Algeria and Niger’s surprise rapprochement

The frozen war in Yemen has thawed... quickly. Houthi forces have charged down the coast, routing the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and raising major questions about Riyadh’s ability to contain the situation.

In the Persian Gulf, Oman is preparing to host talks over its tentative agreement with Iran regarding the Strait of Hormuz, as tensions in the region continue to flare up.

An international report highlighting Ukrainian operations in Africa has made claims of Ukrainian soldiers working in Misrata.

Trump holds a “midterm convention” to distract from his sagging numbers, as fears grow that his party could face major losses in upcoming elections.

Now,

Lets get into it

Would you like some Mocha?

What happened: After a month of static fighting, an Ansarullah (Houthi) offensive on Taiz governorate early this month culminated with the capture of the Red Sea port of Mocha, representing a southward territory grab by the Iran-aligned group that now controls several strategic locations like Perim island and can reinforce its siege of Taiz, a major north-south logistical node and home to roughly a million inhabitants. Continuing Saudi Arabia's double squeezing, an armed group likely belonging to the Iran-aligned Iraqi Islamic Resistance launched strikes on the Kingdom's East-West pipeline, through which around 5% of global oil flows.

Why it matters: This represents a major strategic blow to Riyadh and Washington, with oil prices spiking above $100 and Tehran demonstrating its option of greater global economic disruption. However, the overall narrative of newly-gained Ansarullah control over Bab al-Mandeb bolsters a pro-Saudi doomsday narrative to encourage U.S. airstrikes as well as Chinese pressure on Tehran and Sanaa, rather than reflecting a real threat, since the Yemeni militants have for now reassured markets they won't fully blockade the strategic waterway. Mocha's capture only makes Bab al-Mandeb disruption cheaper and easier for Ansarullah, which already showed capability to hit ships 1000km away last month. Yemen's war, reignited over an Iranian Mahan Air flight from and to Sanaa in July, has given Ansarullah the opportunity to show its superior tactics and cohesiveness against the Saudi-aligned Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which still reels from its dispute with the Emirati-aligned Southern Transitional Council (STC) last December and suffers from poor coordination between its various combating forces.

What it means: Saudi Arabia temporarily closed its East-West pipeline and finds itself strategically weakened, with neither the U.S. nor its newly-found Mecca Pact allies Turkey and Pakistan yet willing to get involved militarily. Ansarullah strikes on southern Saudi Arabia injured 73 civilians, bringing back pre-2023-deal trends of instability and fear in the country. For Ansarullah, which has both been directly encouraged by Iran to go on the offensive and helped by Iran's strikes on U.S. regional bases, the demands on Riyadh are set to increase, as is the desire to encroach on PLC territory further east and south.

Risk metre (medium): Ansarullah is unlikely to hold new ground long-term, but Saudi Arabia lacks the ground capacity to reverse the armed group's gains, and global appetite favours de-escalation over a prolonged Red Sea confrontation. Short of successful mediation, Yemen may be embroiled in deadly Ansarullah offensives and PLC counter-offensives, but the conflict is likely to remain domestic rather than a major chokehold on the global economy.

Oman comes to the diplomatic rescue

What happened: Rather than quietly strangling Iran's economy, Washington struck several Iranian tankers this week, prompting Tehran to retaliate against U.S. Navy vessels, Gulf maritime traffic and U.S. bases in Jordan, underlining its newfound preference for disproportionate rather than measured responses. The clashes, compounded by Ansarullah's advance on Mocha, have sharpened diplomatic urgency in the region. Oman is due to host Iranian, Iraqi and GCC officials on Monday, with Bahrain the sole notable absence, to discuss the bilateral Strait of Hormuz arrangement between Tehran and Muscat and broader regional de-escalation.

Why it matters: The bilateral deal has long been drafted but has faced U.S. opposition. Fresh Gulf momentum to see it signed and registered with the International Maritime Organisation next week would mark a meaningful step toward reviving the June interim deal between Tehran and Washington, should the latter accept regional diplomatic progress and halt its strikes and blockade on Iran. Further escalation remains possible, though, after the IAEA Board of Governors voted against Iran. Even rejected by China and Russia, that vote could give the U.S. grounds to justify strikes on Pickaxe Mountain, where Iran is believed to store many of its advanced centrifuges. Washington is also expected to sanction more financial institutions dealing with Iran, possibly including another large Iraqi bank.

What it means: The broader trend of squeezed Iranian oil flows is now offset by a reversal favouring Tehran, a reminder that this drawn-out conflict will keep swinging both ways even as Iran gradually pushes Washington toward a deal. GCC involvement in Hormuz and PLC-Ansarullah backchannels could lay the groundwork for a region-wide ceasefire. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's continued pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi's looming deadline to disarm Islamic Resistance groups both point to further regional instability, as each leader ties his political credibility to appearing tough.

