After record-low turnout, pressure for change was high. Tebboune opted for limited changes, but they bring Algeria's economic files closer to the presidency while curbing influential ministers.
Over the past years, Ukraine has encouraged the creation of anti-Kremlin Russian rebel groups on its territory. Initially an effective propaganda strategy, concerns have arisen over whether these Russians are reliable, or whether they represent a serious security gamble.
Shortly after announcing he would try to revive the defunct 6+6 talks instead of ratifying the 4+4 agreement, he made a surprise u-turn in a few days, prompting many to question what happened.
With Iran's hardliners facing the war they had long prepared for, they now face increasing divisions on what the goals of the conflict are, and how it should end.
A special report for Intelligence subscribers that breaks down the positions and possible paths forward for over 20 countries trying to navigate around the U.S.-Israel-Iran war
The war on Iran's economy has been running for decades. U.S.-Israeli strikes on economic infrastructure in 2026 brought cascading effects on the country's economy. The result will not be collapse, but it is something more dangerous for ordinary Iranians than the war itself.
For months, it seemed like BGN had been pushed out of Libya. However, according to multiple industry sources, the Swiss-based crude trader is still operating through a network of aligned entities designed to reduce visibility.
After record-low turnout, pressure for change was high. Tebboune opted for limited changes, but they bring Algeria's economic files closer to the presidency while curbing influential ministers.
Over the past years, Ukraine has encouraged the creation of anti-Kremlin Russian rebel groups on its territory. Initially an effective propaganda strategy, concerns have arisen over whether these Russians are reliable, or whether they represent a serious security gamble.
Shortly after announcing he would try to revive the defunct 6+6 talks instead of ratifying the 4+4 agreement, he made a surprise u-turn in a few days, prompting many to question what happened.
The long standing relations between Algiers and Abu Dhabi established by the Bouteflika government have now officially collapsed, as both capitals move in two different geopolitical directions.
Algiers and Niamey's previous relationship had been upended by the wave of Sahel coups in the early 2020s, but recent events in the region have allowed for an opening.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has bet his young government on a September 30 deadline to strip armed groups of their weapons, a high-stakes echo of the 2021 crisis that nearly got his predecessor killed.
Tehran and D.C. have been stuck in their own catch-22, both have been seeking to avoid a return to active fighting, but have no real capacity to cooperate diplomatically.
With Iran's hardliners facing the war they had long prepared for, they now face increasing divisions on what the goals of the conflict are, and how it should end.
What started as problems with card payments turned into an 18-day disruption that exposed the hidden fragility of one of Iran's most critical civilian infrastructures.
Often overlooked, Oman also has a voice in how traffic flows through the Strait, and both Oman and Iran will have to reconcile their opposing visions for the future of Hormuz.
After record-low turnout, pressure for change was high. Tebboune opted for limited changes, but they bring Algeria's economic files closer to the presidency while curbing influential ministers.
Shortly after announcing he would try to revive the defunct 6+6 talks instead of ratifying the 4+4 agreement, he made a surprise u-turn in a few days, prompting many to question what happened.
The long standing relations between Algiers and Abu Dhabi established by the Bouteflika government have now officially collapsed, as both capitals move in two different geopolitical directions.
Cut through the noise of global politics and get the inside story from our experts with one concise weekly email. Trusted by policymakers and business leaders worldwide.
Behind the UNGA speeches, a war and a looming strike
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐ช๐น A rebel coalition declares war in Ethiopia โธ ๐ฑ๐พ Libya moves closer to a deal โธ ๐ฎ๐ท Iran faces air blockade and fears renewed attack
The UN General Assembly is where the world's unresolved crises come to be aired, and this week's gathering in New York offered no shortage of them.
In Ethiopia, the worst-case scenario materialised as several armed opposition groups formed an alliance and declared open rebellion against the federal government.
In Libya, a deal is gradually coming into view, although internal rivalries are beginning to intensify.
Iran's diplomatic efforts in New York yielded no positive response from the U.S., and the regional situation points to renewed escalation as Tehran contends with a form of air blockade and believes Washington could launch another major strike.
In Venezuela, interim president Delcy Rodrรญguez scored diplomatic victories in New York while unrest spread at home amid recurring power cuts.
Now,
Lets get into it
A rebel coalition declares war on the government of Ethiopia
What happened: On Monday a coalition of seven armed opposition groups formally announced its formation. Bringing together several rival ethnic rebel groups including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano National Movement (Fano) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), the coalition called itself the Alliance for Survival, stating its intent to overthrow the Prosperity Party government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. By Wednesday the rebel coalition had launched a major coordinated offensive against federal forces across the northern regions, including Tigray, Amhara and neighbouring Afar. TPLF forces seized the regional airport in Mekelle, prompting flight suspensions and widespread internet disruptions. Heavy clashes and drone strikes were reported near strategic border towns and World Heritage sites such as the ancient church town of Lalibela, resulting in hundreds of reported casualties and fresh waves of displacement.
Why it matters: The escalation marks a near-total collapse of the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement, which brought an end to two years of brutal war in Tigray. The coalition aims to isolate Addis Ababa and choke off vital supply lines, ultimately toppling the state. Simultaneously, the renewed violence threatens to draw in both neighbouring Eritrea and Sudan, which have maintained close ties with the rebel coalition and reportedly played a role in its creation.
What it means: Ethiopia faces a grave risk of descending back into full-scale civil war, severely threatening stability across the entire Horn of Africa. Widespread disruption to humanitarian access, supply lines and domestic travel leaves civilian populations vulnerable to severe shortages and displacement. Combined with the wars in neighbouring Sudan and Somalia, and further away in Yemen, the current eruption of violence has the potential to plunge the region into its worst humanitarian catastrophe in decades.
