Iran has never had more Caspian friends, or needed them more. So why are its neighbours lining up pipelines and corridors that could leave Tehran more exposed than ever?
With Iran's hardliners facing the war they had long prepared for, they now face increasing divisions on what the goals of the conflict are, and how it should end.
A special report for Intelligence subscribers that breaks down the positions and possible paths forward for over 20 countries trying to navigate around the U.S.-Israel-Iran war
The war on Iran's economy has been running for decades. U.S.-Israeli strikes on economic infrastructure in 2026 brought cascading effects on the country's economy. The result will not be collapse, but it is something more dangerous for ordinary Iranians than the war itself.
Iran has never had more Caspian friends, or needed them more. So why are its neighbours lining up pipelines and corridors that could leave Tehran more exposed than ever?
Yemen is not the only side of the Bab al-Mandab, across the water sits the Horn of Africa, which has been dealing with its own strife for the past decade. With the Houthis advancing, more eyes look toward East Africa
Iran has never had more Caspian friends, or needed them more. So why are its neighbours lining up pipelines and corridors that could leave Tehran more exposed than ever?
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has bet his young government on a September 30 deadline to strip armed groups of their weapons, a high-stakes echo of the 2021 crisis that nearly got his predecessor killed.
Tehran and D.C. have been stuck in their own catch-22, both have been seeking to avoid a return to active fighting, but have no real capacity to cooperate diplomatically.
With Iran's hardliners facing the war they had long prepared for, they now face increasing divisions on what the goals of the conflict are, and how it should end.
What started as problems with card payments turned into an 18-day disruption that exposed the hidden fragility of one of Iran's most critical civilian infrastructures.
Cut through the noise of global politics and get the inside story from our experts with one concise weekly email. Trusted by policymakers and business leaders worldwide.
The Bab al-Mandab's never ending story
Bye bye Baghdad, tide turns in Ethiopia, Afghanistanโs restless borders
Behind the UNGA speeches, a war and a looming strike
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐พ๐ช Yemeni government launches counteroffensive โธ ๐ช๐น๐ช๐ท Eritrea and Ethiopia meet on the battlefield โธ ๐บ๐ธ US Republicans fret as midterm draws closer โธ๐บ๐ฆ๐ฐ๐ท Ukraine and South Korea at odds.
There are times where it feels like the entire world is descending into war, and unfortunately this past week felt like one of those moments.
In Yemen, the Yemeni government and its allies launched a new offensive on the Houthis, hoping to reclaim the Red Sea coastline it had lost to the rebels only weeks ago.
Meanwhile the Horn of Africa grows closer to a regional war by the minute as Eritrean troops have entered the battlefield in northern Tigray
And from the battlefield to the electoral arena as in the United States the midterms are drawing near, and Republicans are getting nervous.
Now,
Lets get into it
Riyadh caught between a debilitating war and a costly peace
What happened: Yemenโs Presidential Leadership Council launched Operation Dawn of Yemen on 5 October, with the Giants Brigades and Homeland Shield forces leading the ground push under heavy Saudi air cover. Government forces took ground around Dhubab but turned the offensive into a battle of narratives by prematurely declaring Mocha and the Bab al-Mandab coast retaken, before fighting for both resumed two days later. The Houthis, who deny losing Mocha, have tightened their siege of Taiz by cutting its last main road to Aden. They have also struck at the core of the Saudi economy, hitting energy sites where officials are likely downplaying the damage. The strikes have carried a war once felt mainly in Yemenโs southwest to Riyadh, where attacks on the airport killed three people on 8 October and reportedly killed 12 more on 10 October, injuring hundreds and forcing flight cancellations.
Why it matters: Despite high oil prices, Riyadh is under financial strain, with flows through Hormuz volatile, Yanbu its main export route now threatened by the Houthis, and deficits funded by borrowing. Having already cut back its megaprojects this year, the leadership may see the war as part of the same house cleaning, putting its finances in order and removing the Houthi threat on its border once and for all. The bet looks ill-advised, as its allies remain lukewarm. The Mecca Pact offers defence rather than offence, as Pakistan frees Saudi units but will not cross into Yemen and Turkey rules out offensive operations. Elsewhere, Washington has so far refused strikes, France has yet to deploy at Yanbu and the UAE stays out, while Oman urges de-escalation and Tehran offers help only through a return to the 2023 roadmap, which largely mirrors Houthi demands.
What it means: Riyadh faces two bad choices, a debilitating war or a costly peace that would have it fund salaries in Houthi areas, lift restrictions on their ports and airport, and face demands for billions in war reparations. The PLCโs promise to liberate Sanaa looks, for now, far-fetched, and gains on the coast are unlikely to bring a breakthrough inland. Pragmatic behind their anti-al-Saud rhetoric, the Houthis are escalating to push Riyadh towards peace on their terms, but this could instead harden Saudi resolve and lock both sides into a war of spectacular strikes inside the kingdom and gains and reversals in Yemen that settle into stalemate.
Risk metre (High): Should the US-Iran war resume, Iran-aligned Iraqi militias could strike energy facilities across the Eastern Province, the heart of Saudi oil production, leaving the kingdomโs exports under fire on both its Gulf and Red Sea coasts. If reports that Riyadh is seeking Syrian troops prove true, it would also show how desperate the kingdom has become.
Week 3 of the war: Ethiopia and Eritrea meet in the battlefield
What happened: Eritrean military forces moved into northern Ethiopia's Tigray region, carrying heavy weaponry. Dozens of trucks were sighted passing through the town of Adigrat, on their way to the front further south. In response, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) launched drone strikes targeting Eritrean troop formations and positions within Ethiopian territory. Ethiopia formally notified the UN Security Council that it faces an "all-out invasion" and must defend itself, demanding an immediate Eritrean withdrawal. Meanwhile, Asmara rejected the accusations, claiming Addis Ababa is inventing pretexts to launch an offensive to seize Red Sea port access.
Why it matters: This direct military clash marks the transition from an indirect proxy conflict to open state-on-state war. The Eritrean incursions into northern Tigray is the last nail in the coffin of the 2018 peace agreement. By engaging Eritrean forces directly with air assets and appealing to international bodies, Ethiopia is attempting to strike the first blow, not waiting for the Eritreans to attack.
What it means: The conflict is expanding into a sovereign cross-border war. With Ethiopian drone strikes actively targeting Eritrean personnel, reciprocal strikes or counter-offensives by Asmara are likely. The fighting risks locking both nations into sustained border battles across the rugged terrain of northern Tigray, and potentially Afar state as well, worsening regional escalation, and giving casus belli to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to pursue his expansionist ambitions and launch an invasion of Eritreaโs Red Sea coastline.