Risk metre (medium-high): Heightened regional risk is, as usual, reviving de-escalation efforts, and both Tehran and Sanaa appear open to it. But many in both capitals also see de-escalating now as premature, given the leverage they currently hold. In Israel, in spite of the Lebanon ceasefire, the calculation leans toward further weakening Hezbollah and possibly provoking Tehran into a direct attack, letting Likud cast itself ahead of October elections as defender of the nation and destroying Iranian energy infrastructure to accelerate U.S. economic pressure.

Ukraine’s Libya launchpad

What happened: CNN reported that Ukrainian naval drone operators have been using the international military base in Misrata as a launchpad for attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet, in exchange for training local forces. The revelation is not entirely new. Years ago, Libya Desk Consulting’s Weekly Political Risk Report identified Ukrainian trainers entering Tripoli and subsequently tracked their presence across bases in Misrata and the capital. Russia has also previously accused Ukraine of operating from western Libya. The GNU has moved quickly to reject CNN’s latest reporting and deny that Libyan territory is being used to launch attacks against Russian interests.

Why it matters: The report adds an international dimension to an already deteriorating security environment in western Libya. On 3 March, a Russian LNG tanker was attacked in the Mediterranean, raising the prospect that the Russia-Ukraine conflict could spill into Mediterranean shipping lanes and create the risk of a major environmental incident. Inside Libya itself, drone attacks have become increasingly common, striking refineries, power stations and other critical infrastructure. Rivals of the GNU’s Deputy Defence Minister, who oversees the Ukrainian presence, have accused him of involvement in some of these attacks. Whether those accusations are substantiated or not, the growing use of drones is creating another layer of insecurity around infrastructure already struggling to function.

What it means: For the GNU, the most immediate danger is not necessarily Moscow’s response, but the domestic political fallout. Western Libyans are already enduring prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages, deteriorating public services and attacks on critical infrastructure. Evidence that Ukrainian personnel are operating from western Libya risks reinforcing the perception that GNU-aligned actors are allowing Libyan territory to become entangled in a foreign war while the state struggles to provide basic services. The GNU’s rapid denial reflects how politically sensitive the allegation is. Russia, meanwhile, now has another reason to increase pressure over the Ukrainian presence in western Libya, adding another fault line to an already crowded proxy environment.

Risk metre (medium): A direct Russia-Ukraine confrontation on Libyan soil remains unlikely, and Moscow has little incentive to turn Libya into another front. The greater risk is the cumulative pressure building on the GNU at home. The government is still dealing with persistent power outages, an economy in freefall and growing anger over deteriorating living conditions. It has also only just emerged from the scandal of Syrian mercenaries protesting openly in broad daylight, triggering public outrage over their continued presence. Now come allegations that western Libya is being used as a Ukrainian launchpad against Russian interests. The list of grievances against the GNU keeps piling up, and with each new controversy, the risk of renewed protests developing into a more serious challenge to the government grows higher.

Trump’s mid-term distraction party

What happened: The Republican Party held what it called a “Midterm Convention”, intended to rally support ahead of the November midterm elections. Party conventions are common in the U.S., but they are normally held during presidential election years, when parties nominate their candidates and write their new policy platforms. This two-day midterm convention was not intended to do either, but was instead largely focused on celebrating President Trump.

Why it matters: The convention was a glitzy affair, with multiple guest speakers and Trump speaking on both nights. The event allowed President Trump, whose approval rating is currently below 40%, to try to redirect media attention away from his party’s struggles. He notably said he would give every U.S. adult $5,000 if Republicans won the upcoming midterms, something that is highly unlikely to happen, but which almost all major media outlets covered anyway.

What it means: The convention means very little for Republicans’ chances of winning upcoming elections, but it demonstrates how closely attached the party has become to the President. The convention was mainly intended to praise Trump, showering him with support and allowing him to hold large rallies. However, due to Trump’s unpopularity, the event is unlikely to do much to change the minds of independent voters, and it shows how the party has been unable to separate itself from him. The only real way for Republicans to turn things around is to distance themselves from the President, but Trump has gained such a strong hold on the party that it simply cannot move away.

Libya’s oil expansion versus reality

The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) is continuing to make real strides in increasing production through greater foreign investment and rehabilitation projects. The NOC is ultimately doing what it can, but despite its efforts, the real issue continues to be Libya’s political divide. The NOC has full control over its efforts to increase production capacity, but has little control over the country’s political and security situation.

