The Gulf's Washington delusion

The electrical crisis in Tunisia continues to worsen, as the government is forced to implement uncoordinated power cuts that are only driving further anger.

France and Saudi Arabia’s leaders share their love of Dragon Ball Z as they dream of further entertainment cooperation.

On the website, we delve further into the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, and how both of them are becoming increasingly intertwined.

Now,

Lets get into it

Heatwaves, power cuts and water shortages push Tunisia towards a breaking point

What happened: A new heatwave struck Tunisia this week, with temperatures approaching 50°C in parts of the country. As during previous heatwaves this summer, the electricity grid struggled to meet surging demand. This time, however, several crises converged: longer and more severe power cuts, widespread water disruptions and a shortage of bottled drinking water. With little government communication over when or where outages would occur, households across the country were left without electricity, running water or reliable access to drinking water.

Why it matters: The power cuts appear to have been poorly coordinated, affecting factories, farms, essential businesses, hospitals and even affluent tourist areas. Water-pumping stations and bottling facilities were also disrupted, compounding existing water shortages and reportedly forcing retailers to ration bottled water. Rather than managing pressure on the grid through planned and clearly communicated load-shedding, the authorities allowed failures in one system to cascade into others. The result was a perfect storm exposing Tunisia’s lack of contingency planning and the deterioration of its basic services.

What it means: As in neighbouring Libya, years of underinvestment and mismanagement are pushing public services towards increasingly frequent and interconnected failures. Yet President Kais Saied retains an important political advantage: although his government is deeply unpopular, many Tunisians remain even more hostile towards the political class that preceded him, which they associate with corruption, economic decline and the monopolisation of wealth. When former President Moncef Marzouki attempted from Paris to capitalise on protests over power cuts last month, his intervention arguably helped the authorities portray the unrest as an attempt by discredited former elites to return to power.

Risk metre: This political shield is weakening as living conditions deteriorate. Opposition figures may still lack the credibility needed to mobilise a broad movement, but Tunisia’s deepening service failures could eventually make that irrelevant. If electricity and water disruptions persist, particularly without clear communication or visible remedial action, demonstrations could become less politically organised, more spontaneous and considerably harder to contain. Tunisia may not be on the verge of nationwide unrest today, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to see how some form of civil eruption can be avoided if the country remains on its current trajectory.

Further analysis:

The defeat that broke Tunisia’s silence

For many in the North African country, the national team’s loss at the hands of Sweden was the final straw.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Saudi Crown Prince mixes personal passion and strategic thinking in Paris

What happened: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, an avid gamer, attended the Esports World Cup closing ceremony in Paris on August 23, hosted by President Macron. The tournament, run by a Saudi-funded nonprofit under the Public Investment Fund (PIF), relocated from Riyadh this year amid regional insecurity following the Iran war. The next day, Macron and MBS signed a memorandum of understanding for a €6bn ($7bn) investment in three theme parks forming one complex in Cergy-Pontoise, led by Qiddiya, the PIF's entertainment arm, with one park expected to be Dragon Ball themed, a shared passion between Macron and MBS discovered during a December 2024 meeting in Riyadh.

Why it matters: The parks would rise on the site of Mirapolis, France's first American-style theme park, which shut in 1991 after just four years and has sat derelict for 35 years. Macron pitched the project as creating 22,000 direct jobs, calling it "unseen since Disneyland Paris." France is widely cited as Europe's largest manga market, and PIF's wider portfolio includes a stake in the company owning Toei Animation, the Japanese studio behind Dragon Ball and One Piece. The deal reads as a legacy play for Macron, banking a tangible "Choose France" win as his final term ends early next year.

What it means: Saudi entertainment investment has so far skewed heavily towards the U.S., including a $55bn EA buyout and PIF has named the U.S. as its largest investment partner outside Saudi Arabia. But paired with the Mecca pact signed with Turkey and Pakistan earlier this month, this French push reads as part of a deliberate effort to show Riyadh can diversify its partnerships, on both security and economic fronts, rather than betting everything on Washington. The entertainment push more broadly fits Vision 2030's drive to diversify the economy beyond oil, while also serving as a soft-power play to recast Saudi Arabia's image away from that of a conservative kingdom.