Risk metre (High): Active clashes between the two national armies are a matter of time if they havenโt taken place already. This will irreversibly draw Eritrea into Ethiopiaโs internal conflict. The repercussions of this war will be felt across the region, especially in Sudan and Somalia, already gripped by brutal conflict and instability.
Republicans fret as midterm draws closer
What happened: The U.S. midterm elections are now less than a month away, with voting scheduled to take place on 3 November, and political campaigns are making their final pitches to voters. Polling, as well as results from previous special elections, has revealed deep unpopularity towards U.S. President Donald Trump and his Republican Party, with growing internal fears that the party will suffer a major defeat. In response, the party has sought to withdraw funding from campaigns it considers unlikely to win, in an effort to shore up support in other closely contested elections.
Why it matters: Since the 2024 general election, the Republican Party has held what is known in U.S. politics as a โtrifectaโ, meaning control of the presidency, the House of Representatives and the Senate. This control has not resulted in Congress passing many laws, largely due to the Republicansโ slim majorities in both chambers. However, it has allowed President Trump to avoid significant legislative scrutiny of his executive actions, as Congress is designed to hold the presidency accountable. While Trump will remain president until 2028, if the Democrats are able to take control of at least one chamber of Congress, they will likely be able to create multiple legal obstacles and launch investigations into the Trump presidency.
What it means: Recent polling in the United States has revealed that many Americans are unhappy with Trump and feel that he has failed to deliver on his campaign promises, including improving the economy, ending foreign wars and deporting only โcriminal immigrantsโ. Trump has also increasingly tied the Republican Partyโs identity to his own, meaning that his unpopularity has begun to weigh on Republicans in key stronghold states such as Kansas, Texas, and Iowa. However, this also means that, even if the Democrats secure major victories in the upcoming midterms, these gains are less likely to represent a permanent political shift. Once Trump is no longer president, these Republican-leaning states will likely return to their political median.
Risk metre (low): It is important to highlight that polling does not directly translate into election results. Although current predictions suggest that the Democrats could win multiple gubernatorial races and gain control of both chambers of Congress, there is also a very real chance that their victories will be more limited. If the Democrats do achieve major victories, however, there is a small risk that Trump could attempt to disrupt the election process. He has already begun to discredit elections publicly, but it remains unclear whether he will take further action, such as deploying the National Guard to polling stations or preventing newly elected lawmakers from taking office. While the likelihood remains low, the risk is unusually high for the United States, highlighting the extent to which its political institutions have weakened under Trump.
In 2025, GPD highlighted how the midterms would become a major moment in his turbulent presidency. Read the article here:
An unexpected diplomatic fallout between two friends
What happened: South Korea announced it will recall its ambassador to Ukraine, its first such recall of an envoy since 2008. The dispute erupted after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky revealed during his speech at the UN General Assembly that Kyiv had transferred two captured North Korean POWs to Seoul. South Korea strongly protested the public disclosure, arguing that revealing this sensitive information put the soldiers' families in North Korea at severe risk of retaliation. Ukraine hit back by voicing its displeasement over recent allegations regarding South Korean fuel shipments which allegedly reached Russian ports.
Why it matters: The fallout undermines a delicate geopolitical relation. South Korea has provided humanitarian and financial assistance to Kyiv but has resisted direct arms transfers to preserve regional stability and manage relations with Moscow. Kyiv's public disclosure compromised Seoulโs quiet intelligence channels regarding North Korean military personnel deployed in the conflict. In response, Kyiv urged calm, stating diplomacy must prevail over emotional overreactions while remaining open to restoring diplomatic channels.
What it means: The recall marks a significant rupture in bilateral trust. It stalls prospects for expanded defense cooperation between Kyiv and Seoul, including potential South Korean artillery or air defense support. The public exposure of the POW transfer made South Koreaโs president Lee Jae-myung look weak in safeguarding the safety of North Korean transferees or their families. Not reacting forcefully would have invited intense political backlash from human rights organisations and conservative opposition lawmakers. Kyiv miscalculated on this matter and risks alienating a vital non-NATO partner capable of providing high-tier defense manufacturing support just as North Korea deepens its combat integration with Russian forces.
Risk metre (low): Recalling the Korean ambassador will likely prove sufficient in South Korea to satisfy domestic critics of president Lee. In the coming months, relations will therefore gradually be restored again behind the scenes. But what this entails for the future transfer of North Korean POWs to South Korea is hard to say.
The front lines this past week
๐บ๐ฆ Ukraine: More than 30 people were killed in the city of Kramatorsk in the Donbas region when Russian glider bombs hits two passenger buses on Thursday. Russian drone and missile attacks have steadily increased over the recent days, leading to numerous civilian casualties, sometimes dozens at a time.
๐ธ๐ฉ Sudan: Forces belonging to the Tasis coalition (RSF and SPLM-N) launched a cross-border incursion from Ethiopia into Sudanโs Blue Nile state, establishing a foothold in the district of Wad al-Mahi. This latest push places the rebels within 60 kilometers of the regional capital of Ed Damazin.
๐ฒ๐ฑ Mali: On Tuesday Malian government troops and Russian mercenaries returned to the city of Kidal in the far north of the country. Kidal had been lost to the FLA/JNIM coalition in April and had functioned as theb Tuaregโs defacto capital ever since. This time however the FLA withdrew from the city without a fight, leaving it abandoned before the Malian military even arrived.
๐ฒ๐ฒ Myanmar: Having failed to defeat the Arakan Army in a direct confrontation, junta troops stationed in the regional capital Sittwe have tried on several times to outflank the rebel group. An attempt on Friday to land troops on the nearby island of Ngapyi ended in disaster with junta soldiers forced to withdraw under heavy enemy fire.
Who is Libyaโs new parliament speaker?
In a dramatic shift for eastern Libya's political landscape, the House of Representatives ousted its 12-year leader Agila Saleh, replacing him with low-profile parliamentarian; al-Saleheen Abdul Nabi al-Abidi. The tactical selection by the Libyan National Army (LNA) brings the legislature into direct alignment with military leadership while carefully preserving regional interests as well as Obeidat tribal allegiances.
Morocco's new premier faces a tough house and tired public
Following the Authenticity and Modernity Partyโs (PAM) victory in Morocco's September 2026 legislative elections, Fatima Zahra el-Mansouri was appointed as the nationโs first female head of government. Taking office amid record-low voter turnout, el-Mansouri faces the immediate challenge of forming a working coalition without her partyโs former key ally, the RNI. Beyond navigating complex social and religious protocols, her incoming government must address widespread public frustration driven by rising fuel costs, persistent youth unemployment, and high living costs.