The NOC’s race for investment

The Libyan National Oil Corporation has continued to increase international partnerships and rehabilitation projects, but this push comes as security and stability issues remain unresolved.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Algeria and Niger’s increased relations

After years of tension over military coups and the Sahel war, Algiers and Niamey are once again looking to strengthen their ties. Niger’s alliance with Mali meant that the country had to keep Algeria at arm’s length due to tensions between Bamako and Algiers, but the recent deployment of Algerian military assets in Niger following a failed coup shows that the relationship is once again returning to a baseline. However, while relations are improving, any issue or political crisis could force both countries back to square one.

Algeria and Niger’s surprise rapprochement

Algiers and Niamey’s previous relationship had been upended by the wave of Sahel coups in the early 2020s, but recent events in the region have allowed for an opening.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

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Syria saw a major agreement this week between the new transitional government and the Kurdish separatists in the north-east, as the country continues to try to navigate its complicated post-Arab Spring future.

In the Gulf, the United States continues to argue that it is both winning the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. However, the Iranians are increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress in negotiations and could soon return to fighting.

In Niger, disgruntled army officers and special forces attempted to overthrow the government, as the junta governments fails to contain the ever-expanding Sahel war.

Now,

Lets get into it

No war, no worry?

What happened: After a month-long lull, the U.S. and Iran resumed clashes on August 30, when the U.S. struck what it said was an Iranian attempt to launch mine-carrying missiles to further disrupt Gulf shipping, killing three and prompting Iranian retaliation on U.S. assets in Jordan and the UAE. On September 1, the U.S. carried out its most extensive attack in weeks, targeting southern and western Iran and killing at least 13 military personnel along with five civilians attending a wedding, two killed on site and three who later died of their wounds. Tehran responded by widening its retaliation to hit Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq's KRG.

Why it matters: U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance has denied that what is unfolding constitutes a war, reinforcing Washington's narrative that it can quietly strangle Tehran economically while limiting itself to intermittent strikes aimed at denying Iran the ability to disrupt Gulf shipping. That narrative, paired with U.S. claims of helping move close to 18 million barrels a day out of the Gulf, is meant to reassure markets that this is a war which, despite dragging on, remains under control. Compared to April's Operation Freedom, Washington has strengthened its propaganda position, convincing economic actors that it has finally found a way to checkmate Tehran and no longer needs to urgently pursue a negotiated settlement. Iran-Oman talks over the Strait of Hormuz have stalled in parallel, as the U.S. leans instead on its own containment strategy.

What it means: The dominant narrative is that Tehran is buckling under economic pressure, an impression reinforced by conciliatory statements from Iran's executive branch in favour of diplomacy. But American and Iranian conceptions of time diverge sharply, and a reversal of fortunes in Tehran's favour looks more likely than a last-minute U.S. victory.

Risk metre (medium-high): Tehran has reportedly given Washington until mid-September to shift its stance or face an unprecedented Iranian offensive, a departure from its traditionally defensive doctrine. This escalation isn't set in stone. Domestic pressure to break the dominant U.S. narrative is mounting, but Iranian military officials are not known for abrupt doctrinal shifts and are more likely to wait and see how this cycle of low-intensity clashes and Gulf shipping disruption — with an added layer of attacks at sea — plays out in global markets. China, for its part, has signaled that while it won't align with U.S. secondary sanctions, it doesn't want Tehran to take the initiative on escalation, a preference Iran isn't bound by but may still feel pressure to accommodate.

Syria’s Kurds sign integration deal

What happened: This past week, Syrian-Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi announced the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) during a press conference in Damascus. The announcement came as the majority of SDF forces have entered a process of integration with the military forces of the transitional government of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Mazloum Abdi himself has accepted a position as presidential advisor of al-Sharaa on Kurdish matters. In the subsequent days Syrian government forces entered several key areas of the northeast, including the city of Hasakah, to take over security tasks from the defunct troops of the SDF.

Why it matters: The dissolution marks the formal end of Rojava’s decade-long military autonomy in northeastern Syria. Key factors driving the move include shifting U.S. diplomatic priorities toward Damascus, intense pressure and threats of military action from Turkey, and a centralizing push by Syria's post-Assad transitional authorities. The step significantly reduces the risk of a full-scale civil war between the central government and Kurdish forces, as the SDF formed the main alternative source of power opposite to Damascus.

What it means: The struggle for recognition and equal rights of the Syrian Kurds now transitions from the battlefield to the political arena. While Kurdish fighters gain official military standing and civilians secure citizenship and language rights, local self-governance has made way for central state authority. The integration’s long-term success hinges on whether Damascus will be willing or able to grant genuine constitutional protections and cultural rights to minority populations or reinstates authoritarian central rule.

