in the middle of a global energy crisis, is not incidental.

In West Africa, the security situation in the Sahel deteriorated sharply. Islamist militants and Tuareg separatists launched coordinated nationwide attacks across Mali, seizing the cities of Kidal and Mopti and killing Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

It is one of the most significant military reversals the Mali junta has suffered since coming to power in 2020, and it raises serious questions about the viability of security arrangements (built around Russian Wagner forces and a break with Western partners) that Bamako has staked its survival on.

Across the Atlantic, King Charles III travelled to Washington in what is being framed as an attempt to use his personal relationship with Trump to address a series of bilateral frictions, from Greenland to the Iran war, that have strained the U.S.-U.K. relationship to an unusual degree.

And in Washington itself, Cole Tomas Allen was charged with attempting to assassinate the President after approaching the White House Correspondents' Dinner armed with a shotgun, a handgun and multiple knives.

It was, by any measure, a week that illustrated how many simultaneous pressure points the current global moment contains.

Let's get into it.

Iraq finds a compromise PM, but the pressure on its political model is growing

What happened: Iraqi President Nizar Amedi has tasked Ali al-Zaidi, a political newcomer with no strong factional affiliation, with forming a new government. Al-Zaidi emerged as the compromise candidate after the U.S. blocked multiple other contenders it considered too closely aligned with Iran. His appointment reflects the acute difficulty of governing Iraq when Washington and Tehran are in open conflict and Baghdad sits directly between them.

Why it matters: The U.S. veto of Iran-aligned candidates is not a new phenomenon in Iraqi politics, but the exercise of that veto in the current climate carries a different weight. Iraq hosts U.S. military assets, maintains deep economic and political ties with Iran, and is simultaneously subject to pressure from both sides to choose. Al-Zaidi's appointment buys time, but it does not resolve the underlying tension. A government built on being acceptable to Washington is, almost by definition, one that will struggle for legitimacy with significant parts of the Iraqi political class.

What this means: The formation of al-Zaidi's government — who he appoints, what coalitions he builds, and how he handles the Iran file in his early months — will be an important indicator of whether Iraq can maintain its balancing act or whether the Iran war has finally made that position untenable. Our analysis this week examines exactly that question in depth.

Read the full analysis:

How the Iran war could redefine Iraq’s fragile state

Iraq has long found itself in an uncomfortable position between its two main international partners, Iran and the United States. It has managed to maintain a delicate balance, but the current conflict threatens to upend that equilibrium.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Why the UAE is leaving OPEC

What happened: The United Arab Emirates announced this week that it will leave OPEC, ending a membership that has defined Gulf energy diplomacy for decades. Abu Dhabi cited long-standing frustration with production restrictions that it says have prevented the country from responding to market demand, a complaint that has been building for years but which the current crisis has made impossible to contain.

Why it matters: The UAE holds some of the largest proven reserves in the world and has invested heavily in expanding its production capacity precisely because it wants to use it. The tension between Abu Dhabi's ambitions and OPEC's quota architecture has been the cartel's most significant internal fault line for some time. The UAE's departure removes that tension by resolving it (in Abu Dhabi's favour) and leaves OPEC with a structural question about its own coherence at a moment when the global energy order is being redrawn by the Iran crisis.

What this means: The immediate market implication is that UAE production will likely rise, adding supply at a moment when prices are elevated and the global economy is under stress. For Saudi Arabia, which has invested enormous diplomatic capital in managing OPEC cohesion, the UAE's departure is a significant setback. For energy traders and market analysts: the OPEC price management architecture just became materially weaker. And for the broader geopolitical picture, the UAE's "AND economy" posture, which we noted a few weeks ago, now extends to energy policy.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

Why Gulf states need a unified foreign policy approach

Without a common foreign policy goal, the Gulf states have engaged in trivial rivalries that have carried serious security and human costs for the region. It’s time to rethink that approach.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Can Gulf states survive in a new hard power world?