Iranโs northern partnerships have grown increasingly important amid wartime disruptions and pressure on its southern trade routes. However, despite improved relations with its Caspian neighbours, Tehran has made limited progress on longstanding disputes over maritime boundaries, energy infrastructure and regional security. As the prospect of new transport and gas corridors threatens to further sideline Iran, the country faces difficult choices over whether to ratify the Caspian Seaโs legal framework and how to protect its strategic interests.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐ฎ๐ถ US forces withdraw from Iraq โธ ๐ช๐น Government troops turn tide in Ethiopia โธ ๐ฆ๐ซ Pakistan strikes Afghanistan
What for years would have been considered as breaking news passed this week with little fanfare.
The U.S.-led coalition has left Iraq, but Washington's hold over Iraqi oil revenues and dollar access keeps its leverage intact, as Iran-aligned militias refuse to disarm and Erbil grows more dependent on Baghdad.
But where a chapter is closed in Iraq, another one in Ethiopia is wide open. Federal government troops are advancing on the Tigray capital of Mekelle as a rebel offensive seems to have collapsed.
And after a period of relative calm Pakistan has resorted back to launching strikes on Afghan territory, claiming it means to neutralize the threat of Pakistani insurgent groups across the border zone.
Now,
Lets get into it
U.S. troops leave, but Washington's leverage stays
What happened: The U.S.-led coalition completed its withdrawal from Iraq on September 30. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi hailed it as the start of an era in which Iraq would stay out of regional conflicts and take its decisions independently, while the IRGC congratulated Iraqis on what it framed as a victory over the U.S. The withdrawal had been tied to a deadline for disarming Iran-aligned militias, which al-Zaidi has now pushed back to June 2027. Groups within the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, had long made disarmament conditional on the departure of foreign troops. They now say they must keep their weapons to respond to any U.S. or Israeli violation of Iraqi sovereignty, and they demand an end to what they call American political and economic interference.
Why it matters: The factions' new demands point to where U.S. influence now lies, since Washington's leverage over Baghdad rests less on troops than on its control over Iraq's finances. Iraq's oil export revenues are held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which gives Washington a hold over the country's access to dollars. These funds are protected from seizure by parties with legal claims against Iraq only as long as Washington keeps renewing an emergency order, which currently runs until May 2027. Baghdad secured short-term U.S. waivers allowing Iraqi Airways and Iranian carriers, except Mahan Air, to resume flights between religious city Najaf and Iran, though other Iraqi airports remain closed to Iranian airlines.
What it means: Al-Zaidi is caught between Iraq's financial dependence on Washington and Iran-aligned factions that reject his authority over their weapons. Postponing the deadline rather than abandoning it lets him appear serious to the U.S. while avoiding a confrontation. It also risks repeating the experience of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, whose pledges to rein in the militias stalled under Iranian and factional pressure. Iran may claim the withdrawal as a win, yet without U.S. troops as a foil, Iraqi frustration is more likely to turn towards Tehran and its allies. That frustration would centre on Iran's encroachment on Iraqi sovereignty, the corruption of the militias and the ideological framing they seek to impose on the state.
Risk metre (Elevated): The June 2027 deadline is likely to be missed as well, and a Kataib Hezbollah security official has warned al-Zaidi against pursuing the U.S.-backed disarmament drive, threatening that any government not serving its people would be overthrown by all means. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad and consulate in Erbil remain likely targets in any regional escalation. In Kurdistan, the end of U.S. funding for the Peshmerga leaves Erbil dependent on Baghdad for the pay of its forces, with the KRG seeking an extra 450 billion dinars in the 2027 budget to bring Peshmerga pay in line with federal forces. As Washington increasingly channels Kurdish security through the federal government, this dependence risks becoming a new source of friction in already fraught relations between Erbil and Baghdad.
Week 2 of the war: government forces are advancing
What happened: Fighting raged across the north of Ethiopia for the second week. Ethiopian military forces (ENDF) managed to turn the tide on the rebels of the Tigrayan Peopleโs Liberation Front (TPLF) and Fano, advancing in Amhara, southern Tigray and the Afar region. Among the most significant victories was the capture of the strategic city of Alamata. On the diplomatic front, Ethiopia ordered the closure of its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats. This triggered a full severance of diplomatic ties by Asmara. Simultaneously, Ethiopia expelled a senior Egyptian diplomat from Addis Ababa, prompting Cairo to respond with a tit-for-tat expulsion of an Ethiopian envoy.
Why it matters: The rapid breakdown of diplomatic bridges between Ethiopia and its neighbours increases the risk that the ongoing domestic civil war could escalate into a regional conflict. Addis Ababa accuses Asmara and Cairo of funding and arming internal insurgencies, primarily the Tigrayan TPLF, but also Fano rebels, amid longstanding friction over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cutting ties with Eritrea means the deathblow of the already fragile 2018 peace deal between the two countries, while the spat with Egypt further isolates Ethiopia diplomatically across the wider region.
What it means: Ethiopia is now fighting a multi-front war internally while raising tensions with its neighbors. The 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement has all but collapsed, and Ethiopia is seizing the advantage. Itโs likely that Ethiopia will use the ongoing conflict to reassert its claim over Eritreaโs Red Sea coastline, accusing Asmara of being an existential threat. This raises the risk of interstate clashes between Ethiopia, Eritrea, which down the road might draw in other Egyptian-backed forces such as Sudan.
Risk metre (High): As Ethiopian government and military officials are already publicly accusing Eritrea of aiding the rebels, the stage is being set for a direct confrontation between the two. Addis Ababa might also see reason to double down on its support for the RSF in Sudan, meaning violence in that country is set to worsen as well.
Events in the Horn of Africa do not take place in isolation but are part of a larger struggle for influence in the region:
Pakistani strikes Insurgent groups across Afghan territory
What happened: Pakistanโs Ministry of Information announced that the military had launched airstrikes in Afghanistan, claiming to have killed 22 members of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and destroyed weapons caches. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid denounced the strikes, stating that they had targeted Helmand and Kunar provinces, destroying three homes, killing nine people and wounding 11. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) separately stated that the strikes had killed at least 10 civilians, most of them children.
Why it matters: The strike is a reminder that Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to face severe tensions along the border. While neither side can sustain a prolonged period of border fighting, periods of calm can still easily give way to increased kinetic activity. It also shows that Pakistan remains willing to use force to target armed groups based in Afghanistan, despite the possibility that such strikes could lead to broader border skirmishes. It further demonstrates Pakistanโs continued willingness to conduct strikes in civilian areas, as many Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan have resulted in collateral damage.