Risk metre (High): The multi-front military escalation by a unified rebel coalition seriously threatens the survival of not just the current government but the Ethiopian state in its entirety. Some members of the coalition have made no secret of their ethno-nationalist and separatist ambitions. Even if the government fell tomorrow, these groups would very likely turn on each other for control of land and resources. This means an end to the violence is very unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Libya moves closer to a deal as internal power struggles intensify
What happened: Talks towards a unity agreement advanced this week under the American initiative led by Massad Boulos, while disputes on the ground escalated. A Waha Oil Company board reshuffle triggered protests at the Zawiya Refinery and the closure of a pipeline carrying Sharara crude, causing $75 million in losses, according to the National Oil Corporation. Meanwhile, around 100 parliamentarians attempted to hold a session aimed at removing Speaker Agila Saleh, only to be blocked from entering parliament by Libyan National Army forces.
Why it matters: According to Libya Desk's reporting, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba's son, Mohamed, pushed through the Waha changes with LNA approval, sidelining Zintani interests and bypassing Ibrahim Dabaiba, who normally manages these arrangements. Ibrahim reportedly backed the guards' protests, while Zintani forces subsequently closed the pipeline. Negotiating salaries alone could not resolve a crisis rooted in appointments and influence. The episode exposed growing tensions within the ruling family and the consequences of disrupting the GNU's broader alliances.
What it means: This reinforces our earlier warning that the closer Libya gets to a deal, the more turbulent its politics will become. Factions are negotiating a settlement while demonstrating how much disruption they can cause if their interests are overlooked. Saleh secured LNA protection after pushing the 4+4 Agreement through parliament, but in doing so exposed his growing dependence on it. The High Council of State, meanwhile, has yet to ratify the agreement. Progress between the main powerbrokers is placing their own alliances under strain.
Risk metre (High): A unity agreement remains within reach, but the oil losses show how quickly political bargaining can inflict economic damage. Boulos this week acknowledged progress and the work still required, reaffirming American support for unifying institutions and establishing a credible path towards elections. Sustained engagement must now translate those assurances into implementation, contain disputes and protect the economy. More will be needed to ensure Libya does not stumble before the finish line.
Iran: "Buckle up, we're expecting a few bumps ahead"
What happened: After the Salalah regional meeting on the Iran-Oman Hormuz framework was postponed in mid-September, Iran used the UN General Assembly to re-up an offer for reopening the strait, reframing the messaging without changing the substance. Washington rejected it outright and kept tightening economic pressure, this week getting major regional airports such as DXB to stop servicing Iranian carriers and others such as IST to cut Iranian flights to a minimum. Tehran initially threatened regional airports but later dialled back its rhetoric, saying it would respond with unspecified countermeasures.
Why it matters: The UN offer looks like a half-hearted bid to preempt an attack Tehran considers likely, possibly with Israeli involvement, either within weeks or soon after the 3 November US midterms. Mossad and the CIA may have rebuilt networks inside Iran and located more of the generals on their kill list, which makes a new round of strikes on the capital a dangerous prospect for Tehran. Iraq, whose airports have also closed to Iranian aircraft, is particularly exposed as it prepares to start disarming non-state armed groups next week. Baghdad now faces domestic charges of subservience to Washington and threats from those groups to raid airports unless Iranian flights resume.
What it means: Renewed conflict would land just as Q4 brings European carriers back to Gulf airports and opens the tourism season, delaying the region's recovery and casting doubt on hopes that the war's fallout will have faded by late 2027. Europe would feel it in energy too, with Washington weighing a diesel export ban and the EU already urging member states to curb demand, particularly for gas.
Risk metre (High): Signals point to renewed escalation, with the Israeli and US elections likely the main brake in the coming weeks. In Tehran, hardliners pushing to go on the offensive to break the US siege have yet to win the debate, and the security establishment still favours harsher retaliation over an pre-emptive campaign.
Rodrรญguez meets Trump on the sidelines of UNGA
What happened: At the UN General Assembly in New York, Venezuela's acting president, Delcy Rodrรญguez, delivered her first address since taking power. She promised that elections would take place at the "right moment", without specifying when that would be. After her speech, Rodrรญguez held several high-profile meetings, the most prominent of which was with President Trump, who praised her leadership of the country following the capture of Maduro in January. With all eyes on New York, opposition leader Marรญa Corina Machado tried to return to Venezuela, having left the country late last year. Her plan, however, fell through when her plane was prevented from taking off from Panama following the intervention of an unspecified foreign government. Meanwhile, protests erupted in several states across Venezuela as regular power cuts continued to plague millions of people.
Why it matters: Rodrรญguez's appearance signals a further endorsement of her administration by Western and Latin American nations such as the US, Panama, Spain and the Netherlands. Economic and energy cooperation agreements with the US aim to boost oil production and revive Venezuela's strained economy. But for Venezuelan citizens, little has changed on the political front. There are no indications that Rodrรญguez's government will be any less authoritarian than Maduro's, as critics continue to be arrested and harassed.
What it means: Rodrรญguez is pursuing economic recovery for the country and global recognition for her presidency, yet deep structural and political problems persist. Without fixed dates for elections or reforms to protect civil society, political stability remains elusive. Venezuelans are growing impatient as promises of reform yield few results.
Risk metre (Medium): Diplomatic re-engagement and energy partnerships offer Rodrรญguez an economic lifeline, but the lack of an electoral timeline and continued repression leave political and social stability uncertain.
The front lines this past week
๐บ๐ฆ Ukraine: Russian drones and missiles targeted the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, on multiple occasions this past week, killing several people, including a 14-year-old boy. Ukraine, in turn, struck the Moscow oil refinery and later hit the Perm refinery in the Urals, forcing both facilities to halt operations.
