Thirst for restraint: Water and the limits to the Iran War

We are back after a short break. The past few weeks the Trump administration has argued that a deal with Iran is close, imminent even, yet the hope that the war might end continues to hit the hard reality of the situation.

An Iranian attack on Kuwait's international airport, continued fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, and now IRGC claims that it fired warning shots at U.S. ships show that any lasting peace deal is still a long way away.

The Geopolitical Desk has continued to track the Iran war in order to keep readers informed about the political and economic repercussions on Iran and the wider region, and how every major stakeholder is determining their next steps.

This week, we're also looking at how Australia is trying to expand its footprint in the Pacific Islands by increasing relations with the Solomon Islands and what the recent elections in Ethiopia mean for tensions in the north of the country.

Let's get into it.

Can the "ceasefire" between the U.S. and Iran lead to lasting peace?

What happened: The conflict in the Middle East has seen a series of dramatic developments in recent weeks. U.S. President Donald Trump has continued to say that negotiations between the U.S. and Iran are close to a breakthrough, despite the fact that they have yet to address the issues of control over the Strait of Hormuz and the state of Iran’s nuclear program, which are ultimately the only two issues that actually matter to this conflict.

Why it matters: Despite nominal ceasefires and talk of a lasting peace deal, Israel carried out an airstrike in southern Lebanon and, in the Gulf, Iran launched a strike against Kuwait’s main International Airport, killing one and injuring 63. The IRGC has also claimed it launched warning shots against U.S. ships, which the U.S. Navy has denied. In the U.S. there is growing anger over the war, where the U.S. House of Representatives passed a symbolic vote in the Republican-led Congress that would direct Trump to remove armed forces from the region, a move that has no real legal enforcement.

What this means: To help readers navigate the sprawling cast of actors shaping what comes next, GPD has published a stakeholder map examining the positions of more than 20 countries and the realistic paths forward from the current impasse. Understanding those paths also means understanding Iran from the inside.

Our recent reporting also examines the country's internal condition in the war's aftermath, including the political struggles playing out within the Iranian government, where the conflict has reshuffled power in ways that are not yet fully visible from the outside, and the deepening economic hardship facing ordinary Iranians, whose living conditions have deteriorated sharply as sanctions, strikes on infrastructure and currency collapse compound one another.

Read the full analysis:

After the ceasefire: An Iran War Stakeholder assessment

A special report for Intelligence subscribers that breaks down the positions and possible paths forward for over 20 countries trying to navigate around the U.S.-Israel-Iran war

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Intact but unreformed: Iran after the Ramadan War

The Islamic Republic survived this conflict in more or less the form it entered it. That is simultaneously its achievement and its structural trap.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Iran’s economy under fire

The war on Iran’s economy has been running for decades. U.S.-Israeli strikes on economic infrastructure in 2026 brought cascading effects on the country’s economy. The result will not be collapse, but it is something more dangerous for ordinary Iranians than the war itself.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Solomon Islands re-exmaines their security relationships

What happened: The new Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Matthew Wale, visited Australia and announced that the government would review its secret 2022 Defense agreement with China. Wale, in a press conference with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, said he could not immediately reveal the details of the document due to a non-disclosure clause.

Why it matters: The Solomon islands under its former leadership of Manasseh Sogavare and Jeremiah Manele had been drawing the country away from its traditional western partners like the U.S. and Australia toward China, with Sogavare signing an agreement with China in 2022 that many feared would allow China to build a naval base in the south Pacific. Wale, who is described as a “China Hawk”, and his signaling toward Australian likely means the country will once again move back toward western states.

What this means: Competition for influence between Australia and China in the Solomon Islands is likely to continue, with Wale proving that fortunes can turn quickly. The quick switch from years of Pro-China Prime Ministers to Pro-Western one, shows that the Islands could potentially turn back to China in the future. The Islands are ultimately put into a difficult position, as China looks to expand its influence in the region, and Australia seeks to maintain its position as the main security guarantor in the region.