What it means: The root cause of tensions between the two former allies is the continued presence of the TTP in Afghanistan and its ongoing attacks against Pakistani security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, and with the issue nowhere close to being addressed, these tensions will continue for the medium to long term. The provinces targeted by Pakistan are also notable. While Kunar is a typical target for Pakistani airstrikes due to its border with KP, Helmand has not been targeted as frequently. This could indicate that the BLA is increasing its operations in the southern province, which borders Pakistanโs Balochistan province, with the Taliban potentially becoming more willing to host another antagonist to Islamabad.
Risk metre (low): Despite the severity of the attack, if it leads to another period of border fighting, it is unlikely to last very long. Neither Pakistan nor the Taliban has the capacity to engage in a prolonged military campaign, as both sides continue to deal with their own internal political and security challenges. Both sides are essentially stuck in a stalemate, unwilling to return to negotiations but militarily unable to achieve their objectives. However, recent tensions in Yemen could also mean that Pakistan puts the issue of Afghanistan on the back burner, with both of its Mecca Pact allies, Ankara and Riyadh, increasing efforts to mediate between Kabul and Islamabad over the past few months.
The front lines this past week
๐บ๐ฆ Ukraine: The 3rd Army Corps announced the capture of 250 Russian soldiers, in what it described as the largest mass surrender of Russians since the spring of 2022. The POWs, which were taken captive on the front, north of Lyman, were shown on video spread by the Ukrainian military. Many looked exhausted and malnurished.
๐ธ๐ฉ Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continued their advance across the North Kordofan region, as on Friday they announced the capture of the town of Al-Mazroub from the RSF. The announcement comes at a time when groups of RSF fighters are once again defecting towards the SAF in the dozens.
๐ฒ๐ฑ Mali: JNIM jihadists reported on Tuesday to have ambushed a Malian/Russian convoy in the Sรฉgou region in central Mali. At least seven Russian mercenaries, belonging to the Africa Corps were reported to have been among the casualties. Footage released by the jihadists showed large quantities of weaponry having been seized in the assault.
๐ฒ๐ฒ Myanmar: A deadly junta bombardment in Rakhine state resulted in the death of over 50 people on Monday. Two bombs hit both the main market and a busy overpass in the town of Kyauktaw in AA-territory, during peak hours of the day. The strike was condemned internationally by the UN, US, and human rights organisations.
๐พ๐ช Yemen: Government forces claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the Houthis as attempts by the Iranian-backed rebel groups to complete its encirclement of the city of Taiz have been averted. Saudi Arabia meanwhile accused the Houthis of being behind a drone attack on an electricity facility in the holy city of Medina on Thursday
The NDA is turning Sirte into Libyaโs administrative centre
Under the direction of Saddam Haftar, Libyaโs National Development Agency (NDA) is driving a rapid transformation in Sirte to establish the central coastal city as the nation's new administrative capital. By restoring vital transport hubs, building government complexes, and expanding development projects into the southern city of Sebha, the NDA is using economic reconstruction to secure regional stability. With this project Saddam not only hopes to bridge the long-standing divide between eastern and western factions, but also positions the NDA as a prime conduit for foreign investment in Libya.
Government of National Unity (GNU) Interior Minister Emad al-Trabelsi has once again put himself at the forefront of Western Libya's security architecture, taking advantage of recent delays in the security track. Al-Trabelsi is still trying to recover from last year's fighting in Tripoli, which saw him sidelined within the GNU and largely disregarded by the international community.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐ช๐น A rebel coalition declares war in Ethiopia โธ ๐ฑ๐พ Libya moves closer to a deal โธ ๐ฎ๐ท Iran faces air blockade and fears renewed attack
The UN General Assembly is where the world's unresolved crises come to be aired, and this week's gathering in New York offered no shortage of them.
In Ethiopia, the worst-case scenario materialised as several armed opposition groups formed an alliance and declared open rebellion against the federal government.
In Libya, a deal is gradually coming into view, although internal rivalries are beginning to intensify.
Iran's diplomatic efforts in New York yielded no positive response from the U.S., and the regional situation points to renewed escalation as Tehran contends with a form of air blockade and believes Washington could launch another major strike.
In Venezuela, interim president Delcy Rodrรญguez scored diplomatic victories in New York while unrest spread at home amid recurring power cuts.
Now,
Lets get into it
A rebel coalition declares war on the government of Ethiopia
What happened: On Monday a coalition of seven armed opposition groups formally announced its formation. Bringing together several rival ethnic rebel groups including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano National Movement (Fano) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), the coalition called itself the Alliance for Survival, stating its intent to overthrow the Prosperity Party government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. By Wednesday the rebel coalition had launched a major coordinated offensive against federal forces across the northern regions, including Tigray, Amhara and neighbouring Afar. TPLF forces seized the regional airport in Mekelle, prompting flight suspensions and widespread internet disruptions. Heavy clashes and drone strikes were reported near strategic border towns and World Heritage sites such as the ancient church town of Lalibela, resulting in hundreds of reported casualties and fresh waves of displacement.
Why it matters: The escalation marks a near-total collapse of the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement, which brought an end to two years of brutal war in Tigray. The coalition aims to isolate Addis Ababa and choke off vital supply lines, ultimately toppling the state. Simultaneously, the renewed violence threatens to draw in both neighbouring Eritrea and Sudan, which have maintained close ties with the rebel coalition and reportedly played a role in its creation.
What it means: Ethiopia faces a grave risk of descending back into full-scale civil war, severely threatening stability across the entire Horn of Africa. Widespread disruption to humanitarian access, supply lines and domestic travel leaves civilian populations vulnerable to severe shortages and displacement. Combined with the wars in neighbouring Sudan and Somalia, and further away in Yemen, the current eruption of violence has the potential to plunge the region into its worst humanitarian catastrophe in decades.
Risk metre (High): The multi-front military escalation by a unified rebel coalition seriously threatens the survival of not just the current government but the Ethiopian state in its entirety. Some members of the coalition have made no secret of their ethno-nationalist and separatist ambitions. Even if the government fell tomorrow, these groups would very likely turn on each other for control of land and resources. This means an end to the violence is very unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Libya moves closer to a deal as internal power struggles intensify
What happened: Talks towards a unity agreement advanced this week under the American initiative led by Massad Boulos, while disputes on the ground escalated. A Waha Oil Company board reshuffle triggered protests at the Zawiya Refinery and the closure of a pipeline carrying Sharara crude, causing $75 million in losses, according to the National Oil Corporation. Meanwhile, around 100 parliamentarians attempted to hold a session aimed at removing Speaker Agila Saleh, only to be blocked from entering parliament by Libyan National Army forces.