American power and security guarantees helped build the modern Gulf, but shifting trends both globally and regionally are forcing gulf leaders into difficult decisions

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Islamic militants kill Mali's Defence Minister

What happened: Islamic militants and Tuareg separatists launched coordinated nationwide attacks across Mali this week, seizing the cities of Kidal and Mopti in what represents one of the most significant military reversal the ruling junta has experienced. Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed in the offensive, a loss that is as much symbolic as it is operational.

Why it matters: The Mali junta made a series of irreversible choices: expelling French forces, breaking with ECOWAS, and building its security architecture around Russian Wagner personnel. Those choices were presented domestically as a reassertion of sovereignty and a more effective approach to the Islamist insurgency. This week's events suggest the opposite. Kidal, a city with enormous symbolic significance as a centre of Tuareg political identity, has fallen. Mopti sits in the geographic heart of the country. The coordinated nature of the offensive across multiple fronts suggests an adversary that has been planning, organising and accumulating capacity while the junta's attention and resources were elsewhere.

What this means: The Sahel's security deterioration is no longer a slow-moving story. The Mali junta's survival is now a genuine question, and the regional implications — for Niger, Burkina Faso and the broader arc of Wagner-backed governance experiments across West Africa — are significant.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

Making sense of Iran’s latest Africa push

Tehran has now placed Africa among its top foreign policy priorities, seeking more trade flows, geopolitical alignment, and military cooperation.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

A royal visit and an assassination attempt

What happened: Two stories from Washington this week that say something about the state of American political life. King Charles III travelled to Washington in a diplomatic repair mission, using his personal rapport with Trump to address bilateral frictions that have strained the so-called "special relationship" to an unusual degree. This took place just a few days after the President survived a second assassination attempt.

Why it matters: The two events illuminate different dimensions of the same underlying reality. The King's visit reflects how seriously London takes the current deterioration in the relationship and how limited its conventional diplomatic tools are. The assassination attempt, meanwhile, is the second against Trump since his return to office. Individual incidents have individual causes. But a pattern of repeated attempts on a sitting president reflects a degree of political polarisation and institutional stress that has implications well beyond the security brief.

What this means: The world's most powerful democracy is receiving a state visit from a constitutional monarch because conventional diplomatic channels have broken down. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the White House marked the occasion with a social media post captioned "TWO KINGS," a not-so-subtle jab at the "No Kings" protests held in the U.S. to oppose the actions and policies of the second Trump administration. Trump himself has now survived two assassination attempts in a single term. His foreign policy is generating public rebukes from the Pope, strained relationships with its closest allies and a domestic economic squeeze that is visibly eroding political consensus.

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions — or, if you're in Madrid next week, to arrange a meeting.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

The accumulated weight of unresolved questions around the Iran war is making the world economy increasingly divided.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed and the U.S. Navy has now officially finalised a blockade of Iranian ports, ordering 13 vessels to turn around as Washington attempts to force Iran to agree to better terms.

And yet a ceasefire of sorts persists. Fragile, contested and increasingly strained by the gap between what each side has agreed to and what each side believes it has agreed to.

Nowhere is that gap clearer than on Lebanon. Israel and Lebanese representatives held talks in Washington this week, with Trump announcing a 10-day ceasefire.

But the underlying positions remain irreconcilable in the near term: Israel wants Hezbollah dismantled; Beirut wants Israel to leave.

The Houthis, meanwhile, continue to confound expectations.

Despite weeks of promises to assist Iran if the Gulf war dragged on, Yemen's Houthi movement has carried out only a few missile attacks on southern Israel and otherwise stayed on the sidelines.

Domestic governance pressures, the resource cost of their previous engagement with the U.S., a desire for a deal with Saudi Arabia, and the strategic logic of keeping Bab al-Mandab as a final card rather than playing it prematurely are all factors at play.