Abiy looks to strengthen his position with election victory

What happened: Ethiopia held general elections, with current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party expected to win in a landslide. Counting is currently underway, as parts of the north had voting suspended due to the government fighting active insurgencies in the region.

Why it matters: Abiy has maintained strong control of Ethiopia's government since he took power in 2019, and pushed back major challenges to his rule, including a deadly civil war in the northern Tigray province that many human rights organisations warned amounted to genocide. If Abiy’s party wins the expected landslide it is likely to get, it would further reinforce his control of the country as he looks to try and push Ethiopia's goal of getting access to the sea.

What this means: With a renewed parliamentary majority, Abiy would likely use it to push forward his claims of gaining direct control over a seaport. Entirely landlocked, the country relies on the port of Djibouti, and Abiy has long argued that Ethiopia needs direct access to guarantee its national security. This has meant Abiy has continued to antagonise Eritrea, a small isolated state that gained independence from the country in 1993, and with the extra backing from the elections, Abiy could launch an invasion of the country. This however, could immediately see the return of civil war in Tigray, which would drag the north back into full scale war.

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

This week, GPD published two pieces of analysis that examine some of the structural changes that are unfolding across the world economy.

The first examines the Eastern Mediterranean's renewed role as a gas hotspot, one that is quietly reshaping the energy map of the Levant and creating new alignments between states that have historically been adversaries.

The second takes a hard look at what it means for the global economy when the United States, the architect of the post-war international order, is actively dismantling the rules it spent decades enforcing.

These are two expressions of a world in which the old architecture is losing its load-bearing capacity, and new arrangements — some promising, some dangerous — are filling the space.

Let's get into it.

The rise of Eastern Mediterranean gas

What happened: The reemergence of the Eastern Mediterranean as a significant gas province through the development of offshore fields, as well as the commercial and diplomatic architecture being built around them, provides a strong indicator about what the region's energy potential means for the states involved and for the broader European energy picture.

Why it matters: The Eastern Mediterranean gas story has been developing for over a decade, but it has consistently been overshadowed by the region's security dynamics and geopolitical competition. What our analysis shows is that the energy picture has matured to the point where it is itself becoming a driver of those dynamics — shaping alignments between Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in ways that would have seemed implausible a generation ago, and offering Europe an alternative supply architecture at precisely the moment when the Iran crisis has made diversification a strategic imperative rather than a preference.

What this means: As most energy sector operators, infrastructure investors and anyone tracking the geopolitics of European gas supply already know, the Eastern Mediterranean is no longer a periphery. The fields are real, the commercial frameworks are being built and the political incentives driving cooperation between historically complicated neighbours have rarely been stronger. The question is no longer whether this gas reaches European markets, but on what timeline, through which routes, and under what political conditions. Our analysis maps the answers.

Read the full analysis:

A new Levant: The rise of Eastern Mediterranean gas

The Eastern Med has been an interest for investment for years, but recent geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf are directing more eyes on the region.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

America against its own order

What happened: The United States' relationship with the international order it built after 1945 has been frought, against the backdrop of an American administration that is not merely disengaging from that order but actively working against its foundational principles. Our latest piece on the topic is not an argument about Trump's personality or rhetoric, but a structural analysis of what happens when the order's guarantor becomes its most consequential challenger.

Why it matters: The post-war network of institutions, treaties, norms and enforcement mechanisms centred on American power was always more fragile than it appeared. Its durability depended not just on U.S. military and economic primacy, but on American willingness to be constrained by the rules it had written. What the current moment reveals is that this willingness was always contingent. When the domestic political calculus changed, so did the commitment. The Iran war's conduct, the assault on multilateral institutions, the retreat from alliance obligations and the normalisation of unilateral action have not happened in a vacuum. They are the logical extension of a political movement that concluded the order was no longer serving American interests as defined by its current leadership.

What this means: The world does not yet have an alternative architecture capable of replacing what American-led order provided. The gap between the erosion of the old system and the construction of whatever comes next is the defining geopolitical risk of this decade. It creates space for revisionist powers, for regional actors to pursue interests they previously could not, and for the kind of institutional vacuum that history suggests is rarely filled cleanly. The analysis is essential reading for anyone trying to understand not just the current crisis, but the environment in which every subsequent crisis will unfold.