Why it matters: According to Libya Desk's reporting, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba's son, Mohamed, pushed through the Waha changes with LNA approval, sidelining Zintani interests and bypassing Ibrahim Dabaiba, who normally manages these arrangements. Ibrahim reportedly backed the guards' protests, while Zintani forces subsequently closed the pipeline. Negotiating salaries alone could not resolve a crisis rooted in appointments and influence. The episode exposed growing tensions within the ruling family and the consequences of disrupting the GNU's broader alliances.
What it means: This reinforces our earlier warning that the closer Libya gets to a deal, the more turbulent its politics will become. Factions are negotiating a settlement while demonstrating how much disruption they can cause if their interests are overlooked. Saleh secured LNA protection after pushing the 4+4 Agreement through parliament, but in doing so exposed his growing dependence on it. The High Council of State, meanwhile, has yet to ratify the agreement. Progress between the main powerbrokers is placing their own alliances under strain.
Risk metre (High): A unity agreement remains within reach, but the oil losses show how quickly political bargaining can inflict economic damage. Boulos this week acknowledged progress and the work still required, reaffirming American support for unifying institutions and establishing a credible path towards elections. Sustained engagement must now translate those assurances into implementation, contain disputes and protect the economy. More will be needed to ensure Libya does not stumble before the finish line.
Iran: "Buckle up, we're expecting a few bumps ahead"
What happened: After the Salalah regional meeting on the Iran-Oman Hormuz framework was postponed in mid-September, Iran used the UN General Assembly to re-up an offer for reopening the strait, reframing the messaging without changing the substance. Washington rejected it outright and kept tightening economic pressure, this week getting major regional airports such as DXB to stop servicing Iranian carriers and others such as IST to cut Iranian flights to a minimum. Tehran initially threatened regional airports but later dialled back its rhetoric, saying it would respond with unspecified countermeasures.
Why it matters: The UN offer looks like a half-hearted bid to preempt an attack Tehran considers likely, possibly with Israeli involvement, either within weeks or soon after the 3 November US midterms. Mossad and the CIA may have rebuilt networks inside Iran and located more of the generals on their kill list, which makes a new round of strikes on the capital a dangerous prospect for Tehran. Iraq, whose airports have also closed to Iranian aircraft, is particularly exposed as it prepares to start disarming non-state armed groups next week. Baghdad now faces domestic charges of subservience to Washington and threats from those groups to raid airports unless Iranian flights resume.
What it means: Renewed conflict would land just as Q4 brings European carriers back to Gulf airports and opens the tourism season, delaying the region's recovery and casting doubt on hopes that the war's fallout will have faded by late 2027. Europe would feel it in energy too, with Washington weighing a diesel export ban and the EU already urging member states to curb demand, particularly for gas.
Risk metre (High): Signals point to renewed escalation, with the Israeli and US elections likely the main brake in the coming weeks. In Tehran, hardliners pushing to go on the offensive to break the US siege have yet to win the debate, and the security establishment still favours harsher retaliation over an pre-emptive campaign.
Rodrรญguez meets Trump on the sidelines of UNGA
What happened: At the UN General Assembly in New York, Venezuela's acting president, Delcy Rodrรญguez, delivered her first address since taking power. She promised that elections would take place at the "right moment", without specifying when that would be. After her speech, Rodrรญguez held several high-profile meetings, the most prominent of which was with President Trump, who praised her leadership of the country following the capture of Maduro in January. With all eyes on New York, opposition leader Marรญa Corina Machado tried to return to Venezuela, having left the country late last year. Her plan, however, fell through when her plane was prevented from taking off from Panama following the intervention of an unspecified foreign government. Meanwhile, protests erupted in several states across Venezuela as regular power cuts continued to plague millions of people.
Why it matters: Rodrรญguez's appearance signals a further endorsement of her administration by Western and Latin American nations such as the US, Panama, Spain and the Netherlands. Economic and energy cooperation agreements with the US aim to boost oil production and revive Venezuela's strained economy. But for Venezuelan citizens, little has changed on the political front. There are no indications that Rodrรญguez's government will be any less authoritarian than Maduro's, as critics continue to be arrested and harassed.
What it means: Rodrรญguez is pursuing economic recovery for the country and global recognition for her presidency, yet deep structural and political problems persist. Without fixed dates for elections or reforms to protect civil society, political stability remains elusive. Venezuelans are growing impatient as promises of reform yield few results.
Risk metre (Medium): Diplomatic re-engagement and energy partnerships offer Rodrรญguez an economic lifeline, but the lack of an electoral timeline and continued repression leave political and social stability uncertain.
The front lines this past week
๐บ๐ฆ Ukraine: Russian drones and missiles targeted the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, on multiple occasions this past week, killing several people, including a 14-year-old boy. Ukraine, in turn, struck the Moscow oil refinery and later hit the Perm refinery in the Urals, forcing both facilities to halt operations.
๐ธ๐ฉ Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) captured the town of Sodari in North Kordofan on Friday, pushing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) out of one of the last urban centres it controlled in the state. In the preceding days, the SAF downed several large RSF drones that were targeting army positions and civilian infrastructure across the region. The drones were said to be Emirati-supplied CH-95 UCAV models.
๐ฒ๐ฑ Mali: An attack by the jihadist group JNIM on an army camp in Dioura, in the Mopti region, reportedly killed 150 soldiers and led to the capture of 93 others. Video footage released by the jihadists showed dozens of Malian soldiers in their custody and hundreds of weapons seized in the attack.
๐ฒ๐ฒ Myanmar: Junta forces reportedly suffered heavy casualties in Karen State, where a column of troops trying to reach the town of Hpapun met heavy resistance, leaving 150 soldiers dead. The state is dominated by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), one of the country's main armed groups fighting the junta.
๐พ๐ช Yemen: Following their capture of the Red Sea coastline, Houthi rebels have tried to tighten their siege on the city of Taiz. Government forces and tribal militiamen claimed to have repelled several Houthi attempts to cut off the main road, but heavy fighting continues.
Is Iraq becoming a Houthi front against Saudi Arabia?
Saudi Arabia's efforts to bypass the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz through its cross-country East-West Pipeline are facing a growing threat : the Houthiโs presence in Iraq, which is transitioning from political posturing to active operational coordination. By pairing strikes from Iraqi soil with rapid Houthi advances along Yemenโs Red Sea coast, Iran-aligned networks are exerting pressure on both sides of the Arabian Peninsula simultaneously.
Rumours of Ukrainian military personnel in western Libya were once easy to dismiss, but GPD sources have now confirmed their presence, with Ukrainian trainers and technicians supporting GNU-aligned forces in drone warfare. As investigations allege that Libya is being used to target Russia's shadow fleet, Ukrainian expertise is contributing to a drone race among Tripoli's armed groups and raising questions over a possible confrontation with Russian forces in the LNA-controlled east.