The closure of both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab simultaneously would cut off 25% of global energy traffic, which is why Iran and its proxies are holding it in reserve.

Global markets, in the face of all this, are surprisingly bullish and do not seem to be accurately pricing the risks associated to the ongoing conflict.

To make matters more surreal, Trump and Pope Leo XIV are in open dispute.

After Pope Leo criticised the administration's conduct of the Iran war, Trump and senior Republican figures responded by attacking him on matters of theology.

It is a signal of how isolated Washington's war posture has become, when the sitting U.S. president is in a public argument with the Pope about the morality of his foreign policy.

At GPD, we published two pieces this week that we think are essential reading for anyone trying to understand what's happening in the region.

One on Libya, which argues that the country's long-standing status quo is finally seeing its first potential shake-up in years, and one on China's strategic exposure to the current energy disruption.

And next week, we will be in the Spanish capital for the Madrid Energy Conference, where we will hear about how Latin America can play a strategic role in meeting Europe’s energy security needs at a time of global disruptions.

GPD readers can use code MEC26 for $150 off tickets:

Let's get into it.

Massad Boulos is creating the next Libyan reality

What happened: The diplomatic process pushed by the United States via Massad Boulos, which we have been tracking closely over the past several weeks, is actively reshaping the architecture of Libya's political settlement, determining which actors are legitimised, which are marginalised, and what the country's next institutional reality will look like.

Why it matters: Libya's diplomatic history is littered with international processes that failed to produce tangible outcomes. What distinguishes the current moment is the combination of a U.S. interlocutor with political proximity to the White House, a Libyan factional environment that is for the first time in years showing signs of flexibility, and an external pressure environment created by the Iran crisis that has concentrated minds in Tripoli, Benghazi and the major European capitals simultaneously. The technical talks between the Haftar and Dabaiba factions, which GPD reported last week, are one output of this process.

What this means: The actors who engage constructively with the Boulos process now are positioning themselves for influence in whatever institutional arrangement emerges. Those who stay on the sidelines or who attempt to spoil, risk finding themselves outside the architecture that is being built. For energy sector operators, infrastructure investors and governments with strategic exposure in Libya: the window for positioning is open, but it is not permanent.

Read the full exclusive:

The Boulos process is creating the next Libyan reality

Libya’s long-standing status quo is finally seeing its first potential shake-up in years, which could have major repercussions for the country’s future.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

The indirect war: chokepoint hegemony and China's energy dilemma

What happened: The second order effects of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict on China are becoming increasingly apparent. Not through direct military exposure, but through the strategic pressure that comes from dependence on energy chokepoints now effectively controlled or contested by U.S. naval power. With Hormuz closed and Bab al-Mandab held in reserve as a Houthi card, China's energy import architecture is under strain in ways that Beijing's long-term strategic planning may have not fully anticipated.

Why it matters: China is the world's largest crude importer. Its exposure to Hormuz is structural. The current crisis is functioning as a live stress test of Beijing's energy security assumptions, and the results are not yet clear. What the analysis shows is that the U.S., whether intentionally or as a byproduct of its Iran policy, has demonstrated a capacity to apply indirect pressure on Chinese energy flows without a direct confrontation. That is a significant geopolitical finding, and one with implications that extend well beyond the current conflict.

What this means: For those tracking U.S.-China competition, the Iran war has inadvertently clarified something important about the asymmetry of chokepoint leverage. China is acutely aware of this and has been investing in overland pipeline alternatives and port access across the Indian Ocean littoral for precisely this reason. But those alternatives are not yet sufficient to offset Hormuz exposure. The crisis is accelerating Chinese strategic thinking on energy independence in ways that will reshape infrastructure investment and diplomatic positioning across Central Asia, the Gulf and East Africa for years to come.