Coup reveals country’s fragile state

What happened: Young Nigerian officers and Special Forces soldiers likely attempted to stage a coup against the junta government of General Abdourahamane Tiani. Mutineering soldiers took control of Airbase 101 and launched attacks on the Presidential Palace and the National Radio Station in the capital, Niamey. The Presidential Guard managed to push back the attacks on the Palace, while Russian Africa Corps soldiers recaptured the airbase, ending the coup.

Why it matters: The coup attempt demonstrates how the Nigerien government’s failure to contain the jihadist insurgency in the north is continuing to put pressure on its ability to maintain control away from the front lines. It also demonstrates the increasing success of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), whose battlefield successes are now damaging the stability of the central government itself.

What it means: The incident has revealed a key weakness in Tiani’s government’s ability to fight the war, as the coup was launched due to discontent within the armed forces over favouritism. Reports indicate that Tiani had been giving preferential treatment to the Presidential Guard, the unit he formerly led, while sending the Special Forces to do the brunt of the fighting in the north with little support. The incident also shows how Tiani will now need to rely on the Russians, not only because he needed them to regain control, but because the Special Forces will now likely be purged. He will have to rely on existing units and the Russians, who will likely request more in return from him.

Risk metre (low-medium): Tiani’s government will likely remain in place in the short term. While it faces major setbacks in the north, Niamey is not as encircled as other major cities such as Bamako. With the main internal opponents also gone, another immediate coup attempt is unlikely. However, the entire incident shows how his government is incapable of managing both the domestic front and the fight against JNIM, meaning Niger will continue to face battlefield setbacks and further instability at home.

What will the Democrats do with power?

U.S. President Donald Trump has increased the power of the presidency to push through his own reforms while trying to tilt institutions in his party’s favour. However, Trump cannot be president forever, and a future Democratic president will need to figure out how they will use that expanded authority. The Democrats could try to use that power to restore democratic norms by pulling back Trump’s initiatives, but doing so creates risks of its own.

The gamble of an Imperial Democrat

The Republican Party is increasingly looking to tilt institutions in its favour to secure future power, causing Democrats to plan out how they might try to redress the imbalance. Yet, attempts to do so could spark a much larger GOP backlash and send the American Republic into uncharted territory.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Upcoming Algeria-US Business Forum

U.S. and Algerian relations have had their ups and downs over the years, but have recently been stuck within the security architecture of the war on terror. There has been a concentrated effort over the years between Algeria and the U.S. to diversify their partnership beyond security, and an upcoming business forum in Algiers will provide an opportunity to cement a new relationship.

Algiers betting on U.S.-Algeria Business Forum success

As Washington and Algiers look beyond past tensions, business and energy ties could reshape the future of U.S.-Algeria relations.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Buried heads as the Gulf fails to adapt to new reality.

The Gulf States have effectively tied themselves to America with the hope that warm ties would guarantee American protection. Yet the war in Iran has proven that the Gulf States can be pulled into disastrous American adventures. Many in the Gulf seem to think they can continue with the status quo, but if they want to avoid a crisis like this in the future, they need to look beyond Washington.

The Gulf’s Washington delusion

Gulf states expected to settle back into business as usual once the summer break ended, confident that their diplomatic caution and loyalty to Washington had helped contain the Iran war. They are not out of the woods yet, and only a genuine regional security architecture can get them there.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

The electrical crisis in Tunisia continues to worsen, as the government is forced to implement uncoordinated power cuts that are only driving further anger.

France and Saudi Arabia’s leaders share their love of Dragon Ball Z as they dream of further entertainment cooperation.

On the website, we delve further into the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, and how both of them are becoming increasingly intertwined.

Now,

Lets get into it

Heatwaves, power cuts and water shortages push Tunisia towards a breaking point

What happened: A new heatwave struck Tunisia this week, with temperatures approaching 50°C in parts of the country. As during previous heatwaves this summer, the electricity grid struggled to meet surging demand. This time, however, several crises converged: longer and more severe power cuts, widespread water disruptions and a shortage of bottled drinking water. With little government communication over when or where outages would occur, households across the country were left without electricity, running water or reliable access to drinking water.

Why it matters: The power cuts appear to have been poorly coordinated, affecting factories, farms, essential businesses, hospitals and even affluent tourist areas. Water-pumping stations and bottling facilities were also disrupted, compounding existing water shortages and reportedly forcing retailers to ration bottled water. Rather than managing pressure on the grid through planned and clearly communicated load-shedding, the authorities allowed failures in one system to cascade into others. The result was a perfect storm exposing Tunisia’s lack of contingency planning and the deterioration of its basic services.

