Saddam Haftar heads to Munich as LNA’s diplomatic profile rises

This was an unusual week. The Epstein saga has crossed the Atlantic and risks toppling a British prime minister; Bangladesh is going through its first post-Hasina election; Turkey has signalled an opening to Iran-U.S. nuclear talks; and in Las Vegas, a SuperBowl halftime show quietly reframed who gets to narrate American identity.

Individually, these stories look unrelated.

Taken together, they paint a picture of how political systems everywhere are being stress-tested by reputational risk, geopolitical shocks, structural economics, demographic change and strategic recalibration.

This week’s analysis looks at what happened and, more importantly, what it all means.

Let’s get into it.

Keir Starmer’s tightening political circle

What happened: Keir Starmer has entered one of the most politically delicate phases of his premiership. Pressure is mounting internally and externally, and renewed scrutiny around the Epstein files — particularly alleged links and historic proximity through figures such as Peter Mandelson — has amplified factional unease within Labour’s ecosystem.

Why it matters: The Epstein issue is not primarily about legal jeopardy. It is about perception, elite networks and reputational vulnerability at a moment when Labour’s mandate is on unsure footing. Starmer’s authority rests on competence and stability. Any narrative that suggests proximity to a nepharious cabal of global elite risks undermining that positioning, particularly as Reform and Conservative voices attempt to reframe Labour as indistinguishable from the old political establishment.

What this means: It is unclear whether Starmer will be able to whether this political storm. If ousted, he would be the third Prime Minister in the past seven years to be removed from office before the end of his mandate. This shows that British politics has become structurally volatile. Prime ministers now operate under permanent review. If economic performance stalls or factional pressure intensifies, what appears manageable today can quickly exacerbate.

Libya’s structural energy trap

What happened: Libya’s latest bid round has revived debate about production, reform and investment risk. But in today’s oil market, the real constraint is no longer geology or output. It is whether Libya’s governance and operating model can convert barrels into durable economic value. Our latest report provides a comparative analysis between Libya and Norway, and puts forward some potential solutions to fix Libya’s structural energy trap.

Why it matters: Libya’s problem is not simply production volatility. It is structural design. Oil revenue flows through institutions that lack unified political authority. Every additional barrel strengthens competing patronage networks rather than reinforcing national value. In this context, production increases do not resolve fragmentation; they intensify the incentives that sustain it.

What this means: Absent reform in revenue distribution mechanisms and fiscal governance, Libya’s energy growth will continue to entrench political fragmentation. More oil, without institutional redesign, means more problems.

More oil, more problems: how to fix Libya’s structural energy trap

Libya’s latest bid round has revived debate about production, reform and investment risk. But in today’s oil market, the real constraint is no longer geology or output. It is whether Libya’s governance and operating model can convert barrels into durable economic value.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Bangladesh votes in a landmark election

What happened: Bangladesh held a landmark election following months of political tension and mass mobilisation. Voters turned out in large numbers amid heightened security and a deeply polarised political environment. Our previous report assessed the risks and scenarios of this election in detail.

Why it matters: This election represents the first real stress test of Bangladesh’s post-crisis transition. The vote was not simply about party competition. It was about institutional legitimacy after months of unrest. Whether the outcome is broadly accepted will shape investment risk, governance continuity and regional political alignment.

What this means: The election is both feasible and fragile. The base case is an orderly transition, supported by interim safeguards and public appetite for reform. However, risks still remain and whether the country's opportunity can be fully unlocked will depend on what comes next.

Bangladesh’s fragile transition faces its first test

Bangladesh’s democratic transition remains fragile. The interim government struggles to deliver reforms and prepare the country’s first credible election in 16 years, with risks ranging from orderly democratic renewal to violent breakdown.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Turkey underscores flexibility on U.S.–Iran nuclear talks

The killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is not just another violent episode in a country long accustomed to them.

It is a stark signal that 15 years after the Gaddafi regime was toppled, the country remains structurally insecure, deeply penetrated by external interests and governed by political arrangements that put violence before dialogue.

This week’s reporting pieces together what his killing means for Libya, how Haftar’s foreign outreach and Western recalibration fit into the picture, and examines a wider international environment shaped by fear rather than grand strategy.

Now let's get into it.

🇱🇾 Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s killing and what it reveals about Libya today

What happened: The killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the former heir apparent of Libya’s late leader Muammar Gaddafi, marks a highly symbolic and potentially destabilising moment for the country. His assassination has sent a shockwave through Libyan politics that is likely to reverberate across the country’s fragile social fabric and already strained institutional order.