Read the full analysis:

Indirect warfare, chokepoint hegemony and China’s energy dilemma

With global energy demand rising and limitations in supply infrastructure becoming more apparent, China has been looking to reinforce itself in case of future crises, especially with the U.S.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Why haven't the Houthis closed Bab al-Mandab?

What happened: Despite weeks of public commitments from Houthi leadership to assist Iran if the Gulf war continued, the movement has carried out less than half a dozen missile attacks and has otherwise remained on the sidelines. The Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which 15% of global shipping passes, remains open.

Why it matters: The restraint is a strategic posture, shaped by at least three distinct pressures.

1. First, the Houthis are struggling to govern north Yemen effectively. Deeper engagement in a regional conflict would force resources away from an already fragile domestic situation.
2. Second, the movement's previous engagement with the U.S. cost it resources that were not easily replaceable, and joining the Iran war more fully risks drawing sustained American targeting again.
3. Third and most significantly, the Houthis want a deal with Saudi Arabia. Since Riyadh took control of south Yemen, the Houthis see a greater chance of an agreement and have little incentive to antagonise the Saudis by escalating in a way that destabilises the wider Gulf.

What this means: The closure of Bab al-Mandab is Iran's last major escalation card, and Tehran does not want to play it unless necessary. The simultaneous closure of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab would cut off approximately 25% of global energy traffic, a move with consequences so severe that its value lies almost entirely in the threat rather than the execution. The Houthis understand this. If the ceasefire breaks down, the calculus changes and the likelihood of Houthi intervention increases materially. But for now, restraint is serving everyone's interests, including their own.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

What comes after Yemen’s southern takeover?

The capture of southern Yemen by separatist forces has altered the dynamics of the country’s long-festering civil war. Rising tensions among both rivals and allies now threaten either a renewed outbreak of fighting or a continuation of prolonged stagnation.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

GPD at Madrid Energy Conference

As Europe looks to reduce exposure and rebuild supply chains, Latin America is moving back into focus as a strategic partner in energy and minerals.

The Madrid Energy Conference convenes policymakers, investors and industry leaders around this shift. With a clear emphasis on the Europe-Latin America corridor, it offers a timely lens into how energy security is being redefined.

The GPD Team is looking forward to being in Madrid to exchange perspectives with operators, policymakers and investors who are navigating the same questions we have been writing about.

GPD readers can use code MEC26 for $150 off tickets.

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions — or, if you're in Madrid next week, to arrange a meeting.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

This was a busy week for The Geopolitical Desk team and a pretty consequential one for the regions we cover.

I've spent the past few days in Washington at Semafor World Economy, in a room with CEOs, finance ministers, central bankers and geopolitical risk analysts all grappling with the same question: what does the global system look like on the other side of the Iran crisis?

The conversations were candid in a way that formal statements rarely are, and I came away with a clearer sense of where institutional thinking is landing on energy security, capital allocation and the longer-term map.

Meanwhile, the team published three exclusive articles, including the results of an investigation into Libya's energy sector.

The first exclusive broke the news that the Haftar and Dabaiba factions have agreed to enter technical talks on Libyan unification. This development would have seemed implausible even a few months ago, and carries significant implications for Libya's energy sector and for European strategic interests.

The second is a visual investigation into the war in Sudan: a conflict that has produced one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, and which remains dramatically underreported.

And finally, we published a deep dive into Libya's energy sector that finds how BGN, the Swiss-based crude trader widely believed to have exited the market, never actually left.

The story of how it did so draws on sources across Libya's Ministry of Oil & Gas, National Oil Corporation, Attorney General's Office, and wider market participants and says something important about how Libya's energy sector actually works.

This is the kind of week GPD Intelligence exists for. If you're not yet a subscriber (or your organisation isn't on an Enterprise plan) now is a good time to change that.

Let's get into it.

Exclusive: Haftars and Dabaibas set for technical talks on unification

What happened: GPD exclusively reported that representatives of the Haftar and Dabaiba families, the two dominant power centres in Libya's east-west divide, are set to enter technical talks on unification. The talks represent the most substantive engagement between the two sides in years.