What it means: As in neighbouring Libya, years of underinvestment and mismanagement are pushing public services towards increasingly frequent and interconnected failures. Yet President Kais Saied retains an important political advantage: although his government is deeply unpopular, many Tunisians remain even more hostile towards the political class that preceded him, which they associate with corruption, economic decline and the monopolisation of wealth. When former President Moncef Marzouki attempted from Paris to capitalise on protests over power cuts last month, his intervention arguably helped the authorities portray the unrest as an attempt by discredited former elites to return to power.

Risk metre: This political shield is weakening as living conditions deteriorate. Opposition figures may still lack the credibility needed to mobilise a broad movement, but Tunisia’s deepening service failures could eventually make that irrelevant. If electricity and water disruptions persist, particularly without clear communication or visible remedial action, demonstrations could become less politically organised, more spontaneous and considerably harder to contain. Tunisia may not be on the verge of nationwide unrest today, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to see how some form of civil eruption can be avoided if the country remains on its current trajectory.

Further analysis:

The defeat that broke Tunisia’s silence

For many in the North African country, the national team’s loss at the hands of Sweden was the final straw.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Saudi Crown Prince mixes personal passion and strategic thinking in Paris

What happened: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, an avid gamer, attended the Esports World Cup closing ceremony in Paris on August 23, hosted by President Macron. The tournament, run by a Saudi-funded nonprofit under the Public Investment Fund (PIF), relocated from Riyadh this year amid regional insecurity following the Iran war. The next day, Macron and MBS signed a memorandum of understanding for a €6bn ($7bn) investment in three theme parks forming one complex in Cergy-Pontoise, led by Qiddiya, the PIF's entertainment arm, with one park expected to be Dragon Ball themed, a shared passion between Macron and MBS discovered during a December 2024 meeting in Riyadh.

Why it matters: The parks would rise on the site of Mirapolis, France's first American-style theme park, which shut in 1991 after just four years and has sat derelict for 35 years. Macron pitched the project as creating 22,000 direct jobs, calling it "unseen since Disneyland Paris." France is widely cited as Europe's largest manga market, and PIF's wider portfolio includes a stake in the company owning Toei Animation, the Japanese studio behind Dragon Ball and One Piece. The deal reads as a legacy play for Macron, banking a tangible "Choose France" win as his final term ends early next year.

What it means: Saudi entertainment investment has so far skewed heavily towards the U.S., including a $55bn EA buyout and PIF has named the U.S. as its largest investment partner outside Saudi Arabia. But paired with the Mecca pact signed with Turkey and Pakistan earlier this month, this French push reads as part of a deliberate effort to show Riyadh can diversify its partnerships, on both security and economic fronts, rather than betting everything on Washington. The entertainment push more broadly fits Vision 2030's drive to diversify the economy beyond oil, while also serving as a soft-power play to recast Saudi Arabia's image away from that of a conservative kingdom.

Risk metre: The deal faces steep execution risk as it remains a non-binding memorandum, with financing, ownership and construction timelines still unset while Riyadh's reputation remains rocky among parts of French civil society. Qiddiya's own Dragon Ball park in Riyadh, under development since 2024, has yet to open either.

Further analysis:

To learn more about Saudi Arabia’s growing role in U.S. entertainment, read this article from The Geopolitical Desk’s article.

Saudi’s growing role in U.S. entertainment

Riyadh’s growing investment in the sector is helping establish the kingdom as a global player, while strengthening its domestic capabilities.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

The merging of Sudan and Ethiopia’s wars

Sudan and Ethiopia have been dealing with their own crises and armed conflicts for the past couple of years, but as these conflicts continue to devolve, they are increasingly becoming cross-border issues as the existing rivalry between the two countries worsens.

Why Sudan and Ethiopia’s wars are merging together

For a long time, the civil war in Sudan and the internal conflict in Ethiopia were unrelated conflicts. But recent developments in both countries have led to a gradual merging of the two into a larger regional standoff. Is the Horn of Africa on the eve of a larger war?

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Iraq’s disarming gamble

Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is attempting to rein in the few armed groups that maintain independence from Baghdad. Al-Zaidi continues to find himself in a difficult position between the United States and Iran, while trying to strengthen his government and balance the country’s international partnerships.

Disarm or die trying: Iraq’s September reckoning

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has bet his young government on a September 30 deadline to strip armed groups of their weapons, a high-stakes echo of the 2021 crisis that nearly got his predecessor killed.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Libya’s summer energy issues

A free preview of one of our articles available only to Libya Desk Energy Insight Subscribers. Originally published in the July 2026 issue, this article detailed the increasing energy crisis in the country and the occupation of one of western Libya’s largest energy facilities by protesters.