๐ธ๐ฉ Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) captured the town of Sodari in North Kordofan on Friday, pushing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) out of one of the last urban centres it controlled in the state. In the preceding days, the SAF downed several large RSF drones that were targeting army positions and civilian infrastructure across the region. The drones were said to be Emirati-supplied CH-95 UCAV models.
๐ฒ๐ฑ Mali: An attack by the jihadist group JNIM on an army camp in Dioura, in the Mopti region, reportedly killed 150 soldiers and led to the capture of 93 others. Video footage released by the jihadists showed dozens of Malian soldiers in their custody and hundreds of weapons seized in the attack.
๐ฒ๐ฒ Myanmar: Junta forces reportedly suffered heavy casualties in Karen State, where a column of troops trying to reach the town of Hpapun met heavy resistance, leaving 150 soldiers dead. The state is dominated by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), one of the country's main armed groups fighting the junta.
๐พ๐ช Yemen: Following their capture of the Red Sea coastline, Houthi rebels have tried to tighten their siege on the city of Taiz. Government forces and tribal militiamen claimed to have repelled several Houthi attempts to cut off the main road, but heavy fighting continues.
Is Iraq becoming a Houthi front against Saudi Arabia?
Saudi Arabia's efforts to bypass the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz through its cross-country East-West Pipeline are facing a growing threat : the Houthiโs presence in Iraq, which is transitioning from political posturing to active operational coordination. By pairing strikes from Iraqi soil with rapid Houthi advances along Yemenโs Red Sea coast, Iran-aligned networks are exerting pressure on both sides of the Arabian Peninsula simultaneously.
Rumours of Ukrainian military personnel in western Libya were once easy to dismiss, but GPD sources have now confirmed their presence, with Ukrainian trainers and technicians supporting GNU-aligned forces in drone warfare. As investigations allege that Libya is being used to target Russia's shadow fleet, Ukrainian expertise is contributing to a drone race among Tripoli's armed groups and raising questions over a possible confrontation with Russian forces in the LNA-controlled east.
Algeria's small government reshuffle reveals bigger calculations
After record-low turnout in Algeria's legislative elections, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune opted for a limited government reshuffle rather than a full overhaul. Yet the handful of changes, concentrated in finance, industry and interior, suggest a president tightening his grip on key economic files while seeking to rein in increasingly influential ministers ahead of the 2029 presidential election.
Benghazi's Julyana Free Zone Port, owned by a Haftar-family development agency, has seen shipping traffic surge since its 2021 redevelopment and is drawing projects ranging from a planned sugar plant to a direct COSCO line from China. Tied to a wider build-out in steel, cement and food processing, the port is central to eastern Libya's bid to turn Benghazi from an import gateway into an export platform with growing regional weight.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐ท๐ธ Serbia getโs ready for decisive elections โธ ๐ฑ๐พ The east delivers, the west wavers โธ ๐จ๐ฆ๐ช๐บ Canada first to be offered associate membership to EU
Weโre entering the astronomical fall this next week and the newsflow has been as busy as ever.
In Serbia major political coalitions have presented the candidate lists for the early parliamentary elections, kickstarting the electoral campaigns for Octoberโs vote.
In Libya the House of Representatives has approved the agreement of the 4+4 negotiation teams.
In Europe, Canada became the first country to be offered a newly conceived โAssociate Membershipโ of the European Union.
Now,
Lets get into it
Serbia gets ready for decisive elections
What happened: Following the official dissolution of the Serbian parliament, political parties have rapidly mobilized. The ruling populist bloc (SNS) rallied around the "Aleksandar Vuฤiฤ โ United Serbia" ballot list, anchoring its campaign around president Vuฤiฤ as its candidate for Prime Minister. In a parallel move, university students, opposition figures and anti-corruption activists formally submitted the "Student List โ Students Win" candidate list to the electoral commission, accompanied by a public march through Belgrade. According to the polls the Student List has the best shot at challenging the SNS-led United Serbia coalition.
Why it matters: The rush to present electoral lists by both government and opposition forces demonstrates a dramatic shift from street mobilization to electoral competition. For over a year, anti-corruption protests were organised outside of traditional party structures; the formal submission of the student-backed list converts this widespread civic anger into a unified electoral campaign. Concurrently, the ruling party's unified list demonstrates Vuฤiฤโs strategy to consolidate his core base, counter the opposition's momentum, and secure a smooth transition from the presidency to the premiership.
What it means: Campaign dynamics will depend heavily on list structures and voter registration. The entrance of a distinct student list alongside traditional opposition parties presents voters with a clear choice between civil movement outsiders and established political figures. However, electoral watchdogs, including an international mission deployed by the OSCE warn that the ruling party has an unfair advantage as it plans to benefit from state resources, heavy media influence, and a compressed campaign period, making candidate visibility a central aspect of the campaign.
Risk metre (medium): Although all parties seem to have entered the race with a fair share of optimism, concerns about the fairness of the election process are well-founded. Previous parliamentary elections in 2023 were marred by allegations of fraud, sparking weeks of unrest. Should results be disputed once again we can expect the student protesters to return to the streets in full force.
The east delivers, the west wavers
What happened: Libyaโs political process moved forward as the House of Representatives (HoR) approved the 4+4 Agreement, following days of confusion in which both legislative chambers appeared poised to do what they do best: obstruct. As we explain in โWhatโs behind Salehโs 4+4 U-turn,โ Agila Salehโs attempt to revive the rival 6+6 negotiations ended abruptly after Saddam Haftar reportedly intervened. Saleh then rushed through approval with around 30 MPs present, despite objections over procedure and quorum. The UN Secretary-Generalโs welcome for the decision signalled international determination to press ahead, leaving the still-resistant High Council of State (HCS) increasingly isolated.