Why it matters: Libya's political division is not merely a governance problem. It is the structural condition that has blocked economic recovery, suppressed oil production capacity and made the country a persistent source of instability for its neighbours and for European migration and energy policy.

Any movement toward a unified institutional framework, however imperfect, changes the operating environment for every actor with exposure in Libya. This is also consistent with the renewed diplomatic momentum we reported last week around Massad Boulos, whose re-engagement appears to be producing tangible results.

What this means: Technical talks are not a political settlement, and the history of Libyan negotiations counsels caution. Talks have begun before and collapsed quickly. But the fact that both sides have agreed to engage on a technical basis, which is often where durable arrangements are actually built, below the level of political grandstanding, is a meaningful signal.

Read the full exclusive:

Haftars and Dabaibas set for technical talks on unification

Sources with knowledge of the situation have informed The Geopolitical Desk that the Dabaiba and Haftar families have agreed to begin technical talks this week in Tunis.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

A visual investigation into one of the world's most ignored wars

What happened: GPD published a visual investigation into the war in Sudan, mapping the scale of the conflict and the shifting fault lines that have received a fraction of the international attention directed at other theatres.

Why it matters: Sudan's war has displaced more people than any conflict on earth. It has produced mass atrocity, famine and the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure. The reasons it remain underreported are structural, but the absence of coverage does not diminish the scale.

What this means: The investigation is deliberately visual because the numbers alone have not been sufficient to hold attention. We wanted to produce something that makes the reality of this conflict harder to look away from. Read it, share it, and if you work in a field where Sudan's trajectory is material to your decisions, this piece is a great starting point.

Read the full investigation:

A visual investigation of the war in Sudan

Entering into its third year, Sudan’s civil war continues to drag on with no clear end in sight. This GDP exclusive provides maps detailing the progress of the Sudan war so far and changes in territorial control.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

How BGN rewired its operations in Libya

What happened: A GPD investigation drawing on sources across Libya's Ministry of Oil and Gas, former NOC officials, individuals familiar with inquiries at the Attorney General's Office, and market participants found that BGN, the Swiss-based crude trader widely believed to have exited Libya's market, did not leave.

Why it matters: The narrative that Libya's oil sector was finally opening up to competitive, transparent trading was, on the evidence gathered by GPD, premature. If the accounts provided by sources prove accurate, BGN's reported re-entry through proxy structures would demonstrate that the networks shaping Libya's energy economy remain capable of absorbing political pressure and adapting to it.

What this means: This is not, ultimately, a story about one company. It is a story about a system in which access is negotiated through relationships rather than regulation, and in which the scale of potential value diversion from a state whose population has long borne the costs of that dysfunction is likely far greater than what has yet been documented.

For operators, investors and policymakers with exposure in Libya: the technical talks between the Haftar and Dabaiba factions represent a genuine opportunity. But political process and commercial reality are not the same thing. Understanding who actually controls access to Libya's crude, and through what channels, remains as consequential as it has ever been.

Read the full exclusive:

The return of Libya’s most controversial oil trader

For months, it seemed like BGN had been pushed out of Libya. However, according to multiple industry sources, the Swiss-based crude trader is still operating through a network of aligned entities designed to reduce visibility.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

GPD at Semafor World Economy

What happened: GPD spent four days at Semafor World Economy in Washington this week, in conversation with and listening to some of the most influential figures shaping the global economic and energy landscape — among them TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné, IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol, and Dubai Economic Development Corporation CEO Hadi Badri. The throughline across sessions was consistent: the Iran crisis has not just disrupted global energy markets, it has structurally altered them in ways that will outlast any ceasefire.