Read the full analysis:

From shining city to fortress: America against its own order

The United States under Donald Trump has severely damaged the very order it had created, but a retreat from global norms does not mean a retreat from global power.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

The Iran ceasefire came to the edge of collapse this week after the U.S. Navy attempted to escort container ships through the Strait of Hormuz and Iran fired warning shots. Trump quickly announced he was calling off the operation.

He also said, again, that a deal is close.

In Libya, the picture is one of slow political progress and escalating pressure.

Sources indicate that at least five Libyan individuals have been recommended to the UN Security Council for possible international sanctions, with member states currently reviewing the information.

According to the information we have received, some of the names that have been allegedly included on this list are individuals that are currently active in various sectors of Libya’s economy, including prominent players in the energy sector.

And in India, Narendra Modi's BJP won 205 out of 294 seats in a state assembly that has traditionally been opposition territory, a signal that last year's national setback has not slowed the party's structural consolidation at the regional level.

GPD also published an analysis this week examining the data on rising political violence in America and what it reveals about a society that is increasingly normalising violent confrontation as a mode of political expression.

Let's get into it.

The U.S.-Iran ceasefire nearly collapsed, but Trump says a deal is close

What happened: The U.S. Navy this week attempted to escort container ships through the Strait of Hormuz, which remains effectively closed since the ceasefire. Iranian forces fired warning shots at U.S. vessels. Trump announced he was calling off the escort operation. He subsequently stated that a deal with Iran is close.

Why it matters: Warning shots between U.S. and Iranian naval forces in the Strait represent exactly the kind of incident that ceasefire agreements are supposed to prevent. The fact that it happened and that Washington chose de-escalation by withdrawing the operation rather than holding its position says something important about the current balance of leverage. The Strait remains closed. The U.S. has not reopened it by force. And every week that passes without resolution, the economic and political cost of the stalemate compounds.

What this means: Trump's assertion that a deal is close has become a recurring feature of this conflict, repeated at intervals that do not appear to correspond to actual diplomatic progress. The warning shots episode suggests that the operational situation in the Strait is less stable than the ceasefire language implies, and that the gap between a managed pause and a durable settlement remains considerable. Watch the next round of reported talks carefully for any sign that the two sides are actually narrowing their positions rather than managing the appearance of doing so.

Background reading from the archive:

Iran war: scenarios, conflict pathways and market implications

This report provides scenario mapping of the ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran war, analysing potential regional escalation pathways, Strait of Hormuz disruption risk and the likelihood of further attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

The threat of sanctions on Libya's elite

What happened: Western Libya's political and military fragmentation continues to hamper both the U.S. and UN political tracks. UNSMIL is pressing ahead with its "mini-table" negotiations and has reportedly recommended personal sanctions to the Security Council. Both rival governments have committed to upholding the Unified Budget Agreement as the Central Bank begins direct distribution of foreign currency, a technical step with significant political implications.

Why it matters: The sanctions recommendation is one of the most significant developments in Libya's international diplomatic track in months. If approved by the Security Council, personal sanctions would represent the most direct external pressure applied to individual Libyan actors in years. The Unified Budget Agreement commitment, meanwhile, is a fragile signal of economic pragmatism that could lead to further progress on the political track.

Read the full analysis:

Libya Weekly Update (May 8, 2026)

This report covers political and security updates in Libya between May 01, 2026 and May 07, 2026. Clients can download the full report at the end of the page.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Modi's BJP wins an opposition stronghold

What happened: Narendra Modi's BJP won 205 out of 294 seats in a state assembly election that has traditionally been opposition territory, a decisive result that continues the party's pattern of consolidating power at the state level even as it navigates the aftermath of a more difficult national election in 2024.

Why it matters: State-level dominance is how durable political power is built in India's federal system. The 2024 national setback created a narrative of BJP vulnerability that this result significantly complicates. A party that can win 205 seats in hostile territory is not a party in structural decline, it is a party with organisational depth and message discipline that transcends the national cycle.