Risk metre: The deal faces steep execution risk as it remains a non-binding memorandum, with financing, ownership and construction timelines still unset while Riyadh's reputation remains rocky among parts of French civil society. Qiddiya's own Dragon Ball park in Riyadh, under development since 2024, has yet to open either.

Further analysis:

To learn more about Saudi Arabia’s growing role in U.S. entertainment, read this article from The Geopolitical Desk’s article.

Saudi’s growing role in U.S. entertainment

Riyadh’s growing investment in the sector is helping establish the kingdom as a global player, while strengthening its domestic capabilities.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

The merging of Sudan and Ethiopia’s wars

Sudan and Ethiopia have been dealing with their own crises and armed conflicts for the past couple of years, but as these conflicts continue to devolve, they are increasingly becoming cross-border issues as the existing rivalry between the two countries worsens.

Why Sudan and Ethiopia’s wars are merging together

For a long time, the civil war in Sudan and the internal conflict in Ethiopia were unrelated conflicts. But recent developments in both countries have led to a gradual merging of the two into a larger regional standoff. Is the Horn of Africa on the eve of a larger war?

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Iraq’s disarming gamble

Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is attempting to rein in the few armed groups that maintain independence from Baghdad. Al-Zaidi continues to find himself in a difficult position between the United States and Iran, while trying to strengthen his government and balance the country’s international partnerships.

Disarm or die trying: Iraq’s September reckoning

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has bet his young government on a September 30 deadline to strip armed groups of their weapons, a high-stakes echo of the 2021 crisis that nearly got his predecessor killed.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Libya’s summer energy issues

A free preview of one of our articles available only to Libya Desk Energy Insight Subscribers. Originally published in the July 2026 issue, this article detailed the increasing energy crisis in the country and the occupation of one of western Libya’s largest energy facilities by protesters.

Libya’s summer electricity crisis nears breaking point

Infrastructure failures driven by political corruption are continuing to drive anger in the north African country.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

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We are continuing to monitor the situation in Libya, which is seeing increased political activity combined with growing instability in the west. Drone strikes on critical infrastructure in Zawiya have stood in contrast to advances in the Boulos process.

The U.S. and Iran have failed to come to an agreement due to general distrust, but neither side wants to commit to a full resumption of hostilities yet. Instead, the U.S. is now hoping to increase economic pressure on Iran to push for a deal in its favour.

In North America, trade tensions between Canada and the United States remain unresolved and could potentially worsen, as high-level negotiations break down.

Now,

Lets get into it

Libya’s political process gains momentum as instability deepens

What happened: Libya entered a second month of its worst power outages in years. Although there have been no further drone attacks since last weekend’s strike on a power station, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba replaced the head of the General Electricity Company of Libya. Meanwhile, Zawiya’s security situation remains fragile, while tensions appear to be rising within the GNU coalition between the Dabaibas and powerful 444 Brigade commander Mahmoud Hamza.

Why it matters: Western Libya continues to regress socially, economically and from a security perspective. Prolonged outages are intensifying public frustration, Zawiya remains capable of igniting at any moment, and divisions within the GNU coalition could destabilise the security arrangement holding Tripoli together. Clashes, protests or both could erupt with little warning.

What it means: Political developments are moving in the opposite direction. A UN-facilitated mini-summit in Tunis concluded with participants initialling a draft agreement covering the formation of the High National Elections Commission and amendments to the electoral framework. They will meet again inside Libya before the end of August to arrange its implementation and official announcement. At the same time, Khalifa Haftar met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Cairo, where Sisi declared his support for Libya’s unification process. Saddam Haftar met Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where discussions appear to have extended beyond bilateral relations to the political process as presented by the LNA. Together, these engagements suggest the Haftar camp is communicating the process to its principal allies and securing their support.