Libya’s summer electricity crisis nears breaking point

Infrastructure failures driven by political corruption are continuing to drive anger in the north African country.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

We are continuing to monitor the situation in Libya, which is seeing increased political activity combined with growing instability in the west. Drone strikes on critical infrastructure in Zawiya have stood in contrast to advances in the Boulos process.

The U.S. and Iran have failed to come to an agreement due to general distrust, but neither side wants to commit to a full resumption of hostilities yet. Instead, the U.S. is now hoping to increase economic pressure on Iran to push for a deal in its favour.

In North America, trade tensions between Canada and the United States remain unresolved and could potentially worsen, as high-level negotiations break down.

Now,

Lets get into it

Libya’s political process gains momentum as instability deepens

What happened: Libya entered a second month of its worst power outages in years. Although there have been no further drone attacks since last weekend’s strike on a power station, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba replaced the head of the General Electricity Company of Libya. Meanwhile, Zawiya’s security situation remains fragile, while tensions appear to be rising within the GNU coalition between the Dabaibas and powerful 444 Brigade commander Mahmoud Hamza.

Why it matters: Western Libya continues to regress socially, economically and from a security perspective. Prolonged outages are intensifying public frustration, Zawiya remains capable of igniting at any moment, and divisions within the GNU coalition could destabilise the security arrangement holding Tripoli together. Clashes, protests or both could erupt with little warning.

What it means: Political developments are moving in the opposite direction. A UN-facilitated mini-summit in Tunis concluded with participants initialling a draft agreement covering the formation of the High National Elections Commission and amendments to the electoral framework. They will meet again inside Libya before the end of August to arrange its implementation and official announcement. At the same time, Khalifa Haftar met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Cairo, where Sisi declared his support for Libya’s unification process. Saddam Haftar met Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where discussions appear to have extended beyond bilateral relations to the political process as presented by the LNA. Together, these engagements suggest the Haftar camp is communicating the process to its principal allies and securing their support.

Risk metre (High): Libya is moving in two directions simultaneously. Western Libya’s governing and security order is weakening, while the political unification process associated with the Boulos track is gaining momentum. Each could disrupt the other: instability may accelerate political compromise, but clashes or sustained social unrest could also derail it. Libya is entering an eventful few months and remains a country to watch closely.

Further analysis:

Libya’s forced reckoning

The systems that once maintained Libya’s status quo are now beginning to fail, with the Boulos process attempting to create a new one. Yet the competing drives to move forward and keep things the same are increasingly at odds, sometimes with violent consequences.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As Diplomacy Stalls, Washington Bets on Economic Attrition

What happened: The Iran-U.S. conflict is now primarily maritime and increasingly fought on the economic battlefield, with Washington hoping that worsening livelihoods in Iran would push Tehran to revise its conditions to return to talks. Meanwhile, the UAE announced a suspension of economic ties with Iran, less a new policy than a de facto acknowledgment of wartime reality, and more a signal to Washington meant to preserve its standing as a steadfast ally.

Why it matters: Next Monday (24 August), the U.S. Treasury is meant to announce unprecedented sanctions against Iran, which could potentially target the Islamic Republic's key trading partners such as China. This would come a month before a rare U.S. visit by Xi Jinping (24 September), where discussions are likely going to focus on how to manage, and ideally end, the war's effects on global markets. Ultimately, the economic attrition of this conflict cuts both ways, and the real question is whether Trump shows rare patience to let Hormuz disruption grind on for months, or whether, as earlier this year, world leaders convince him accommodation is the only way out.

What it means: The diplomatic track has stalled, including Iran-Oman talks on the Strait of Hormuz, with Washington still opposed, while the U.S. reverts to economic pressure as it did momentarily after the 8 April ceasefire. Tehran reads Washington's renewed reliance on non-kinetic pressure as an admission of military defeat, and while the economic strain worries the executive branch, it's likelier to embolden the security establishment toward offensive assertiveness than push Iran toward accommodation.

Risk metre (Moderate): Each side is waging its own narrative war: Ghalibaf claims neighbours are quietly texting about new security and economic arrangements, while Bessent insists oil markets are misreading developments and should expect no war, only the Islamic Republic's quiet collapse. Nothing could be further from the truth on that latter point. Calm may hold for the next few weeks, but Tehran is confident it can return to kinetic action, potentially by the end of September, in order to shift Washington's focus away from maximum pressure.

Further analysis:

Read our latest Iran article to understand why a return to a strengthened version of the June MoU remains both Washington and Tehran's better option, despite the interim deal's inherent weaknesses and perennial Iran-U.S. distrust.