This week’s coverage circles a familiar but increasingly unstable reality in West Asia: escalation without strategy and policies that are being vindicated for the wrong reasons.

As the world watches Washington’s taskforce throttle towards Iran without a clear objective, the Saudis have succeeded in blunting Emirati influence in south Yemen (for now), even as the quiet risk that Gulf competition may harden into bloc rivalry and spread across the region.

The common thread in all these developments is not necessarily strategic calls but potential miscalculations. Power is being exercised, but without a clear sense of the second and third-order effects.

Below, I break down what shifted this week, why it matters and where the risks are quietly stacking up.

Now let's get into it.

The many paths to confrontation between the US and Iran

What happened: US–Iran tensions are not accelerating in a straight line but branching into multiple, overlapping pressure tracks.

Washington continues to apply sanctions, rhetorical deterrence and selective military signalling, without committing to either escalation or de-escalation.

Tehran, meanwhile, is responding asymmetrically; avoiding outright confrontation while expanding leverage through proxies, regional positioning and calibrated nuclear ambiguity.

Why it matters: As we explored in this week's article, there is no single “path” to conflict. There are several, and they are increasingly disconnected from any clear political objective.

This ambiguity is often mistaken for strategy. It isn’t. The absence of a defined U.S. endgame has created space for misreading on all sides.

Iran interprets Washington’s posture as risk-averse but unpredictable. Regional actors hedge accordingly. Israel plans for unilateral action. Gulf states quietly prepare for containment, not resolution.

The result is a crowded escalation ladder where no actor controls the pace.

What this means: The danger is not a deliberate war but an accidental one, triggered by an incident that no party originally intended to escalate. In this environment, deterrence is less stable, not more. Washington’s current approach buys time, but it also multiplies the number of ways things can go wrong.

Read the full analysis below:

The multiple murky paths of U.S.-Iran tensions

An American flotilla is nearing Iran as the country recovers from a violent state crackdown on mass protests. The U.S. task force’s goals remain unclear, driving tensions in southwest Asia.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Yemen was Saudi Arabia’s red line

This week’s newsletter is built around a moment that stuck with me.

At Davos, Mark Carney described the collapse of a “pleasant fiction” — the idea that the rules-based international order still works as advertised, and that middle powers can remain safe by quietly going along with it.

If you received my last newsletter of 2025, you'll find the argument familiar.

That framing also resonates with two pieces we published this week:

1. One looks at Europe’s growing strategic irrelevance and its reluctance to name reality.
2. The other looks at Libya’s energy transition, where ambition keeps colliding with political fragmentation and external dependency.

Below is a breakdown of both pieces, although I encourage you to read the original articles to get the full picture.

🇪🇺 Can Europe still save itself from irrelevance?

What happened: Europe has struggled to respond coherently as power politics return. The performance of deference became a form of virtue signalling for European leaders, existing mainly to reinforce an imperfect but functional political status quo.

Why it matters: The rules-based order no longer constrains great powers, and middle powers that continue to perform belief in it risk strategic subordination. The previous arrangement worked for Europe until Trumpism entered the political ecosystem, and suddenly the assumptions that underlied the post-war system started failing.

What this means: Today, most of the threats that Europe has traditionally ascribed to China and Russia (economic coercion, weaponised interdependence, political pressure through trade, and threat to territorial integrity) are coming from the U.S., Europe's closest ally. Unless EU leaders can articulate a clear-eyed response in a world of great powers, the bloc risks becoming a rule-taker in a system that no longer protects it. As Carney put it, sovereignty today is less about rhetoric and more about the ability to withstand pressure.

Can Europe still save itself from irrelevance?

Faced with the reality that the system that once benefited Europe is now failing it, the EU must decide how it will define itself in the modern world.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

🇱🇾 Libya’s stumbling energy transition

Let's be honest: too much is going on in the world. And is it just me, or did this week go Monday–Tue-Wed-Thu–Friday?

Here's a quick breakdown of GPD's coverage this week:

• We covered Iran from multiple angles: from the missing pieces of the puzzle in Iran's protests, to the new Iran coming online before it even takes shape, to Tehran’s subsidy reform amid unrest, and even the way Baluch militancy is being nationalised rhetorically.
• We tracked the aftershocks of Venezuela’s political rupture and examined why Maduro’s fall is not Tehran’s nightmare.
• In Libya, we looked at a potentially imminent leadership vacuum and a regional contest hiding in plain sight
• In Syria, we went hyperlocal to examine how the shifting balance of power in Aleppo is creating a growing and problematic anomaly.