What this means: The BJP's state-level consolidation suggests that Modi's political model remains robust. The question going into the next national cycle is whether the opposition can translate state-level resilience of its own into a coherent national alternative — and on the current evidence, that project remains incomplete.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

India is calibrating its tilt to a fragmented West

India’s energy relationship with Russia has forced New Delhi to look westward, but the current fracturing of the western system is allowing India a chance to balance its relationships.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Are Americans normalising political violence at home?

What happened: Our analysis this week looks at the data behind rising political violence in the United States, moving beyond the headline incidents to look at what the underlying trends reveal about the country's political culture. The findings are not reassuring.

Why it matters: The two assassination attempts on Trump this term, the January 6th legacy, the accelerating rhetoric across the political spectrum reflect a broader normalisation of political violence as an acceptable mode of expression, and a media and political environment that has struggled to push back against that normalisation consistently. The data shows that Americans are not simply more polarised than they were a decade ago, they are more comfortable with the idea that political opponents represent an existential threat, which is the cognitive precondition for violence rather than disagreement.

What this means: The implications run well beyond the domestic political environment. A United States in which political violence is rising and being partially normalised is a less reliable partner, a less stable market and a less predictable actor in every crisis it is involved in.

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

More than 2 months in, the war in Iran continues to reshape the geopolitical landscape in ways that extend far beyond the immediate theatre of operations. This week, several of those downstream consequences came into sharper focus.

In Iraq, a new prime minister designate has emerged. Ali al-Zaidi, a political newcomer and a compromise candidate acceptable to Washington, has been tasked with forming a government after the U.S. blocked multiple other contenders deemed too close to Tehran.

It is a telling moment: Iraq, a country that has spent two decades navigating its position between American power and Iranian influence, is now being asked to make that choice more explicitly than ever.

Earlier this week we published an analysis of exactly that dilemma, examining how the Iran war is pulling Iraq in two directions at once, and what the consequences of that tension could be for one of the region's most fragile states.

In the Gulf, the UAE made a decision that has sent shockwaves through energy markets after Abu Dhabi announced it was leaving OPEC, citing long-standing frustration with production restrictions that it says have prevented the country from meeting market demand.

The timing, in the middle of a global energy crisis, is not incidental.

In West Africa, the security situation in the Sahel deteriorated sharply. Islamist militants and Tuareg separatists launched coordinated nationwide attacks across Mali, seizing the cities of Kidal and Mopti and killing Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

It is one of the most significant military reversals the Mali junta has suffered since coming to power in 2020, and it raises serious questions about the viability of security arrangements (built around Russian Wagner forces and a break with Western partners) that Bamako has staked its survival on.

Across the Atlantic, King Charles III travelled to Washington in what is being framed as an attempt to use his personal relationship with Trump to address a series of bilateral frictions, from Greenland to the Iran war, that have strained the U.S.-U.K. relationship to an unusual degree.

And in Washington itself, Cole Tomas Allen was charged with attempting to assassinate the President after approaching the White House Correspondents' Dinner armed with a shotgun, a handgun and multiple knives.

It was, by any measure, a week that illustrated how many simultaneous pressure points the current global moment contains.

Let's get into it.

Iraq finds a compromise PM, but the pressure on its political model is growing

What happened: Iraqi President Nizar Amedi has tasked Ali al-Zaidi, a political newcomer with no strong factional affiliation, with forming a new government. Al-Zaidi emerged as the compromise candidate after the U.S. blocked multiple other contenders it considered too closely aligned with Iran. His appointment reflects the acute difficulty of governing Iraq when Washington and Tehran are in open conflict and Baghdad sits directly between them.

Why it matters: The U.S. veto of Iran-aligned candidates is not a new phenomenon in Iraqi politics, but the exercise of that veto in the current climate carries a different weight. Iraq hosts U.S. military assets, maintains deep economic and political ties with Iran, and is simultaneously subject to pressure from both sides to choose. Al-Zaidi's appointment buys time, but it does not resolve the underlying tension. A government built on being acceptable to Washington is, almost by definition, one that will struggle for legitimacy with significant parts of the Iraqi political class.