Risk metre (High): Libya is moving in two directions simultaneously. Western Libya’s governing and security order is weakening, while the political unification process associated with the Boulos track is gaining momentum. Each could disrupt the other: instability may accelerate political compromise, but clashes or sustained social unrest could also derail it. Libya is entering an eventful few months and remains a country to watch closely.

Further analysis:

Libya’s forced reckoning

The systems that once maintained Libya’s status quo are now beginning to fail, with the Boulos process attempting to create a new one. Yet the competing drives to move forward and keep things the same are increasingly at odds, sometimes with violent consequences.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As Diplomacy Stalls, Washington Bets on Economic Attrition

What happened: The Iran-U.S. conflict is now primarily maritime and increasingly fought on the economic battlefield, with Washington hoping that worsening livelihoods in Iran would push Tehran to revise its conditions to return to talks. Meanwhile, the UAE announced a suspension of economic ties with Iran, less a new policy than a de facto acknowledgment of wartime reality, and more a signal to Washington meant to preserve its standing as a steadfast ally.

Why it matters: Next Monday (24 August), the U.S. Treasury is meant to announce unprecedented sanctions against Iran, which could potentially target the Islamic Republic's key trading partners such as China. This would come a month before a rare U.S. visit by Xi Jinping (24 September), where discussions are likely going to focus on how to manage, and ideally end, the war's effects on global markets. Ultimately, the economic attrition of this conflict cuts both ways, and the real question is whether Trump shows rare patience to let Hormuz disruption grind on for months, or whether, as earlier this year, world leaders convince him accommodation is the only way out.

What it means: The diplomatic track has stalled, including Iran-Oman talks on the Strait of Hormuz, with Washington still opposed, while the U.S. reverts to economic pressure as it did momentarily after the 8 April ceasefire. Tehran reads Washington's renewed reliance on non-kinetic pressure as an admission of military defeat, and while the economic strain worries the executive branch, it's likelier to embolden the security establishment toward offensive assertiveness than push Iran toward accommodation.

Risk metre (Moderate): Each side is waging its own narrative war: Ghalibaf claims neighbours are quietly texting about new security and economic arrangements, while Bessent insists oil markets are misreading developments and should expect no war, only the Islamic Republic's quiet collapse. Nothing could be further from the truth on that latter point. Calm may hold for the next few weeks, but Tehran is confident it can return to kinetic action, potentially by the end of September, in order to shift Washington's focus away from maximum pressure.

Further analysis:

Read our latest Iran article to understand why a return to a strengthened version of the June MoU remains both Washington and Tehran's better option, despite the interim deal's inherent weaknesses and perennial Iran-U.S. distrust.

The U.S. and Iran want a deal neither can trust

Tehran and D.C. have been stuck in their own catch-22, both have been seeking to avoid a return to active fighting, but have no real capacity to cooperate diplomatically.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

U.S.-Canada trade talks hit a wall

What happened: Canada walked away from intense trade negotiations that would have likely seen U.S. tariffs reduced on important Canadian exports like aluminium, steel, and cars. Canadian Prime Minister Carney stated that a deal was near completion, but that the Trump administration had asked for last-minute concessions.

Why it matters: The negotiations are critical for both the U.S. and Canada, as the tariffs have hurt vital Canadian industries while also drastically raising the cost of products in the United States. Trump, increasingly unpopular at home due to a high cost of living, is attempting to balance his personal affinity for tariffs while also trying to reduce costs to ease domestic pressure. Instead, however, with this impasse, it looks like the trade war between the two will intensify for now.

What it means: There will likely be an immediate escalation period, in which the U.S. will attach more tariffs to Canadian products, with Canada retaliating one-for-one. However, there is a political imbalance between the two, as Canadians and some vital Canadian governors approve of Carney’s approach, while Americans are increasingly angry about the high cost of living. Trump has been dedicated to his tariff policy, but there is a chance he could back down or find an off-ramp if prices in the U.S. begin to rise dramatically, especially with upcoming mid-term elections.