Why it matters: The consensus in the room, if it can be called that, was that the world is not returning to the pre-crisis baseline. Pouyanné was direct about the precedent: a closed Strait of Hormuz creates a template that other actors in other chokepoints will study and potentially replicate. Birol's concern was that the cost of this crisis is not being borne by major economies but by net energy importers in the developing world, in a pattern that echoes the 1970s debt spirals. And Badri's underlined the UAE's resilience in spite of the war, claiming that consumer spending has recovered to just shy of pre-crisis levels and arguing that capital is not fleeing the region, it is repositioning within it.

What this means: Three things emerged from Washington that, for me, are worth thinking about. First, energy security and trust in geopolitical systems has become a distinct investment criterion, sitting alongside price and technology in a way it never did before.

Second, the gas industry faces a credibility problem it has not yet fully reckoned with: two major gas crises in four years is beginning to deter the long-term infrastructure commitments that emerging economies need to make, which presents a significant opportunity for U.S., Canadian and Australian exporters and a significant challenge for everyone else.

Third, the psychological shift caused by the Iran war may matter as much as the operational reality, if not more. The crisis has compressed timelines on supply chain diversification, economic localisation and energy system redesign that were already underway. The question is no longer whether those shifts happen, but how fast and who is positioned to benefit.

PARTNER CONTENT

As Europe looks to reduce exposure and rebuild supply chains, Latin America is moving back into focus. Not as a peripheral market, but as a strategic partner in energy and minerals.

The Madrid Energy Conference convenes policymakers, investors and industry leaders around this shift. With a clear emphasis on the Europe–Latin America corridor, it offers a timely lens into how energy security is being redefined.

GPD readers can use code MEC26 for $150 off tickets

Register Now

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions — or, if you're in DC next week, to arrange a meeting.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

Hours before President Trump's own deadline to strike Iranian power plants and bridges last Tuesday, the U.S. President announced that a two-week ceasefire had been agreed between the United States and Iran.

While the announcement was received with relief in many quarters, the main question we have been receiving from clients and subscribers is whether it amounts to anything durable.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, oil prices remain high, and Iran has already rejected a U.S. proposal for a 45-day extension.

Meanwhile, Israel continues to strike Lebanon — and the three sides cannot agree on whether Lebanon was ever included in the ceasefire to begin with (Iran says it was, the U.S. and Israel say it wasn't).

The week that preceded the ceasefire announcement was one of the most turbulent of the conflict.

Trump, for his part, threatened further strikes in a profanity-laden post on Truth Social, calling Iranians "crazy bastards" and promising that Tuesday would be "Power Plant Day and Bridge Day." He also called Iranians "animals" at a slightly surreal Easter celebration at the White House.

These observations raise two important questions that will determine the fate of the conflict in the weeks and months to come:

1. First, has the U.S. crossed a threshold from being the world's policeman to becoming a rogue state?
2. And second, has Iran, by surviving the campaign with its regional position arguably intact, emerged from this conflict in a stronger strategic posture than when it began?

Despite President Trump's alarming disregard for international law in his threats to bomb Iran back to the “Stone Ages” and the Iranian regime's continued survival, neither question has a clean answer yet.

But both will define the next phase of this conflict, ceasefire or not.

Elsewhere, we have a new exclusive that suggests Massad Boulos, Trump's Senior Advisor on Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs, appears poised to achieve a breakthrough on negotiations around Libya's unified budget next week, and has reinvigorated talks for a possible political unity deal.

I'll be in Washington next week for Semafor World Economy. More on that below.

Let's get into it.

A U.S.-Iran ceasefire arrives, but uncertainty remains

What happened: Trump announced a two-week ceasefire with Iran after intensifying rhetoric that suggested the U.S. President was prepared to commit war crimes in Iran. The ceasefire is holding, but Iran has since rejected a U.S. proposal for a 45-day extension. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

Why it matters: The ceasefire is real in the narrow sense that large-scale direct U.S.-Iran exchanges have paused. But the conditions that made the conflict possible, and that could reignite it, remain entirely in place. Iran has not reopened the Strait. Israel has not halted operations. And the diplomatic architecture that would be required to convert a two-week pause into a durable settlement does not currently exist.