What this means: The formation of al-Zaidi's government — who he appoints, what coalitions he builds, and how he handles the Iran file in his early months — will be an important indicator of whether Iraq can maintain its balancing act or whether the Iran war has finally made that position untenable. Our analysis this week examines exactly that question in depth.

Read the full analysis:

How the Iran war could redefine Iraq’s fragile state

Iraq has long found itself in an uncomfortable position between its two main international partners, Iran and the United States. It has managed to maintain a delicate balance, but the current conflict threatens to upend that equilibrium.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Why the UAE is leaving OPEC

What happened: The United Arab Emirates announced this week that it will leave OPEC, ending a membership that has defined Gulf energy diplomacy for decades. Abu Dhabi cited long-standing frustration with production restrictions that it says have prevented the country from responding to market demand, a complaint that has been building for years but which the current crisis has made impossible to contain.

Why it matters: The UAE holds some of the largest proven reserves in the world and has invested heavily in expanding its production capacity precisely because it wants to use it. The tension between Abu Dhabi's ambitions and OPEC's quota architecture has been the cartel's most significant internal fault line for some time. The UAE's departure removes that tension by resolving it (in Abu Dhabi's favour) and leaves OPEC with a structural question about its own coherence at a moment when the global energy order is being redrawn by the Iran crisis.

What this means: The immediate market implication is that UAE production will likely rise, adding supply at a moment when prices are elevated and the global economy is under stress. For Saudi Arabia, which has invested enormous diplomatic capital in managing OPEC cohesion, the UAE's departure is a significant setback. For energy traders and market analysts: the OPEC price management architecture just became materially weaker. And for the broader geopolitical picture, the UAE's "AND economy" posture, which we noted a few weeks ago, now extends to energy policy.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

Why Gulf states need a unified foreign policy approach

Without a common foreign policy goal, the Gulf states have engaged in trivial rivalries that have carried serious security and human costs for the region. It’s time to rethink that approach.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Can Gulf states survive in a new hard power world?

American power and security guarantees helped build the modern Gulf, but shifting trends both globally and regionally are forcing gulf leaders into difficult decisions

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Islamic militants kill Mali's Defence Minister

What happened: Islamic militants and Tuareg separatists launched coordinated nationwide attacks across Mali this week, seizing the cities of Kidal and Mopti in what represents one of the most significant military reversal the ruling junta has experienced. Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed in the offensive, a loss that is as much symbolic as it is operational.

Why it matters: The Mali junta made a series of irreversible choices: expelling French forces, breaking with ECOWAS, and building its security architecture around Russian Wagner personnel. Those choices were presented domestically as a reassertion of sovereignty and a more effective approach to the Islamist insurgency. This week's events suggest the opposite. Kidal, a city with enormous symbolic significance as a centre of Tuareg political identity, has fallen. Mopti sits in the geographic heart of the country. The coordinated nature of the offensive across multiple fronts suggests an adversary that has been planning, organising and accumulating capacity while the junta's attention and resources were elsewhere.

What this means: The Sahel's security deterioration is no longer a slow-moving story. The Mali junta's survival is now a genuine question, and the regional implications — for Niger, Burkina Faso and the broader arc of Wagner-backed governance experiments across West Africa — are significant.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

Making sense of Iran’s latest Africa push

Tehran has now placed Africa among its top foreign policy priorities, seeking more trade flows, geopolitical alignment, and military cooperation.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

A royal visit and an assassination attempt

What happened: Two stories from Washington this week that say something about the state of American political life. King Charles III travelled to Washington in a diplomatic repair mission, using his personal rapport with Trump to address bilateral frictions that have strained the so-called "special relationship" to an unusual degree. This took place just a few days after the President survived a second assassination attempt.

Why it matters: The two events illuminate different dimensions of the same underlying reality. The King's visit reflects how seriously London takes the current deterioration in the relationship and how limited its conventional diplomatic tools are. The assassination attempt, meanwhile, is the second against Trump since his return to office. Individual incidents have individual causes. But a pattern of repeated attempts on a sitting president reflects a degree of political polarisation and institutional stress that has implications well beyond the security brief.