Synthesising all of that into a single, clean narrative isn’t easy — partly because these stories aren’t neat, and partly because the world has entered uncharted territory.

But one thing is certain, 2026 is going to be an interesting year.

Now let's get into it.

Iran’s protests and why they are harder to read this time

Iran’s latest wave of unrest has been widely reported, but poorly understood.

What we are seeing is not a classic protest cycle driven by a single grievance or unified opposition movement. Instead, it is a convergence of unresolved pressures: economic exhaustion, generational change, digital mobilisation and elite paralysis.

That is why the recurring question of – Is this the beginning of the end? – misses the point almost entirely.

Iran’s Protests and the Missing Pieces of the Puzzle

The recent protests in Iran have been some of the largest in years, yet gaps in their strategy will prevent them from breaking the regime.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

While there is no shortage of reasons to believe the Islamic Republic is structurally brittle, inevitability does not mean imminence.

As long as elite fractures do not translate into moderates persuading the military and security establishment to step aside, and as long as there is no credible opposition with a coherent and reassuring vision, the system can endure or collapse in ways that produce state failure rather than transition.

Our reporting this week unpacks why current protests are less likely to lead to regime change and why this latest cycle of unrest may prove more destabilising precisely because it lacks a single centre of gravity.

We also explain why parallel developments, such as subsidy reform during protests and the emergence of a digitally networked, post-ideological “new Iran”, matter less in isolation than in combination.

Iran’s gamble of subsidy reform during protests

Iran is attempting to reform its subsidy regime in the middle of its most combustible protest cycle in years.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

The new Iran is online before it even takes shape

Protests and public anger are meeting the realities and challenges of the new AI age

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Libya's prime minister is sick at a fragile moment

Abdulhamid Dabaiba has now been Libya’s prime minister for several years, presiding over one of the most demanding political roles in the country’s post-2011 period.

What has often gone underappreciated is not only how long he has survived in office, but the personal and physical toll that survival has required.

In recent months, that strain appears to have intensified. He has reportedly been hospitalized twice due to heart related issues, prompting quiet concern within political and security circles in Tripoli and Misurata.

Libya’s prime minister is sick at a fragile moment

With the possibility that Dabaiba may need treatment abroad, Libya’s Government of National Unity could be forced to run on autopilot at a critical time.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Venezuela after Maduro

Delcy Rodríguez succeeds Maduro-era Chavismo, which further prioritised loyalty over competence as the primary path to power. Lacking Chávez’s charisma, Maduro ruled through patronage, distributing offices and oil wealth to loyalists.

Rodríguez now stands between a belligerent Trump administration and a rent-seeking domestic elite. Washington wants oil access; the Chavistas want to preserve wealth and power. Both sides ultimately pursue conflicting demands.

The testing of Delcy Rodríguez

The Trump administration and the Chavistas appear to have reached the same conclusion: Delcy Rodríguez will be their woman in Caracas. The question is whether she can balance both sides.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Rodríguez must also manage multiple internal factions, while balancing external ties with Cuba, Iran, Russia, and China – even as Washington pressures her to sever them, moves that could leave her exposed if U.S. policy shifts again.

Why Maduro’s fall is not Tehran’s nightmare

Hailed by some Americans as a blow to Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”, the fall of Maduro in Venezuela is mostly a minor inconvenience for Tehran.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

A regional contest hiding in plain sight

At first glance, Egypt’s posture toward Libya and Sudan can look reactive: border security here, mediation there, cautious diplomacy everywhere.

In reality, something more deliberate is taking shape.

Cairo is quietly trying to reassert itself as a central stabilising — and gatekeeping — power across its western and southern flanks.

What links Libya and Sudan from Cairo’s perspective is risk:

• uncontrolled borders,
• conflict spillover,
• refugee flows,
• and the danger of rival regional actors shaping outcomes Egypt cannot live with.

At the same time, the UAE has been steadily working to build its own regional network of allied forces and local partners across key theatres such as Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan.

This ambition has increasingly brought Abu Dhabi into competition with Egypt, whose strategic equities are directly exposed.

Egypt, Libya and Sudan: What Is Really Being Played Out

Growing geopolitical competition between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates is taking shape in the Sahel, with the LNA poised to benefit due to its increasing presence in the region.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

A brief aside: our reporting on Egypt–UAE competition across Libya and Sudan was cited this week by Semafor and flagged as one of their Weekend Reads.

That's it for this week.

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Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

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