Afghanistan's instability continues

The Taliban are celebrating five years since their return to power in 2021, but since then, they have failed to fix the country’s weary economy. This failure to reform has helped drive low-level insurgencies across the country, both from the Islamic State and former Republic factions. While the Taliban face no real threat to their rule in the short term, if they continue to resist change, armed groups will only continue to slowly build up their own strength.

Afghanistan’s never ending story

Five years after seizing Kabul, the Taliban have consolidated their rule over Afghanistan, but the same failures that helped them defeat the Republic are now giving rise to a new generation of insurgents.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Algeria builds its new parliament

For the first time in Algeria’s history, the country now has a female prime minister in charge of the country’s new national parliament. However, this new governing body is a simple facelift of the status quo and lacks any real power to implement change. The Algerian state mainly hopes that the new body can help reduce the anger that helped spawn the 2019 Hirak movement, but without real reform, the country will continue to face major issues.

Algeria’s new parliament: Continuity with new faces

Algeria’s second parliamentary elections since the 2019 Hirak protest movement produced a legislature that looks different on its surface but changes little beneath it. A new assembly with its first female speaker sits atop a system built well before polling day to deliver a predetermined outcome.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

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This week, we break down the continued developments across the Middle East and North Africa, as the war in the Gulf continues to linger and several regional states look to further integrate their defensive and intelligence networks.

Additionally, on the website, we have new articles breaking down why Ceuta might have seen such a large migration surge and the current political tensions occurring in Libya.

We also have two featured articles, including another Partner Insights piece detailing how Gulf states are looking to diversify how they export oil, and an over 30-page report from Global Insights Group detailing why the previous U.S.-Iran MoU failed and how the two sides might return to another agreement.

Now,

Lets get into it

Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi sign new defensive pact

What happened: On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. Negotiated by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, the landmark pact introduces an "attack on one is an attack on all" clause reminiscent of NATO's Article 5.

Why it matters: The pact formalizes a powerful trilateral bloc combining Saudi financial weight, Turkey’s NATO-grade defense industry, and Pakistan's military capacity, as well as its nuclear umbrella. Formed against the backdrop of the ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict, the pact serves as a major strategic hedge by these three regional powers seeking autonomy rather than exclusive reliance on external security guarantors like Washington.

What it means: While the arrangement reinforces regional deterrence, the full collective defense mechanism presents immediate challenges. The signatories maintain divergent global alliances, Turkey remains in NATO, Pakistan relies heavily on China, and Saudi Arabia retains key ties with the U.S. In the short term, the agreement will function more as a framework for consultation, intelligence sharing, and defense procurement rather than an immediate joint military command.

Stalemate by design: Sequencing dispute slows return to MoU(+)

What happened: Diplomacy has stalled over sequencing. Tehran wants Washington to move first in returning to the MoU's terms, to extend peace region-wide, and to accept a future Iran-Oman agreement on bilateral management of the Strait of Hormuz, one that will be difficult to reach and harder still for Washington to accept. The MoU's collapse last month hardened Tehran's posture, with more IRGC figures formally appointed to security leadership and new threats of offensive action should the U.S. not accept Iran's conditions. Washington, for its part, appears to have concluded that neither kinetic action nor Iran's conditions serve it well, and has fallen back on what it knows best: economic pressure in the form of an indefinite naval blockade threat in addition to market jawboning with claims that it has the final word on the Strait and secures the flow of 9m bpd of oil, well above the 2-3m bpd some shipping trackers report.

Why it matters: Both sides are negotiating through posture rather than at the table. Iran's insistence that Washington move first, and that an Oman-brokered deal alone can't reopen the Strait, is a leverage play as much as a substantive demand, designed to make sequencing itself Washington's problem. Washington's exacting blockade and likely inflated flow figures are the mirror move: pressure and market messaging standing in for concessions neither side is yet ready to make.