What this means: The world's most powerful democracy is receiving a state visit from a constitutional monarch because conventional diplomatic channels have broken down. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the White House marked the occasion with a social media post captioned "TWO KINGS," a not-so-subtle jab at the "No Kings" protests held in the U.S. to oppose the actions and policies of the second Trump administration. Trump himself has now survived two assassination attempts in a single term. His foreign policy is generating public rebukes from the Pope, strained relationships with its closest allies and a domestic economic squeeze that is visibly eroding political consensus.

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions — or, if you're in Madrid next week, to arrange a meeting.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

The accumulated weight of unresolved questions around the Iran war is making the world economy increasingly divided.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed and the U.S. Navy has now officially finalised a blockade of Iranian ports, ordering 13 vessels to turn around as Washington attempts to force Iran to agree to better terms.

And yet a ceasefire of sorts persists. Fragile, contested and increasingly strained by the gap between what each side has agreed to and what each side believes it has agreed to.

Nowhere is that gap clearer than on Lebanon. Israel and Lebanese representatives held talks in Washington this week, with Trump announcing a 10-day ceasefire.

But the underlying positions remain irreconcilable in the near term: Israel wants Hezbollah dismantled; Beirut wants Israel to leave.

The Houthis, meanwhile, continue to confound expectations.

Despite weeks of promises to assist Iran if the Gulf war dragged on, Yemen's Houthi movement has carried out only a few missile attacks on southern Israel and otherwise stayed on the sidelines.

Domestic governance pressures, the resource cost of their previous engagement with the U.S., a desire for a deal with Saudi Arabia, and the strategic logic of keeping Bab al-Mandab as a final card rather than playing it prematurely are all factors at play.

The closure of both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab simultaneously would cut off 25% of global energy traffic, which is why Iran and its proxies are holding it in reserve.

Global markets, in the face of all this, are surprisingly bullish and do not seem to be accurately pricing the risks associated to the ongoing conflict.

To make matters more surreal, Trump and Pope Leo XIV are in open dispute.

After Pope Leo criticised the administration's conduct of the Iran war, Trump and senior Republican figures responded by attacking him on matters of theology.

It is a signal of how isolated Washington's war posture has become, when the sitting U.S. president is in a public argument with the Pope about the morality of his foreign policy.

At GPD, we published two pieces this week that we think are essential reading for anyone trying to understand what's happening in the region.

One on Libya, which argues that the country's long-standing status quo is finally seeing its first potential shake-up in years, and one on China's strategic exposure to the current energy disruption.

And next week, we will be in the Spanish capital for the Madrid Energy Conference, where we will hear about how Latin America can play a strategic role in meeting Europe’s energy security needs at a time of global disruptions.

GPD readers can use code MEC26 for $150 off tickets:

Let's get into it.

Massad Boulos is creating the next Libyan reality

What happened: The diplomatic process pushed by the United States via Massad Boulos, which we have been tracking closely over the past several weeks, is actively reshaping the architecture of Libya's political settlement, determining which actors are legitimised, which are marginalised, and what the country's next institutional reality will look like.

Why it matters: Libya's diplomatic history is littered with international processes that failed to produce tangible outcomes. What distinguishes the current moment is the combination of a U.S. interlocutor with political proximity to the White House, a Libyan factional environment that is for the first time in years showing signs of flexibility, and an external pressure environment created by the Iran crisis that has concentrated minds in Tripoli, Benghazi and the major European capitals simultaneously. The technical talks between the Haftar and Dabaiba factions, which GPD reported last week, are one output of this process.

What this means: The actors who engage constructively with the Boulos process now are positioning themselves for influence in whatever institutional arrangement emerges. Those who stay on the sidelines or who attempt to spoil, risk finding themselves outside the architecture that is being built. For energy sector operators, infrastructure investors and governments with strategic exposure in Libya: the window for positioning is open, but it is not permanent.