Why it matters: Saddamโs intervention demonstrated his growing status as parliamentโs kingmaker, capable of bringing both Saleh and competing parliamentary currents into line when their maneuvering threatens the LNAโs commitments. The message was clear: eastern political rivalries would not be allowed to derail the agreement. The contrast with western Libya is increasingly stark. The Government of National Unity (GNU) has failed to bring HCS leader Mohammed Takala on board, while competition between Ibrahim Dabaiba and Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba and his son Mohamed is deepening fractures within the ruling family. As the LNA demonstrates its authority, the GNU risks unravelling before it can deliver its side of the bargain.
What it means: Successive hurdles are being overcome, bringing a broader political settlement and potentially a unified government closer. But Tripoli remains uneasy. Alongside the Dabaibasโ internal competition, Zawiya remains a flashpoint, with protesters partially shutting an oil pipeline this week, while armed mobilisation from Misrata adds to western tensions. Further meetings are expected next week under Massad Boulosโs auspices. As negotiations advance, actors fearing exclusion will have stronger incentives to obstruct or manufacture crises to secure their interests. Takalaโs resistance could therefore accelerate efforts to bypass the HCS rather than win it greater influence.
Risk metre (medium-high): The risk of further chaos in western Libya remains medium, even as the national political process advances. Progress depends on Washington sustaining momentum and the Dabaibas containing their internal contest sufficiently to honour their commitments. Eastern cohesion has helped clear one obstacle, but western fragmentation could still undermine implementation. Western Libya is increasingly in a race between a political agreement that produces a unified government and another crisis that overtakes the negotiations.
First to be offered associate membership to the EU
What happened: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU would explore making Canada the EU's first "Associate Member". This came after Canadian and European leaders discussed the possibility of strengthening relations between Ottawa and the European bloc in the face of worsening Canadian-US relations.
Why it matters: Canada's shift away from the North American continent towards Europe would have been unthinkable a few years ago and demonstrates how far relations have worsened with the United States since President Trump began his second term. Threats from the President to annex Canada, combined with real economic damage from US tariffs, have forced Canada to seriously consider expanding its partnership with what Prime Minister Mark Carney would call other "middle powers".
What it means: There is no clear idea of what being an "Associate Member" would actually mean, as it is not a defined term and no other country has gone through such a process. The EU would have to establish its own systems first, which would likely require intra-bloc negotiations and consensus, meaning any such agreement with Canada would take time. The most realistic agreements would likely involve the removal of visa requirements between the two, as well as easing barriers surrounding international trade. Already, Canada and the EU have agreed to allow Ottawa to join a programme that will ease access to European defence procurement.
Risk metre (medium): Trump has already lashed out at the apparent plan, calling it "laughable" and threatening more sanctions on Canada. Ultimately, any integration between the EU and Canada would take time, even if both sides work on an accelerated timeline, and Trump might forget about it. Even if Trump implements more sanctions, it's unlikely to change much, as both Canada and the EU have already begun to look for ways to decrease their reliance on the US.
๐บ๐ฆ Ukraine: The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps announced a limited offensive around Lyman, in the north of the Donetsk oblast. Dubbed Operation Vivaldi, the offensive reported some small advances, including the capture of the villages of Serednie, Novoselivka, Yarova and Oleksandrivka.
๐ฎ๐ท Iran: Iranian forces continue targeting commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, stranding and striking foreign bulk carriers including a Togo-flagged vessel, trying to make the passage through the Strait. Iranโs Security Chief meanwhile, rejected any talks with the US, following remarks by President Trump he was willing to work out a deal.
๐ธ๐ฉ Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their allied Joint Forces launched an offensive in the North Kordofan region, moving towards the RSF-held town of Sodari. The military reported the capture of at least 11 localities including the villages of Kagmar, Sharshar, Al-Kurayniyah, Al-Qaa, Ghabat Al-Laqad, Al-Kukaiti
๐ฒ๐ฒ Myanmar: A junta offensive in Rakhine State called Operation 4926 has grinded to a halt under heavy resistance by the resistance Arakan Army. Junta troops have suffered heavy casualties outside of their enclaves in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, with resistance sources reporting many of the casualties on the militaryโs side being poorly equipped and inexperienced recruits.
๐พ๐ช Yemen: Houthi rebels reported the downing of the Saudi F-15 jet over the Marib Governorate a fighting continued to rage across the country. Saudi strikes targeted several positions in the Taiz governorate while Houthi missiles and drones were fired at military targets in Saudi Arabia, including King Khalid Air Base.
Whatโs behind the Algeria-UAE rupture?
Relations between Algeria and the United Arab Emirates have officially reached a breaking point following Algiers' decision to sever diplomatic ties and restrict its airspace to Emirati carriers. What was once a lucrative economic partnership anchored in strategic infrastructure and military cooperation has completely dissolved under the weight of conflicting regional ambitions in North Africa and the Sahel.
Russia's rebels in Ukraine are starting to cause problems
A shootout between Ukraineโs SBU and HUR intelligence agencies on the streets of Kyiv has exposed the high-stakes gamble behind Kyivโs Russian volunteer units. While groups like the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) and Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL) offer valuable propaganda value, they also present a dangerous dilemma. Are they an asset, or a security risk?
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐พ๐ช War returns to Yemen โธ ๐ฎ๐ท Oman negotiations to the rescue โธ ๐ฑ๐พ Ukrainian actions in Libya โธ ๐บ๐ธ Trumps hold โmid-term conventionโ
The frozen war in Yemen has thawed... quickly. Houthi forces have charged down the coast, routing the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and raising major questions about Riyadhโs ability to contain the situation.