Algeria's small government reshuffle reveals bigger calculations
After record-low turnout in Algeria's legislative elections, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune opted for a limited government reshuffle rather than a full overhaul. Yet the handful of changes, concentrated in finance, industry and interior, suggest a president tightening his grip on key economic files while seeking to rein in increasingly influential ministers ahead of the 2029 presidential election.
Benghazi's Julyana Free Zone Port, owned by a Haftar-family development agency, has seen shipping traffic surge since its 2021 redevelopment and is drawing projects ranging from a planned sugar plant to a direct COSCO line from China. Tied to a wider build-out in steel, cement and food processing, the port is central to eastern Libya's bid to turn Benghazi from an import gateway into an export platform with growing regional weight.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐ท๐ธ Serbia getโs ready for decisive elections โธ ๐ฑ๐พ The east delivers, the west wavers โธ ๐จ๐ฆ๐ช๐บ Canada first to be offered associate membership to EU
Weโre entering the astronomical fall this next week and the newsflow has been as busy as ever.
In Serbia major political coalitions have presented the candidate lists for the early parliamentary elections, kickstarting the electoral campaigns for Octoberโs vote.
In Libya the House of Representatives has approved the agreement of the 4+4 negotiation teams.
In Europe, Canada became the first country to be offered a newly conceived โAssociate Membershipโ of the European Union.
Now,
Lets get into it
Serbia gets ready for decisive elections
What happened: Following the official dissolution of the Serbian parliament, political parties have rapidly mobilized. The ruling populist bloc (SNS) rallied around the "Aleksandar Vuฤiฤ โ United Serbia" ballot list, anchoring its campaign around president Vuฤiฤ as its candidate for Prime Minister. In a parallel move, university students, opposition figures and anti-corruption activists formally submitted the "Student List โ Students Win" candidate list to the electoral commission, accompanied by a public march through Belgrade. According to the polls the Student List has the best shot at challenging the SNS-led United Serbia coalition.
Why it matters: The rush to present electoral lists by both government and opposition forces demonstrates a dramatic shift from street mobilization to electoral competition. For over a year, anti-corruption protests were organised outside of traditional party structures; the formal submission of the student-backed list converts this widespread civic anger into a unified electoral campaign. Concurrently, the ruling party's unified list demonstrates Vuฤiฤโs strategy to consolidate his core base, counter the opposition's momentum, and secure a smooth transition from the presidency to the premiership.
What it means: Campaign dynamics will depend heavily on list structures and voter registration. The entrance of a distinct student list alongside traditional opposition parties presents voters with a clear choice between civil movement outsiders and established political figures. However, electoral watchdogs, including an international mission deployed by the OSCE warn that the ruling party has an unfair advantage as it plans to benefit from state resources, heavy media influence, and a compressed campaign period, making candidate visibility a central aspect of the campaign.
Risk metre (medium): Although all parties seem to have entered the race with a fair share of optimism, concerns about the fairness of the election process are well-founded. Previous parliamentary elections in 2023 were marred by allegations of fraud, sparking weeks of unrest. Should results be disputed once again we can expect the student protesters to return to the streets in full force.
The east delivers, the west wavers
What happened: Libyaโs political process moved forward as the House of Representatives (HoR) approved the 4+4 Agreement, following days of confusion in which both legislative chambers appeared poised to do what they do best: obstruct. As we explain in โWhatโs behind Salehโs 4+4 U-turn,โ Agila Salehโs attempt to revive the rival 6+6 negotiations ended abruptly after Saddam Haftar reportedly intervened. Saleh then rushed through approval with around 30 MPs present, despite objections over procedure and quorum. The UN Secretary-Generalโs welcome for the decision signalled international determination to press ahead, leaving the still-resistant High Council of State (HCS) increasingly isolated.
Why it matters: Saddamโs intervention demonstrated his growing status as parliamentโs kingmaker, capable of bringing both Saleh and competing parliamentary currents into line when their maneuvering threatens the LNAโs commitments. The message was clear: eastern political rivalries would not be allowed to derail the agreement. The contrast with western Libya is increasingly stark. The Government of National Unity (GNU) has failed to bring HCS leader Mohammed Takala on board, while competition between Ibrahim Dabaiba and Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba and his son Mohamed is deepening fractures within the ruling family. As the LNA demonstrates its authority, the GNU risks unravelling before it can deliver its side of the bargain.
What it means: Successive hurdles are being overcome, bringing a broader political settlement and potentially a unified government closer. But Tripoli remains uneasy. Alongside the Dabaibasโ internal competition, Zawiya remains a flashpoint, with protesters partially shutting an oil pipeline this week, while armed mobilisation from Misrata adds to western tensions. Further meetings are expected next week under Massad Boulosโs auspices. As negotiations advance, actors fearing exclusion will have stronger incentives to obstruct or manufacture crises to secure their interests. Takalaโs resistance could therefore accelerate efforts to bypass the HCS rather than win it greater influence.
Risk metre (medium-high): The risk of further chaos in western Libya remains medium, even as the national political process advances. Progress depends on Washington sustaining momentum and the Dabaibas containing their internal contest sufficiently to honour their commitments. Eastern cohesion has helped clear one obstacle, but western fragmentation could still undermine implementation. Western Libya is increasingly in a race between a political agreement that produces a unified government and another crisis that overtakes the negotiations.
First to be offered associate membership to the EU
What happened: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU would explore making Canada the EU's first "Associate Member". This came after Canadian and European leaders discussed the possibility of strengthening relations between Ottawa and the European bloc in the face of worsening Canadian-US relations.
Why it matters: Canada's shift away from the North American continent towards Europe would have been unthinkable a few years ago and demonstrates how far relations have worsened with the United States since President Trump began his second term. Threats from the President to annex Canada, combined with real economic damage from US tariffs, have forced Canada to seriously consider expanding its partnership with what Prime Minister Mark Carney would call other "middle powers".
What it means: There is no clear idea of what being an "Associate Member" would actually mean, as it is not a defined term and no other country has gone through such a process. The EU would have to establish its own systems first, which would likely require intra-bloc negotiations and consensus, meaning any such agreement with Canada would take time. The most realistic agreements would likely involve the removal of visa requirements between the two, as well as easing barriers surrounding international trade. Already, Canada and the EU have agreed to allow Ottawa to join a programme that will ease access to European defence procurement.
Risk metre (medium): Trump has already lashed out at the apparent plan, calling it "laughable" and threatening more sanctions on Canada. Ultimately, any integration between the EU and Canada would take time, even if both sides work on an accelerated timeline, and Trump might forget about it. Even if Trump implements more sanctions, it's unlikely to change much, as both Canada and the EU have already begun to look for ways to decrease their reliance on the US.