The U.S. and Iran want a deal neither can trust

Tehran and D.C. have been stuck in their own catch-22, both have been seeking to avoid a return to active fighting, but have no real capacity to cooperate diplomatically.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

U.S.-Canada trade talks hit a wall

What happened: Canada walked away from intense trade negotiations that would have likely seen U.S. tariffs reduced on important Canadian exports like aluminium, steel, and cars. Canadian Prime Minister Carney stated that a deal was near completion, but that the Trump administration had asked for last-minute concessions.

Why it matters: The negotiations are critical for both the U.S. and Canada, as the tariffs have hurt vital Canadian industries while also drastically raising the cost of products in the United States. Trump, increasingly unpopular at home due to a high cost of living, is attempting to balance his personal affinity for tariffs while also trying to reduce costs to ease domestic pressure. Instead, however, with this impasse, it looks like the trade war between the two will intensify for now.

What it means: There will likely be an immediate escalation period, in which the U.S. will attach more tariffs to Canadian products, with Canada retaliating one-for-one. However, there is a political imbalance between the two, as Canadians and some vital Canadian governors approve of Carney’s approach, while Americans are increasingly angry about the high cost of living. Trump has been dedicated to his tariff policy, but there is a chance he could back down or find an off-ramp if prices in the U.S. begin to rise dramatically, especially with upcoming mid-term elections.

Afghanistan's instability continues

The Taliban are celebrating five years since their return to power in 2021, but since then, they have failed to fix the country’s weary economy. This failure to reform has helped drive low-level insurgencies across the country, both from the Islamic State and former Republic factions. While the Taliban face no real threat to their rule in the short term, if they continue to resist change, armed groups will only continue to slowly build up their own strength.

Afghanistan’s never ending story

Five years after seizing Kabul, the Taliban have consolidated their rule over Afghanistan, but the same failures that helped them defeat the Republic are now giving rise to a new generation of insurgents.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Algeria builds its new parliament

For the first time in Algeria’s history, the country now has a female prime minister in charge of the country’s new national parliament. However, this new governing body is a simple facelift of the status quo and lacks any real power to implement change. The Algerian state mainly hopes that the new body can help reduce the anger that helped spawn the 2019 Hirak movement, but without real reform, the country will continue to face major issues.

Algeria’s new parliament: Continuity with new faces

Algeria’s second parliamentary elections since the 2019 Hirak protest movement produced a legislature that looks different on its surface but changes little beneath it. A new assembly with its first female speaker sits atop a system built well before polling day to deliver a predetermined outcome.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.

This week, we break down the continued developments across the Middle East and North Africa, as the war in the Gulf continues to linger and several regional states look to further integrate their defensive and intelligence networks.

Additionally, on the website, we have new articles breaking down why Ceuta might have seen such a large migration surge and the current political tensions occurring in Libya.

We also have two featured articles, including another Partner Insights piece detailing how Gulf states are looking to diversify how they export oil, and an over 30-page report from Global Insights Group detailing why the previous U.S.-Iran MoU failed and how the two sides might return to another agreement.

Now,

Lets get into it

Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi sign new defensive pact

What happened: On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. Negotiated by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, the landmark pact introduces an "attack on one is an attack on all" clause reminiscent of NATO's Article 5.

Why it matters: The pact formalizes a powerful trilateral bloc combining Saudi financial weight, Turkey’s NATO-grade defense industry, and Pakistan's military capacity, as well as its nuclear umbrella. Formed against the backdrop of the ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict, the pact serves as a major strategic hedge by these three regional powers seeking autonomy rather than exclusive reliance on external security guarantors like Washington.

What it means: While the arrangement reinforces regional deterrence, the full collective defense mechanism presents immediate challenges. The signatories maintain divergent global alliances, Turkey remains in NATO, Pakistan relies heavily on China, and Saudi Arabia retains key ties with the U.S. In the short term, the agreement will function more as a framework for consultation, intelligence sharing, and defense procurement rather than an immediate joint military command.

Stalemate by design: Sequencing dispute slows return to MoU(+)

What happened: Diplomacy has stalled over sequencing. Tehran wants Washington to move first in returning to the MoU's terms, to extend peace region-wide, and to accept a future Iran-Oman agreement on bilateral management of the Strait of Hormuz, one that will be difficult to reach and harder still for Washington to accept. The MoU's collapse last month hardened Tehran's posture, with more IRGC figures formally appointed to security leadership and new threats of offensive action should the U.S. not accept Iran's conditions. Washington, for its part, appears to have concluded that neither kinetic action nor Iran's conditions serve it well, and has fallen back on what it knows best: economic pressure in the form of an indefinite naval blockade threat in addition to market jawboning with claims that it has the final word on the Strait and secures the flow of 9m bpd of oil, well above the 2-3m bpd some shipping trackers report.