In the Persian Gulf, Oman is preparing to host talks over its tentative agreement with Iran regarding the Strait of Hormuz, as tensions in the region continue to flare up.
An international report highlighting Ukrainian operations in Africa has made claims of Ukrainian soldiers working in Misrata.
Trump holds a โmidterm conventionโ to distract from his sagging numbers, as fears grow that his party could face major losses in upcoming elections.
Now,
Lets get into it
Would you like some Mocha?
What happened: After a month of static fighting, an Ansarullah (Houthi) offensive on Taiz governorate early this month culminated with the capture of the Red Sea port of Mocha, representing a southward territory grab by the Iran-aligned group that now controls several strategic locations like Perim island and can reinforce its siege of Taiz, a major north-south logistical node and home to roughly a million inhabitants. Continuing Saudi Arabia's double squeezing, an armed group likely belonging to the Iran-aligned Iraqi Islamic Resistance launched strikes on the Kingdom's East-West pipeline, through which around 5% of global oil flows.
Why it matters: This represents a major strategic blow to Riyadh and Washington, with oil prices spiking above $100 and Tehran demonstrating its option of greater global economic disruption. However, the overall narrative of newly-gained Ansarullah control over Bab al-Mandeb bolsters a pro-Saudi doomsday narrative to encourage U.S. airstrikes as well as Chinese pressure on Tehran and Sanaa, rather than reflecting a real threat, since the Yemeni militants have for now reassured markets they won't fully blockade the strategic waterway. Mocha's capture only makes Bab al-Mandeb disruption cheaper and easier for Ansarullah, which already showed capability to hit ships 1000km away last month. Yemen's war, reignited over an Iranian Mahan Air flight from and to Sanaa in July, has given Ansarullah the opportunity to show its superior tactics and cohesiveness against the Saudi-aligned Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which still reels from its dispute with the Emirati-aligned Southern Transitional Council (STC) last December and suffers from poor coordination between its various combating forces.
What it means: Saudi Arabia temporarily closed its East-West pipeline and finds itself strategically weakened, with neither the U.S. nor its newly-found Mecca Pact allies Turkey and Pakistan yet willing to get involved militarily. Ansarullah strikes on southern Saudi Arabia injured 73 civilians, bringing back pre-2023-deal trends of instability and fear in the country. For Ansarullah, which has both been directly encouraged by Iran to go on the offensive and helped by Iran's strikes on U.S. regional bases, the demands on Riyadh are set to increase, as is the desire to encroach on PLC territory further east and south.
Risk metre (medium): Ansarullah is unlikely to hold new ground long-term, but Saudi Arabia lacks the ground capacity to reverse the armed group's gains, and global appetite favours de-escalation over a prolonged Red Sea confrontation. Short of successful mediation, Yemen may be embroiled in deadly Ansarullah offensives and PLC counter-offensives, but the conflict is likely to remain domestic rather than a major chokehold on the global economy.
Oman comes to the diplomatic rescue
What happened: Rather than quietly strangling Iran's economy, Washington struck several Iranian tankers this week, prompting Tehran to retaliate against U.S. Navy vessels, Gulf maritime traffic and U.S. bases in Jordan, underlining its newfound preference for disproportionate rather than measured responses. The clashes, compounded by Ansarullah's advance on Mocha, have sharpened diplomatic urgency in the region. Oman is due to host Iranian, Iraqi and GCC officials on Monday, with Bahrain the sole notable absence, to discuss the bilateral Strait of Hormuz arrangement between Tehran and Muscat and broader regional de-escalation.
Why it matters: The bilateral deal has long been drafted but has faced U.S. opposition. Fresh Gulf momentum to see it signed and registered with the International Maritime Organisation next week would mark a meaningful step toward reviving the June interim deal between Tehran and Washington, should the latter accept regional diplomatic progress and halt its strikes and blockade on Iran. Further escalation remains possible, though, after the IAEA Board of Governors voted against Iran. Even rejected by China and Russia, that vote could give the U.S. grounds to justify strikes on Pickaxe Mountain, where Iran is believed to store many of its advanced centrifuges. Washington is also expected to sanction more financial institutions dealing with Iran, possibly including another large Iraqi bank.
What it means: The broader trend of squeezed Iranian oil flows is now offset by a reversal favouring Tehran, a reminder that this drawn-out conflict will keep swinging both ways even as Iran gradually pushes Washington toward a deal. GCC involvement in Hormuz and PLC-Ansarullah backchannels could lay the groundwork for a region-wide ceasefire. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's continued pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi's looming deadline to disarm Islamic Resistance groups both point to further regional instability, as each leader ties his political credibility to appearing tough.
Risk metre (medium-high): Heightened regional risk is, as usual, reviving de-escalation efforts, and both Tehran and Sanaa appear open to it. But many in both capitals also see de-escalating now as premature, given the leverage they currently hold. In Israel, in spite of the Lebanon ceasefire, the calculation leans toward further weakening Hezbollah and possibly provoking Tehran into a direct attack, letting Likud cast itself ahead of October elections as defender of the nation and destroying Iranian energy infrastructure to accelerate U.S. economic pressure.
Ukraineโs Libya launchpad
What happened: CNN reported that Ukrainian naval drone operators have been using the international military base in Misrata as a launchpad for attacks on Russiaโs shadow fleet, in exchange for training local forces. The revelation is not entirely new. Years ago, Libya Desk Consultingโs Weekly Political Risk Report identified Ukrainian trainers entering Tripoli and subsequently tracked their presence across bases in Misrata and the capital. Russia has also previously accused Ukraine of operating from western Libya. The GNU has moved quickly to reject CNNโs latest reporting and deny that Libyan territory is being used to launch attacks against Russian interests.