What it means: The MoU's text was already a major achievement for Iran. Tehran needs little more than a return to it, with the main addendum being international recognition for its future bilateral framework with Oman on Hormuz. To get there, the voices being heard in Tehran are strong advocates of assertiveness over accommodation, the logic being that assertiveness won them the original MoU, and going up a notch further will win them the plus. That leaves the tired Iranian government to manage the dire economic consequences, facing once again a U.S. bent on making its job harder, and a Trump admin that has so far been fairly successful at blunting Iran's own counter game of global economic attrition.

Risk metre (Moderate): Both sides remain at loggerheads amid a deep trust deficit, but a major U.S. campaign remains implausible, which keeps a return to the MoU, in its stronger "plus" form, the more likely scenario. Still, this week's backtracking shows that a temporary relapse into fighting or a prolonged stalemate are live alternatives.

Further analysis:

The Geopolitical Desk is proud to present a recent analytical report by Global Insights Group regarding the state of negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. The report breaks down why the initial MoU failed, what risks remain ahead, and how both sides could return to the negotiating table. Click on the link below to download the article for free.

After the MoU Failure: Iran, the U.S., and the road back to a deal

This latest report from Iran Desk explains why the previous MoU between D.C. and Tehran failed, what that means for the war, and how both sides might return to an agreement.

Global Insights Group | Corporate Intelligence in MENAGlobal Insights Group

French Ambassador investigated in CAR

What happened: France has initiated disciplinary proceedings against the French Ambassador to the Central African Republic (CAR), Bruno Foucher. French media reported that Foucher had brought around 30 women, aged 20-30, to his official residence from 2024 to 2026, with Foucher admitting to having sexual relations with two of them.

Why it matters: The situation is embarrassing for the French Embassy, especially in a country Paris sees as an important piece of its Africa policy. Foucher had been the ambassador during French efforts to try and rebuild relations with Bangui following CAR’s increased relations with Russia and the former Wagner Group, now the Africa Corps.

What it means: It could be an unnecessary step backwards for France, as the country looks to try and rebuild relations with its former colonies. Paris recently lost its influence in countries like Mali and the CAR to Russia, which has increasingly become their main security provider. The Africa Corps personally provides protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and helps train the CAR military, and Paris has been trying to maintain its traditional ties.

Morocco’s conflicted economy

On paper, Morocco’s economy continues to grow, as the nation prepares to host the next World Cup. That reality was challenged, though, when thousands of Moroccans charged the border fences and sea walls of the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, searching for work and better livelihoods. This article from GIG examines the domestic situation in Morocco and how it helped lead to the shocking events at Ceuta.

The promise of Europe or the stagnation of Morocco?

In trying to explain what happened on the borders of Ceuta and how, what is often overlooked is why thousands of Moroccans are so desperate to leave home.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Reforming the way oil is moved

The U.S.-Iran war has broken the reality that the oil-exporting powers of the Middle East can continue to rely on just two narrow waterways for the selling of their main financial resource. Countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are now looking to diversify the way they transport oil, mainly via overland pipelines, and while it might lessen reliance on the straits of Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz, it will introduce new security and supply challenges of its own.

The Middle East’s new oil networks

The U.S.-Iran War and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have upended traditional energy transport networks, with countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq now looking to change how their oil is moved.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Libya is facing the music

Libya’s economic and security institutions are seeing increased strain, as the country’s long-standing status quo continues to fall apart. The threatened resignation of the Central Bank Governor threw Libya’s economy into shock, while unprecedented drone attacks on oil infrastructure in Zawiya threatened to completely upend western Libya’s weak security architecture. As American efforts to create a new unity government intensify, so too will attempts to spoil the process.

Libya’s forced reckoning

The systems that once maintained Libya’s status quo are now beginning to fail, with the Boulos process attempting to create a new one. Yet the competing drives to move forward and keep things the same are increasingly at odds, sometimes with violent consequences.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

It is a familiar cycle: the U.S. and Iran trade blows across the region, the U.S. president threatens heavier attacks on civilian infrastructure, then reports emerge of progress towards a deal, only for Iran to dismiss them. Then the cycle threatens to repeat.