Why it matters: Both sides are negotiating through posture rather than at the table. Iran's insistence that Washington move first, and that an Oman-brokered deal alone can't reopen the Strait, is a leverage play as much as a substantive demand, designed to make sequencing itself Washington's problem. Washington's exacting blockade and likely inflated flow figures are the mirror move: pressure and market messaging standing in for concessions neither side is yet ready to make.

What it means: The MoU's text was already a major achievement for Iran. Tehran needs little more than a return to it, with the main addendum being international recognition for its future bilateral framework with Oman on Hormuz. To get there, the voices being heard in Tehran are strong advocates of assertiveness over accommodation, the logic being that assertiveness won them the original MoU, and going up a notch further will win them the plus. That leaves the tired Iranian government to manage the dire economic consequences, facing once again a U.S. bent on making its job harder, and a Trump admin that has so far been fairly successful at blunting Iran's own counter game of global economic attrition.

Risk metre (Moderate): Both sides remain at loggerheads amid a deep trust deficit, but a major U.S. campaign remains implausible, which keeps a return to the MoU, in its stronger "plus" form, the more likely scenario. Still, this week's backtracking shows that a temporary relapse into fighting or a prolonged stalemate are live alternatives.

Further analysis:

The Geopolitical Desk is proud to present a recent analytical report by Global Insights Group regarding the state of negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. The report breaks down why the initial MoU failed, what risks remain ahead, and how both sides could return to the negotiating table. Click on the link below to download the article for free.

After the MoU Failure: Iran, the U.S., and the road back to a deal

This latest report from Iran Desk explains why the previous MoU between D.C. and Tehran failed, what that means for the war, and how both sides might return to an agreement.

Global Insights Group | Corporate Intelligence in MENAGlobal Insights Group

French Ambassador investigated in CAR

What happened: France has initiated disciplinary proceedings against the French Ambassador to the Central African Republic (CAR), Bruno Foucher. French media reported that Foucher had brought around 30 women, aged 20-30, to his official residence from 2024 to 2026, with Foucher admitting to having sexual relations with two of them.

Why it matters: The situation is embarrassing for the French Embassy, especially in a country Paris sees as an important piece of its Africa policy. Foucher had been the ambassador during French efforts to try and rebuild relations with Bangui following CAR’s increased relations with Russia and the former Wagner Group, now the Africa Corps.

What it means: It could be an unnecessary step backwards for France, as the country looks to try and rebuild relations with its former colonies. Paris recently lost its influence in countries like Mali and the CAR to Russia, which has increasingly become their main security provider. The Africa Corps personally provides protection for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and helps train the CAR military, and Paris has been trying to maintain its traditional ties.

Morocco’s conflicted economy

On paper, Morocco’s economy continues to grow, as the nation prepares to host the next World Cup. That reality was challenged, though, when thousands of Moroccans charged the border fences and sea walls of the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, searching for work and better livelihoods. This article from GIG examines the domestic situation in Morocco and how it helped lead to the shocking events at Ceuta.

The promise of Europe or the stagnation of Morocco?

In trying to explain what happened on the borders of Ceuta and how, what is often overlooked is why thousands of Moroccans are so desperate to leave home.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Reforming the way oil is moved

The U.S.-Iran war has broken the reality that the oil-exporting powers of the Middle East can continue to rely on just two narrow waterways for the selling of their main financial resource. Countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are now looking to diversify the way they transport oil, mainly via overland pipelines, and while it might lessen reliance on the straits of Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz, it will introduce new security and supply challenges of its own.

The Middle East’s new oil networks

The U.S.-Iran War and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have upended traditional energy transport networks, with countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq now looking to change how their oil is moved.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

Libya is facing the music

Libya’s economic and security institutions are seeing increased strain, as the country’s long-standing status quo continues to fall apart. The threatened resignation of the Central Bank Governor threw Libya’s economy into shock, while unprecedented drone attacks on oil infrastructure in Zawiya threatened to completely upend western Libya’s weak security architecture. As American efforts to create a new unity government intensify, so too will attempts to spoil the process.

Libya’s forced reckoning

The systems that once maintained Libya’s status quo are now beginning to fail, with the Boulos process attempting to create a new one. Yet the competing drives to move forward and keep things the same are increasingly at odds, sometimes with violent consequences.

The Geopolitical DeskThe Geopolitical Desk

As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.

Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.

See you next week,

The Geopolitical Desk team

P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If you’re reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.

Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.

If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.