Why it matters: The report adds an international dimension to an already deteriorating security environment in western Libya. On 3 March, a Russian LNG tanker was attacked in the Mediterranean, raising the prospect that the Russia-Ukraine conflict could spill into Mediterranean shipping lanes and create the risk of a major environmental incident. Inside Libya itself, drone attacks have become increasingly common, striking refineries, power stations and other critical infrastructure. Rivals of the GNUโs Deputy Defence Minister, who oversees the Ukrainian presence, have accused him of involvement in some of these attacks. Whether those accusations are substantiated or not, the growing use of drones is creating another layer of insecurity around infrastructure already struggling to function.
What it means: For the GNU, the most immediate danger is not necessarily Moscowโs response, but the domestic political fallout. Western Libyans are already enduring prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages, deteriorating public services and attacks on critical infrastructure. Evidence that Ukrainian personnel are operating from western Libya risks reinforcing the perception that GNU-aligned actors are allowing Libyan territory to become entangled in a foreign war while the state struggles to provide basic services. The GNUโs rapid denial reflects how politically sensitive the allegation is. Russia, meanwhile, now has another reason to increase pressure over the Ukrainian presence in western Libya, adding another fault line to an already crowded proxy environment.
Risk metre (medium): A direct Russia-Ukraine confrontation on Libyan soil remains unlikely, and Moscow has little incentive to turn Libya into another front. The greater risk is the cumulative pressure building on the GNU at home. The government is still dealing with persistent power outages, an economy in freefall and growing anger over deteriorating living conditions. It has also only just emerged from the scandal of Syrian mercenaries protesting openly in broad daylight, triggering public outrage over their continued presence. Now come allegations that western Libya is being used as a Ukrainian launchpad against Russian interests. The list of grievances against the GNU keeps piling up, and with each new controversy, the risk of renewed protests developing into a more serious challenge to the government grows higher.
Trumpโs mid-term distraction party
What happened: The Republican Party held what it called a โMidterm Conventionโ, intended to rally support ahead of the November midterm elections. Party conventions are common in the U.S., but they are normally held during presidential election years, when parties nominate their candidates and write their new policy platforms. This two-day midterm convention was not intended to do either, but was instead largely focused on celebrating President Trump.
Why it matters: The convention was a glitzy affair, with multiple guest speakers and Trump speaking on both nights. The event allowed President Trump, whose approval rating is currently below 40%, to try to redirect media attention away from his partyโs struggles. He notably said he would give every U.S. adult $5,000 if Republicans won the upcoming midterms, something that is highly unlikely to happen, but which almost all major media outlets covered anyway.
What it means: The convention means very little for Republicansโ chances of winning upcoming elections, but it demonstrates how closely attached the party has become to the President. The convention was mainly intended to praise Trump, showering him with support and allowing him to hold large rallies. However, due to Trumpโs unpopularity, the event is unlikely to do much to change the minds of independent voters, and it shows how the party has been unable to separate itself from him. The only real way for Republicans to turn things around is to distance themselves from the President, but Trump has gained such a strong hold on the party that it simply cannot move away.
Libyaโs oil expansion versus reality
The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) is continuing to make real strides in increasing production through greater foreign investment and rehabilitation projects. The NOC is ultimately doing what it can, but despite its efforts, the real issue continues to be Libyaโs political divide. The NOC has full control over its efforts to increase production capacity, but has little control over the countryโs political and security situation.
After years of tension over military coups and the Sahel war, Algiers and Niamey are once again looking to strengthen their ties. Nigerโs alliance with Mali meant that the country had to keep Algeria at armโs length due to tensions between Bamako and Algiers, but the recent deployment of Algerian military assets in Niger following a failed coup shows that the relationship is once again returning to a baseline. However, while relations are improving, any issue or political crisis could force both countries back to square one.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
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What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐ฎ๐ท U.S. assures it has Iran war under control โธ ๐ธ๐พ Syriaโs Kurds sign integration deal โธ ๐ณ๐ช Niger coup reveals countryโs fragile state
Syria saw a major agreement this week between the new transitional government and the Kurdish separatists in the north-east, as the country continues to try to navigate its complicated post-Arab Spring future.
In the Gulf, the United States continues to argue that it is both winning the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. However, the Iranians are increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in negotiations and could soon return to fighting.
In Niger, disgruntled army officers and special forces attempted to overthrow the government, as the junta governments fails to contain the ever-expanding Sahel war.
Now,
Lets get into it
No war, no worry?
What happened: After a month-long lull, the U.S. and Iran resumed clashes on August 30, when the U.S. struck what it said was an Iranian attempt to launch mine-carrying missiles to further disrupt Gulf shipping, killing three and prompting Iranian retaliation on U.S. assets in Jordan and the UAE. On September 1, the U.S. carried out its most extensive attack in weeks, targeting southern and western Iran and killing at least 13 military personnel along with five civilians attending a wedding, two killed on site and three who later died of their wounds. Tehran responded by widening its retaliation to hit Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq's KRG.
Why it matters: U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance has denied that what is unfolding constitutes a war, reinforcing Washington's narrative that it can quietly strangle Tehran economically while limiting itself to intermittent strikes aimed at denying Iran the ability to disrupt Gulf shipping. That narrative, paired with U.S. claims of helping move close to 18 million barrels a day out of the Gulf, is meant to reassure markets that this is a war which, despite dragging on, remains under control. Compared to April's Operation Freedom, Washington has strengthened its propaganda position, convincing economic actors that it has finally found a way to checkmate Tehran and no longer needs to urgently pursue a negotiated settlement. Iran-Oman talks over the Strait of Hormuz have stalled in parallel, as the U.S. leans instead on its own containment strategy.