This cycle, of course, is never guaranteed, and it should not be assumed that this will last forever. This week, we look at the chances of an agreement regarding the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the same lingering issues that could see any future deal fail.

Additionally, tensions in Yemen have continued to rise after the Houthis and Yemeni government forces clashed in their most violent confrontations in years.

Across the world, Myanmar's military leader, Min Aung Hlaing, received a warm welcome in Thailand, indicating potential re-engagement in Southeast Asia after years of diplomatic isolation.

Now,

Lets get into it

Back to full circle: Diplomacy reopens the door to an MoU+

What happened: Trump's threats of massive strikes on Iran have been shelved, with Gulf states warning that such an escalation would trigger the kind of Iranian retaliation the region cannot absorb. Diplomatic efforts have picked back up, this time aimed at a return to the MoU, but a stronger version of it, one that resolves in advance the Strait of Hormuz management questions left unsettled in June. That makes the Iran-Oman talks the hinge on which everything else turns.

Why it matters: A return to peace is back within reach, but getting there requires actual progress on the specifics, not just political will. The entire premise of an MoU+ is to close the gaps that let the original deal collapse within weeks, particularly the ambiguity that let Iran and the U.S. talk past each other on the strait.

What it means: A durable peace is far from certain. Last month's decentralisation of the conflict means the Houthis and Iraq's PMF would also need to lay down arms, actors with their own grievances and agendas separate from Tehran's. Trump's own conduct adds another layer of risk, since a revanchist spirit is likely to persist within him regardless of how talks proceed, and Iran's insistence on a hard bargain in talks could once again tip a fragile interim arrangement into collapse. Even if an MoU+ is achieved, a final agreement remains a distant prospect.

Risk metre (Moderate): The appetite for de-escalation is real on both sides, but the structural problems that broke the last deal, proxy actors outside Tehran's full control and a U.S. president disinclined to accept failure, haven't gone away. A second collapse remains a live possibility even if the coming weeks bring genuine progress.

Yemen teeters toward wider conflict

What happened: The Houthis and the Yemeni government have directly attacked each other in recent days, marking the first time in years that both sides have engaged in heavy kinetic activity. It began when the Houthis struck multiple Yemeni government sites in Hadramout and Marib, killing around 30 Yemeni soldiers. The Houthis stated that the attacks were pre-emptive, claiming that Saudi forces were preparing for an offensive. The government responded by announcing that it had launched a counter-offensive against Houthi positions.

Why it matters: These are the heaviest intra-Yemeni attacks since the 2022 ceasefire that established an unstable status quo between the two factions. It is also a significant operation for the Yemeni government, which has long been plagued by instability. The government's ability to launch a coordinated operation demonstrates that it has been able to rebuild itself after internal clashes between pro-Saudi forces and UAE-backed southern separatists earlier this year

What it means: The return to open hostilities between the two sides, combined with recent tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, means that Yemen could once again descend into a wider war after several years of an unstable ceasefire. A return to war in Yemen could also see the return of famine and a country-wide civilian crisis.

Risk metre (Moderate): While the recent attacks and open hostilities could easily spiral and expand, much of the recent tension has mainly been caused by the overall tense state of the region. It is not surprising that the U.S.-Iran war, which has upended the status quo in the Persian Gulf, is helping to spur other crises in the region. These recent attacks should be taken seriously and create a real risk, but if the U.S. and Iran somehow reach an agreement over the Strait of Hormuz and de-escalate the conflict, there is a chance it could also slow tensions in Yemen.

Myanmar’s Junta leader receives warm welcome

What happened: Myanmar’s military leader and self-proclaimed President, Min Aung Hlaing, conducted an official two-day state visit to Thailand, where he was received in Bangkok by Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul with full ceremonial honours. The bilateral talks centered on economic cooperation, migrant worker policies, river management, and regional stability, leading to several signed memorandums of understanding.