Read the full exclusive:

The Boulos process is creating the next Libyan reality

Libya’s long-standing status quo is finally seeing its first potential shake-up in years, which could have major repercussions for the country’s future.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

The indirect war: chokepoint hegemony and China's energy dilemma

What happened: The second order effects of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict on China are becoming increasingly apparent. Not through direct military exposure, but through the strategic pressure that comes from dependence on energy chokepoints now effectively controlled or contested by U.S. naval power. With Hormuz closed and Bab al-Mandab held in reserve as a Houthi card, China's energy import architecture is under strain in ways that Beijing's long-term strategic planning may have not fully anticipated.

Why it matters: China is the world's largest crude importer. Its exposure to Hormuz is structural. The current crisis is functioning as a live stress test of Beijing's energy security assumptions, and the results are not yet clear. What the analysis shows is that the U.S., whether intentionally or as a byproduct of its Iran policy, has demonstrated a capacity to apply indirect pressure on Chinese energy flows without a direct confrontation. That is a significant geopolitical finding, and one with implications that extend well beyond the current conflict.

What this means: For those tracking U.S.-China competition, the Iran war has inadvertently clarified something important about the asymmetry of chokepoint leverage. China is acutely aware of this and has been investing in overland pipeline alternatives and port access across the Indian Ocean littoral for precisely this reason. But those alternatives are not yet sufficient to offset Hormuz exposure. The crisis is accelerating Chinese strategic thinking on energy independence in ways that will reshape infrastructure investment and diplomatic positioning across Central Asia, the Gulf and East Africa for years to come.

Read the full analysis:

Indirect warfare, chokepoint hegemony and China’s energy dilemma

With global energy demand rising and limitations in supply infrastructure becoming more apparent, China has been looking to reinforce itself in case of future crises, especially with the U.S.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Why haven't the Houthis closed Bab al-Mandab?

What happened: Despite weeks of public commitments from Houthi leadership to assist Iran if the Gulf war continued, the movement has carried out less than half a dozen missile attacks and has otherwise remained on the sidelines. The Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which 15% of global shipping passes, remains open.

Why it matters: The restraint is a strategic posture, shaped by at least three distinct pressures.

1. First, the Houthis are struggling to govern north Yemen effectively. Deeper engagement in a regional conflict would force resources away from an already fragile domestic situation.
2. Second, the movement's previous engagement with the U.S. cost it resources that were not easily replaceable, and joining the Iran war more fully risks drawing sustained American targeting again.
3. Third and most significantly, the Houthis want a deal with Saudi Arabia. Since Riyadh took control of south Yemen, the Houthis see a greater chance of an agreement and have little incentive to antagonise the Saudis by escalating in a way that destabilises the wider Gulf.

What this means: The closure of Bab al-Mandab is Iran's last major escalation card, and Tehran does not want to play it unless necessary. The simultaneous closure of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab would cut off approximately 25% of global energy traffic, a move with consequences so severe that its value lies almost entirely in the threat rather than the execution. The Houthis understand this. If the ceasefire breaks down, the calculus changes and the likelihood of Houthi intervention increases materially. But for now, restraint is serving everyone's interests, including their own.

Background reading from the GPD Archive:

What comes after Yemen’s southern takeover?

The capture of southern Yemen by separatist forces has altered the dynamics of the country’s long-festering civil war. Rising tensions among both rivals and allies now threaten either a renewed outbreak of fighting or a continuation of prolonged stagnation.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

GPD at Madrid Energy Conference

As Europe looks to reduce exposure and rebuild supply chains, Latin America is moving back into focus as a strategic partner in energy and minerals.

The Madrid Energy Conference convenes policymakers, investors and industry leaders around this shift. With a clear emphasis on the Europe-Latin America corridor, it offers a timely lens into how energy security is being redefined.

The GPD Team is looking forward to being in Madrid to exchange perspectives with operators, policymakers and investors who are navigating the same questions we have been writing about.

GPD readers can use code MEC26 for $150 off tickets.

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions — or, if you're in Madrid next week, to arrange a meeting.

See you next week,

Oliver Crowley
Co-Founder, The Geopolitical Desk

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