What it means: The dominant narrative is that Tehran is buckling under economic pressure, an impression reinforced by conciliatory statements from Iran's executive branch in favour of diplomacy. But American and Iranian conceptions of time diverge sharply, and a reversal of fortunes in Tehran's favour looks more likely than a last-minute U.S. victory.
Risk metre (medium-high): Tehran has reportedly given Washington until mid-September to shift its stance or face an unprecedented Iranian offensive, a departure from its traditionally defensive doctrine. This escalation isn't set in stone. Domestic pressure to break the dominant U.S. narrative is mounting, but Iranian military officials are not known for abrupt doctrinal shifts and are more likely to wait and see how this cycle of low-intensity clashes and Gulf shipping disruption โ with an added layer of attacks at sea โ plays out in global markets. China, for its part, has signaled that while it won't align with U.S. secondary sanctions, it doesn't want Tehran to take the initiative on escalation, a preference Iran isn't bound by but may still feel pressure to accommodate.
Syriaโs Kurds sign integration deal
What happened: This past week, Syrian-Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi announced the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) during a press conference in Damascus. The announcement came as the majority of SDF forces have entered a process of integration with the military forces of the transitional government of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Mazloum Abdi himself has accepted a position as presidential advisor of al-Sharaa on Kurdish matters. In the subsequent days Syrian government forces entered several key areas of the northeast, including the city of Hasakah, to take over security tasks from the defunct troops of the SDF.
Why it matters: The dissolution marks the formal end of Rojavaโs decade-long military autonomy in northeastern Syria. Key factors driving the move include shifting U.S. diplomatic priorities toward Damascus, intense pressure and threats of military action from Turkey, and a centralizing push by Syria's post-Assad transitional authorities. The step significantly reduces the risk of a full-scale civil war between the central government and Kurdish forces, as the SDF formed the main alternative source of power opposite to Damascus.
What it means: The struggle for recognition and equal rights of the Syrian Kurds now transitions from the battlefield to the political arena. While Kurdish fighters gain official military standing and civilians secure citizenship and language rights, local self-governance has made way for central state authority. The integrationโs long-term success hinges on whether Damascus will be willing or able to grant genuine constitutional protections and cultural rights to minority populations or reinstates authoritarian central rule.
Coup reveals countryโs fragile state
What happened: Young Nigerian officers and Special Forces soldiers likely attempted to stage a coup against the junta government of General Abdourahamane Tiani. Mutineering soldiers took control of Airbase 101 and launched attacks on the Presidential Palace and the National Radio Station in the capital, Niamey. The Presidential Guard managed to push back the attacks on the Palace, while Russian Africa Corps soldiers recaptured the airbase, ending the coup.
Why it matters: The coup attempt demonstrates how the Nigerien governmentโs failure to contain the jihadist insurgency in the north is continuing to put pressure on its ability to maintain control away from the front lines. It also demonstrates the increasing success of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), whose battlefield successes are now damaging the stability of the central government itself.
What it means: The incident has revealed a key weakness in Tianiโs governmentโs ability to fight the war, as the coup was launched due to discontent within the armed forces over favouritism. Reports indicate that Tiani had been giving preferential treatment to the Presidential Guard, the unit he formerly led, while sending the Special Forces to do the brunt of the fighting in the north with little support. The incident also shows how Tiani will now need to rely on the Russians, not only because he needed them to regain control, but because the Special Forces will now likely be purged. He will have to rely on existing units and the Russians, who will likely request more in return from him.
Risk metre (low-medium): Tianiโs government will likely remain in place in the short term. While it faces major setbacks in the north, Niamey is not as encircled as other major cities such as Bamako. With the main internal opponents also gone, another immediate coup attempt is unlikely. However, the entire incident shows how his government is incapable of managing both the domestic front and the fight against JNIM, meaning Niger will continue to face battlefield setbacks and further instability at home.
What will the Democrats do with power?
U.S. President Donald Trump has increased the power of the presidency to push through his own reforms while trying to tilt institutions in his partyโs favour. However, Trump cannot be president forever, and a future Democratic president will need to figure out how they will use that expanded authority. The Democrats could try to use that power to restore democratic norms by pulling back Trumpโs initiatives, but doing so creates risks of its own.
U.S. and Algerian relations have had their ups and downs over the years, but have recently been stuck within the security architecture of the war on terror. There has been a concentrated effort over the years between Algeria and the U.S. to diversify their partnership beyond security, and an upcoming business forum in Algiers will provide an opportunity to cement a new relationship.
Buried heads as the Gulf fails to adapt to new reality.
The Gulf States have effectively tied themselves to America with the hope that warm ties would guarantee American protection. Yet the war in Iran has proven that the Gulf States can be pulled into disastrous American adventures. Many in the Gulf seem to think they can continue with the status quo, but if they want to avoid a crisis like this in the future, they need to look beyond Washington.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐น๐ณ Tunisia's power crisis โธ ๐ซ๐ท๐ธ๐ฆ France and Saudi entertainment diplomacy
The electrical crisis in Tunisia continues to worsen, as the government is forced to implement uncoordinated power cuts that are only driving further anger.
France and Saudi Arabiaโs leaders share their love of Dragon Ball Z as they dream of further entertainment cooperation.
On the website, we delve further into the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, and how both of them are becoming increasingly intertwined.