Why it matters: The visit represents one of Min Aung Hlaing’s highest-profile foreign trips since assuming the presidency following military-staged elections. While Western powers continue to sanction his regime over the 2021 military coup and widespread human rights abuses, Thailand’s reception grants him significant diplomatic visibility. Human rights groups and pro-democracy advocates strongly condemned the meeting, arguing it bestows false legitimacy on a junta chief facing international scrutiny for alleged war crimes.

What it means: Myanmar’s armed opposition has looked with dismay towards the visit. Resistance forces in Myanmar are very dependent on the Thai border region for supply routes, cross-border smuggling and a safe haven for refugees fleeing the violence. Many fear that following this visit Thailand will start cracking down on resistance activities within its own territory.

Turkey in a new Middle East

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long sought to make Turkey a major centre of power in the Middle East. While he has not necessarily made Turkey the hegemon of the region, he has made the country a major piece of a greater puzzle, though he is hampered by an economy that is increasingly weak.

Erdoğan’s diplomacy outruns Turkey’s economy, but not its region

Turkey’s struggling economy tells one story, but its growing geopolitical influence tells another.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Mali and Algeria forced back together

The Islamist and Tuareg insurgency in Mali had driven the once-close countries apart, as Bamako publicly accused Algiers of supporting the separatists. However, while Mali could afford its bravado a few years ago, the situation in the Sahara has worsened considerably, and the Junta must now repair relations with Algeria if it wants to survive.

How the Sahara War is forcing Mali and Algeria back together

Multiple coups, broken treaties, and “hostile acts” pushed the two countries apart, but as the insurgency in the desert grows, Algiers and Bamako need each other more than ever

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Putin’s global ambitions stuck

When Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine, he believed that he could overcome his initial failures through sheer attrition over time, expecting that incoming President Donald Trump would reduce support for Ukraine. However, Ukraine has found its footing, building its relations with Europe, maintaining ties to Washington, D.C., and reforming its military strategy. Putin has been forced into an increasingly uncomfortable position, as the stalemate in Ukraine is slowly starting to backfire against him.

Putin’s multipolar dream, stuck in neutral

Moscow had hoped it could force a break in the global order, but has instead found itself in a quagmire

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

The week ended with a shock in southern Europe as the Spanish enclave of Ceuta faced a migrant crisis, the aftermath of which has exposed some of the current fault lines within the European Union.

The Iran war also continues to escalate, as the United States struggles to move Iran towards a deal through military means. In addition, more countries across the region continue to be targeted by drone and missile strikes, indicating that it will be harder to bring Iran and the U.S. back to the negotiating table.

The Sudanese Army launched an offensive to relieve the North Kordofan capital of El Obeid, which has been encircled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for months. Although the battle is not yet won, it marks a significant gain for the military in its efforts to push back the RSF.

Now,

Lets get into it

Thousands of migrants storm Spanish enclave

What happened: Between July 30 and August 1, 2026, approximately 60,000 migrants crossed from Morocco into the Spanish North African enclave of Ceuta, overwhelming local infrastructure and resulting in at least 67 reported deaths. Spain responded by deploying armed forces, placing offshore containment barriers, and conducting expedited returns to Morocco.

Why it matters: The sudden crisis highlights the volatile dynamics of Spain–Morocco border management and demonstrates how regulatory shifts, such as a recent Spanish court ruling restricting immediate sea expulsions, can instantly alter migration flows. Externally, it has ignited sharp political discord within the European Union, prompting several member states to challenge Madrid’s border handling and advocate for tightened Schengen controls.

What it means: Diplomatically, the event illustrates Morocco’s strategic position as a primary buffer for European security, requiring Madrid to continuously negotiate cooperation with Rabat. But with accusations that Morocco has facilitated or even encouraged such migration waves, this incident could prove a major point of tension between Brussels and Rabat.