What this means: Two strategic questions now dominate the post-ceasefire landscape. First: has Iran's regional position been strengthened by surviving the campaign? Tehran entered this conflict as a state under maximum pressure. It absorbed significant strikes, but it also demonstrated missile capability, held the Strait closed, and extracted concessions without capitulating. That is not nothing. Second: has the U.S. become a rogue state? The targeting of civilian infrastructure, the belligerent rhetoric from the White House, and the conduct of the campaign have been noted in capitals from Brussels to Beijing.

Go deeper: Our Iran Desk has been providing Enterprise subscribers with in-depth reporting and scenario analysis on the conflict. We are preparing a new special report outlining our assessment of what comes next.

IRAN DESK ◉ Political and strategic risk analysis on Iran

Exclusive briefings, source-based analysis, scenario assessments and market implications for professionals in energy, finance, diplomacy and risk who need to understand how developments in Iran affect global markets.

The Geopolitical DeskOliver Crowley

Exclusive: Boulos catches a second wind in Libya negotiations

What happened: Massad Boulos — whose grip on the North Africa portfolio had appeared to be loosening — has re-emerged with renewed traction in Libya's diplomatic track, in what represents a notable reversal from the trajectory we reported several weeks ago.

Why it matters: With everything that's happening in the world, from Iran to Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump needs a foreign policy win. Next week could potentially signal the first step towards that success. A more engaged Boulos, with a clearer mandate, changes the calculus for Libyan factions and for the European governments that remain deeply invested in Libyan stability.

What this means: The window for a meaningful diplomatic shift in Libya is narrow and historically prone to closing without warning. Boulos catching a second wind is a positive signal for those hoping for U.S. re-engagement, but the structural obstacles that have blocked progress to date have not disappeared.

Enterprise and Intelligence subscribers can read the full exclusive below:

Boulos catches second wind in Libya negotiations

The Senior Advisor is set for a budget breakthrough next week, and has reinvigorated talks for a possible political unity deal.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Two more countries move away from democratic governance

What happened: In Myanmar, General Min Aung Hlaing was formally appointed President by his proxy political party, formalising a status quo that has existed since he overthrew the elected government in 2021. In Burkina Faso, junta leader General Ibrahim Traoré — who himself took power in a 2022 coup — told citizens the country should "forget about the question of democracy," pushing previously promised elections back to 2029 at the earliest.

Why it matters: These are part of a broader pattern of military-led governments entrenching themselves while the international mechanisms designed to hold them accountable operate at reduced capacity. The U.S., historically the most assertive external enforcer of democratic norms, is currently occupied elsewhere and operating under an administration with limited appetite for that role.

What this means: For investors and risk analysts with exposure in West Africa or Southeast Asia: the governance risk horizon is lengthening. In Burkina Faso specifically, the delay of elections to 2029 extends the period of policy unpredictability and limits the leverage available to development institutions and commercial partners seeking contractual certainty.

GPD at Semafor World Economy

Next week, I'll be in Washington as part of the inaugural cohort of Principals at Semafor World Economy. The lineup brings together policymakers, investors and business leaders at a moment when geopolitics is moving markets in real time — which is, of course, exactly what GPD exists to help readers navigate.

I'll be in DC for a handful of days and am setting aside time for a small number of meetings, particularly with readers who are working on North Africa, West Asia or energy sector exposure, where we've been covering developments at a granular level.

If you're based in DC or will be there next week and want to connect, feel free to reply directly to this email. I'd welcome the conversation.

Learn more about Semafor World Economy:

Semafor World Economy

Convening from April 13-17 in Washington, DC, Semafor World Economy 2026 is dedicated to advancing dialogues that catalyze global growth.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions — or, if you're in DC next week, to arrange a meeting.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

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