๐บ๐ฆ Ukraine: The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps announced a limited offensive around Lyman, in the north of the Donetsk oblast. Dubbed Operation Vivaldi, the offensive reported some small advances, including the capture of the villages of Serednie, Novoselivka, Yarova and Oleksandrivka.
๐ฎ๐ท Iran: Iranian forces continue targeting commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, stranding and striking foreign bulk carriers including a Togo-flagged vessel, trying to make the passage through the Strait. Iranโs Security Chief meanwhile, rejected any talks with the US, following remarks by President Trump he was willing to work out a deal.
๐ธ๐ฉ Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their allied Joint Forces launched an offensive in the North Kordofan region, moving towards the RSF-held town of Sodari. The military reported the capture of at least 11 localities including the villages of Kagmar, Sharshar, Al-Kurayniyah, Al-Qaa, Ghabat Al-Laqad, Al-Kukaiti
๐ฒ๐ฒ Myanmar: A junta offensive in Rakhine State called Operation 4926 has grinded to a halt under heavy resistance by the resistance Arakan Army. Junta troops have suffered heavy casualties outside of their enclaves in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, with resistance sources reporting many of the casualties on the militaryโs side being poorly equipped and inexperienced recruits.
๐พ๐ช Yemen: Houthi rebels reported the downing of the Saudi F-15 jet over the Marib Governorate a fighting continued to rage across the country. Saudi strikes targeted several positions in the Taiz governorate while Houthi missiles and drones were fired at military targets in Saudi Arabia, including King Khalid Air Base.
Whatโs behind the Algeria-UAE rupture?
Relations between Algeria and the United Arab Emirates have officially reached a breaking point following Algiers' decision to sever diplomatic ties and restrict its airspace to Emirati carriers. What was once a lucrative economic partnership anchored in strategic infrastructure and military cooperation has completely dissolved under the weight of conflicting regional ambitions in North Africa and the Sahel.
Russia's rebels in Ukraine are starting to cause problems
A shootout between Ukraineโs SBU and HUR intelligence agencies on the streets of Kyiv has exposed the high-stakes gamble behind Kyivโs Russian volunteer units. While groups like the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) and Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL) offer valuable propaganda value, they also present a dangerous dilemma. Are they an asset, or a security risk?
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
What we're monitoring this week: โธ ๐พ๐ช War returns to Yemen โธ ๐ฎ๐ท Oman negotiations to the rescue โธ ๐ฑ๐พ Ukrainian actions in Libya โธ ๐บ๐ธ Trumps hold โmid-term conventionโ
The frozen war in Yemen has thawed... quickly. Houthi forces have charged down the coast, routing the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and raising major questions about Riyadhโs ability to contain the situation.
In the Persian Gulf, Oman is preparing to host talks over its tentative agreement with Iran regarding the Strait of Hormuz, as tensions in the region continue to flare up.
An international report highlighting Ukrainian operations in Africa has made claims of Ukrainian soldiers working in Misrata.
Trump holds a โmidterm conventionโ to distract from his sagging numbers, as fears grow that his party could face major losses in upcoming elections.
Now,
Lets get into it
Would you like some Mocha?
What happened: After a month of static fighting, an Ansarullah (Houthi) offensive on Taiz governorate early this month culminated with the capture of the Red Sea port of Mocha, representing a southward territory grab by the Iran-aligned group that now controls several strategic locations like Perim island and can reinforce its siege of Taiz, a major north-south logistical node and home to roughly a million inhabitants. Continuing Saudi Arabia's double squeezing, an armed group likely belonging to the Iran-aligned Iraqi Islamic Resistance launched strikes on the Kingdom's East-West pipeline, through which around 5% of global oil flows.
Why it matters: This represents a major strategic blow to Riyadh and Washington, with oil prices spiking above $100 and Tehran demonstrating its option of greater global economic disruption. However, the overall narrative of newly-gained Ansarullah control over Bab al-Mandeb bolsters a pro-Saudi doomsday narrative to encourage U.S. airstrikes as well as Chinese pressure on Tehran and Sanaa, rather than reflecting a real threat, since the Yemeni militants have for now reassured markets they won't fully blockade the strategic waterway. Mocha's capture only makes Bab al-Mandeb disruption cheaper and easier for Ansarullah, which already showed capability to hit ships 1000km away last month. Yemen's war, reignited over an Iranian Mahan Air flight from and to Sanaa in July, has given Ansarullah the opportunity to show its superior tactics and cohesiveness against the Saudi-aligned Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which still reels from its dispute with the Emirati-aligned Southern Transitional Council (STC) last December and suffers from poor coordination between its various combating forces.
What it means: Saudi Arabia temporarily closed its East-West pipeline and finds itself strategically weakened, with neither the U.S. nor its newly-found Mecca Pact allies Turkey and Pakistan yet willing to get involved militarily. Ansarullah strikes on southern Saudi Arabia injured 73 civilians, bringing back pre-2023-deal trends of instability and fear in the country. For Ansarullah, which has both been directly encouraged by Iran to go on the offensive and helped by Iran's strikes on U.S. regional bases, the demands on Riyadh are set to increase, as is the desire to encroach on PLC territory further east and south.
Risk metre (medium): Ansarullah is unlikely to hold new ground long-term, but Saudi Arabia lacks the ground capacity to reverse the armed group's gains, and global appetite favours de-escalation over a prolonged Red Sea confrontation. Short of successful mediation, Yemen may be embroiled in deadly Ansarullah offensives and PLC counter-offensives, but the conflict is likely to remain domestic rather than a major chokehold on the global economy.
Oman comes to the diplomatic rescue
What happened: Rather than quietly strangling Iran's economy, Washington struck several Iranian tankers this week, prompting Tehran to retaliate against U.S. Navy vessels, Gulf maritime traffic and U.S. bases in Jordan, underlining its newfound preference for disproportionate rather than measured responses. The clashes, compounded by Ansarullah's advance on Mocha, have sharpened diplomatic urgency in the region. Oman is due to host Iranian, Iraqi and GCC officials on Monday, with Bahrain the sole notable absence, to discuss the bilateral Strait of Hormuz arrangement between Tehran and Muscat and broader regional de-escalation.
Why it matters: The bilateral deal has long been drafted but has faced U.S. opposition. Fresh Gulf momentum to see it signed and registered with the International Maritime Organisation next week would mark a meaningful step toward reviving the June interim deal between Tehran and Washington, should the latter accept regional diplomatic progress and halt its strikes and blockade on Iran. Further escalation remains possible, though, after the IAEA Board of Governors voted against Iran. Even rejected by China and Russia, that vote could give the U.S. grounds to justify strikes on Pickaxe Mountain, where Iran is believed to store many of its advanced centrifuges. Washington is also expected to sanction more financial institutions dealing with Iran, possibly including another large Iraqi bank.