The Iran conflict is decentralising and internationalising

What happened: On July 25, an Iranian-flagged ship was hit by Ukraine in the Caspian Sea. In the early hours of July 29, Saudi Arabia launched its first publicly acknowledged joint strikes with the U.S. against Iran-aligned groups in Iraq which had targeted the Kingdom in coordination with Yemen's Houthis. Later in the day, a U.S.-owned LNG ship was hit by a drone in Egypt's Damietta port from an unknown attacker, potentially Iran-sponsored.

Why it matters: While Iran and the U.S. continue their intermittent exchange of fire, the greater involvement of Iran-aligned groups, driven by their own motives, is leading to horizontal yet decentralised escalation with more and more countries directly impacted by the war.

This creates several hotspots, with the Red Sea now being a flashpoint, and the more actors involved, the harder resolution becomes, even as the case for it grows more urgent. Ukraine's attempt at linking the Russian and Iranian conflicts, while still a marginal scenario, could add the Caspian and the Caucasus as new hotspots.

What it means: Energy infrastructure and supply chains remain the primary target of the conflict's geographic expansion. The Persian Gulf remains almost entirely closed, and the Red Sea now faces risks of attacks on both its shores.

The Caspian has already seen Ukrainian strikes on the CPC pipeline carrying Kazakh oil to Europe via Russia. An Iranian-sponsored attack on Azerbaijan's BTC pipeline, which supplies a good chunk of Israel's oil, is looking increasingly likely if the IDF rejoins the battle.

Risk metre (High): The failure of the Iran-U.S. interim deal is pushing Washington to consider harder measures such as strikes on Iranian energy sites while the ruling conservative camp in Tehran is, despite differences about the merits of diplomacy, in consensus that hard power only can get Iran to prevail against American onslaught.

To learn more about the differences between Tehran’s hardliners and pragmatic conservatives, you can read the analysis below:

Same Camp, Different Bet: Inside Iran’s Conservative Split

With Iran’s hardliners facing the war they had long prepared for, they now face increasing divisions on what the goals of the conflict are, and how it should end.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

SAF captures main road towards the city of El Obeid

What happened: In late July 2026, intense fighting escalated around El Obeid, the strategic capital of North Kordofan. Following months of encirclement and heavy Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drone strikes on critical infrastructure, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched a major offensive. On July 27, SAF forces broke part of the siege by recapturing the vital highway connecting El Obeid to Khartoum, forcing the RSF to withdraw.

Why it matters: El Obeid serves as the central operational bridge between RSF-controlled Darfur in the west and SAF-held territories in eastern Sudan. The siege had triggered urgent UN warnings of potential mass atrocities threatening roughly 500,000 residents. The capture of a main highway between the city and the capital will facilitate the transport of much-needed supplies.

What it means: The defeat at El Obeid could trigger more surrenders and desertions within the RSF, which already suffered some high-level desertions over recent months. This has exposed vulnerabilities in its command structure when denied quick tactical victories.

Further coverage of El Obeid’s importance of the war can be read here:

El Obeid: The hinge of Sudan’s war

The RSF is preparing to attack the city of El Obeid as a means to gain leverage in peace talks. The result may be more war and mass killings.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Analysis of Russia’s “Africa Corps”

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the dismantling of the Wagner Group, the private military contractor continues to live on in the form of Russia's “Africa Corps”. Now under Moscow's command, the unit is seeking to expand its influence across the continent in an effort to increase Russia's global reach.

The return and rise of Russia’s “Africa Corps”

Three years after the notorious mutiny by the Wagner Group and the death of its founder, Russian mercenaries have fully returned to their original task: spreading the Kremlin’s influence across the African continent.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Algeria looks to Spain and Germany for help

Algiers has long struggled with diplomatic isolation and economic weakness, and now sees Berlin and Madrid as potential solutions to its problems. Following its recent efforts to strengthen relations with Italy, Algeria is hoping that closer ties with two of the European Union's other major powers will encourage investment in its beleaguered economy and increase its influence on the world stage.

Algeria’s road to Europe is through Madrid and Berlin

As relations with France remain weak, Algeria is turning to Europe’s other major powers for investment and political backing

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

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The Geopolitical Desk team

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