Now,
Lets get into it
Heatwaves, power cuts and water shortages push Tunisia towards a breaking point
What happened: A new heatwave struck Tunisia this week, with temperatures approaching 50ยฐC in parts of the country. As during previous heatwaves this summer, the electricity grid struggled to meet surging demand. This time, however, several crises converged: longer and more severe power cuts, widespread water disruptions and a shortage of bottled drinking water. With little government communication over when or where outages would occur, households across the country were left without electricity, running water or reliable access to drinking water.
Why it matters: The power cuts appear to have been poorly coordinated, affecting factories, farms, essential businesses, hospitals and even affluent tourist areas. Water-pumping stations and bottling facilities were also disrupted, compounding existing water shortages and reportedly forcing retailers to ration bottled water. Rather than managing pressure on the grid through planned and clearly communicated load-shedding, the authorities allowed failures in one system to cascade into others. The result was a perfect storm exposing Tunisiaโs lack of contingency planning and the deterioration of its basic services.
What it means: As in neighbouring Libya, years of underinvestment and mismanagement are pushing public services towards increasingly frequent and interconnected failures. Yet President Kais Saied retains an important political advantage: although his government is deeply unpopular, many Tunisians remain even more hostile towards the political class that preceded him, which they associate with corruption, economic decline and the monopolisation of wealth. When former President Moncef Marzouki attempted from Paris to capitalise on protests over power cuts last month, his intervention arguably helped the authorities portray the unrest as an attempt by discredited former elites to return to power.
Risk metre: This political shield is weakening as living conditions deteriorate. Opposition figures may still lack the credibility needed to mobilise a broad movement, but Tunisiaโs deepening service failures could eventually make that irrelevant. If electricity and water disruptions persist, particularly without clear communication or visible remedial action, demonstrations could become less politically organised, more spontaneous and considerably harder to contain. Tunisia may not be on the verge of nationwide unrest today, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to see how some form of civil eruption can be avoided if the country remains on its current trajectory.
Saudi Crown Prince mixes personal passion and strategic thinking in Paris
What happened: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, an avid gamer, attended the Esports World Cup closing ceremony in Paris on August 23, hosted by President Macron. The tournament, run by a Saudi-funded nonprofit under the Public Investment Fund (PIF), relocated from Riyadh this year amid regional insecurity following the Iran war. The next day, Macron and MBS signed a memorandum of understanding for a โฌ6bn ($7bn) investment in three theme parks forming one complex in Cergy-Pontoise, led by Qiddiya, the PIF's entertainment arm, with one park expected to be Dragon Ball themed, a shared passion between Macron and MBS discovered during a December 2024 meeting in Riyadh.
Why it matters: The parks would rise on the site of Mirapolis, France's first American-style theme park, which shut in 1991 after just four years and has sat derelict for 35 years. Macron pitched the project as creating 22,000 direct jobs, calling it "unseen since Disneyland Paris." France is widely cited as Europe's largest manga market, and PIF's wider portfolio includes a stake in the company owning Toei Animation, the Japanese studio behind Dragon Ball and One Piece. The deal reads as a legacy play for Macron, banking a tangible "Choose France" win as his final term ends early next year.
What it means: Saudi entertainment investment has so far skewed heavily towards the U.S., including a $55bn EA buyout and PIF has named the U.S. as its largest investment partner outside Saudi Arabia. But paired with the Mecca pact signed with Turkey and Pakistan earlier this month, this French push reads as part of a deliberate effort to show Riyadh can diversify its partnerships, on both security and economic fronts, rather than betting everything on Washington. The entertainment push more broadly fits Vision 2030's drive to diversify the economy beyond oil, while also serving as a soft-power play to recast Saudi Arabia's image away from that of a conservative kingdom.
Risk metre: The deal faces steep execution risk as it remains a non-binding memorandum, with financing, ownership and construction timelines still unset while Riyadh's reputation remains rocky among parts of French civil society. Qiddiya's own Dragon Ball park in Riyadh, under development since 2024, has yet to open either.
Further analysis:
To learn more about Saudi Arabiaโs growing role in U.S. entertainment, read this article from The Geopolitical Deskโs article.
Sudan and Ethiopia have been dealing with their own crises and armed conflicts for the past couple of years, but as these conflicts continue to devolve, they are increasingly becoming cross-border issues as the existing rivalry between the two countries worsens.
Iraqโs Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is attempting to rein in the few armed groups that maintain independence from Baghdad. Al-Zaidi continues to find himself in a difficult position between the United States and Iran, while trying to strengthen his government and balance the countryโs international partnerships.
A free preview of one of our articles available only to Libya Desk Energy Insight Subscribers. Originally published in the July 2026 issue, this article detailed the increasing energy crisis in the country and the occupation of one of western Libyaโs largest energy facilities by protesters.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
Shortly after announcing he would try to revive the defunct 6+6 talks instead of ratifying the 4+4 agreement, he made a surprise u-turn in a few days, prompting many to question what happened.
The Libyan National Oil Corporation has continued to increase international partnerships and rehabilitation projects, but this push comes as security and stability issues remain unresolved.
Algeria is North Africaโs largest country by landmass and a pivotal gas supplier to Europe. Since 2019, the state has prioritized stability, energy revenues and strategic autonomy.
After record-low turnout, pressure for change was high. Tebboune opted for limited changes, but they bring Algeria's economic files closer to the presidency while curbing influential ministers.
The long standing relations between Algiers and Abu Dhabi established by the Bouteflika government have now officially collapsed, as both capitals move in two different geopolitical directions.
Algiers and Niamey's previous relationship had been upended by the wave of Sahel coups in the early 2020s, but recent events in the region have allowed for an opening.
Algeria's second parliamentary elections since the 2019 Hirak protest movement produced a legislature that looks different on its surface but changes little beneath it. A new assembly with its first female speaker sits atop a system built well before polling day to deliver a predetermined outcome.
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