What it means: The broader trend of squeezed Iranian oil flows is now offset by a reversal favouring Tehran, a reminder that this drawn-out conflict will keep swinging both ways even as Iran gradually pushes Washington toward a deal. GCC involvement in Hormuz and PLC-Ansarullah backchannels could lay the groundwork for a region-wide ceasefire. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's continued pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi's looming deadline to disarm Islamic Resistance groups both point to further regional instability, as each leader ties his political credibility to appearing tough.
Risk metre (medium-high): Heightened regional risk is, as usual, reviving de-escalation efforts, and both Tehran and Sanaa appear open to it. But many in both capitals also see de-escalating now as premature, given the leverage they currently hold. In Israel, in spite of the Lebanon ceasefire, the calculation leans toward further weakening Hezbollah and possibly provoking Tehran into a direct attack, letting Likud cast itself ahead of October elections as defender of the nation and destroying Iranian energy infrastructure to accelerate U.S. economic pressure.
Ukraineโs Libya launchpad
What happened: CNN reported that Ukrainian naval drone operators have been using the international military base in Misrata as a launchpad for attacks on Russiaโs shadow fleet, in exchange for training local forces. The revelation is not entirely new. Years ago, Libya Desk Consultingโs Weekly Political Risk Report identified Ukrainian trainers entering Tripoli and subsequently tracked their presence across bases in Misrata and the capital. Russia has also previously accused Ukraine of operating from western Libya. The GNU has moved quickly to reject CNNโs latest reporting and deny that Libyan territory is being used to launch attacks against Russian interests.
Why it matters: The report adds an international dimension to an already deteriorating security environment in western Libya. On 3 March, a Russian LNG tanker was attacked in the Mediterranean, raising the prospect that the Russia-Ukraine conflict could spill into Mediterranean shipping lanes and create the risk of a major environmental incident. Inside Libya itself, drone attacks have become increasingly common, striking refineries, power stations and other critical infrastructure. Rivals of the GNUโs Deputy Defence Minister, who oversees the Ukrainian presence, have accused him of involvement in some of these attacks. Whether those accusations are substantiated or not, the growing use of drones is creating another layer of insecurity around infrastructure already struggling to function.
What it means: For the GNU, the most immediate danger is not necessarily Moscowโs response, but the domestic political fallout. Western Libyans are already enduring prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages, deteriorating public services and attacks on critical infrastructure. Evidence that Ukrainian personnel are operating from western Libya risks reinforcing the perception that GNU-aligned actors are allowing Libyan territory to become entangled in a foreign war while the state struggles to provide basic services. The GNUโs rapid denial reflects how politically sensitive the allegation is. Russia, meanwhile, now has another reason to increase pressure over the Ukrainian presence in western Libya, adding another fault line to an already crowded proxy environment.
Risk metre (medium): A direct Russia-Ukraine confrontation on Libyan soil remains unlikely, and Moscow has little incentive to turn Libya into another front. The greater risk is the cumulative pressure building on the GNU at home. The government is still dealing with persistent power outages, an economy in freefall and growing anger over deteriorating living conditions. It has also only just emerged from the scandal of Syrian mercenaries protesting openly in broad daylight, triggering public outrage over their continued presence. Now come allegations that western Libya is being used as a Ukrainian launchpad against Russian interests. The list of grievances against the GNU keeps piling up, and with each new controversy, the risk of renewed protests developing into a more serious challenge to the government grows higher.
Trumpโs mid-term distraction party
What happened: The Republican Party held what it called a โMidterm Conventionโ, intended to rally support ahead of the November midterm elections. Party conventions are common in the U.S., but they are normally held during presidential election years, when parties nominate their candidates and write their new policy platforms. This two-day midterm convention was not intended to do either, but was instead largely focused on celebrating President Trump.
Why it matters: The convention was a glitzy affair, with multiple guest speakers and Trump speaking on both nights. The event allowed President Trump, whose approval rating is currently below 40%, to try to redirect media attention away from his partyโs struggles. He notably said he would give every U.S. adult $5,000 if Republicans won the upcoming midterms, something that is highly unlikely to happen, but which almost all major media outlets covered anyway.
What it means: The convention means very little for Republicansโ chances of winning upcoming elections, but it demonstrates how closely attached the party has become to the President. The convention was mainly intended to praise Trump, showering him with support and allowing him to hold large rallies. However, due to Trumpโs unpopularity, the event is unlikely to do much to change the minds of independent voters, and it shows how the party has been unable to separate itself from him. The only real way for Republicans to turn things around is to distance themselves from the President, but Trump has gained such a strong hold on the party that it simply cannot move away.
Libyaโs oil expansion versus reality
The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) is continuing to make real strides in increasing production through greater foreign investment and rehabilitation projects. The NOC is ultimately doing what it can, but despite its efforts, the real issue continues to be Libyaโs political divide. The NOC has full control over its efforts to increase production capacity, but has little control over the countryโs political and security situation.
After years of tension over military coups and the Sahel war, Algiers and Niamey are once again looking to strengthen their ties. Nigerโs alliance with Mali meant that the country had to keep Algeria at armโs length due to tensions between Bamako and Algiers, but the recent deployment of Algerian military assets in Niger following a failed coup shows that the relationship is once again returning to a baseline. However, while relations are improving, any issue or political crisis could force both countries back to square one.
As always, thank you for reading and for your continued support.
Feel free to reply with feedback or suggestions.
See you next week,
The Geopolitical Desk team
P.S. Please forward this to anyone who might find it useful. If youโre reading this second-hand, you can sign up for our free newsletter here.
Professionals across energy markets, diplomacy, risk advisory and investment use GPD Intelligence to track geopolitical developments before they move markets.
If you find this coverage valuable, you can unlock the full Intelligence briefings and scenario analysis.
Algeria is North Africaโs largest country by landmass and a pivotal gas supplier to Europe. Since 2019, the state has prioritized stability, energy revenues and strategic autonomy.
After record-low turnout, pressure for change was high. Tebboune opted for limited changes, but they bring Algeria's economic files closer to the presidency while curbing influential ministers.
The long standing relations between Algiers and Abu Dhabi established by the Bouteflika government have now officially collapsed, as both capitals move in two different geopolitical directions.
Algiers and Niamey's previous relationship had been upended by the wave of Sahel coups in the early 2020s, but recent events in the region have allowed for an opening.
Algeria's second parliamentary elections since the 2019 Hirak protest movement produced a legislature that looks different on its surface but changes little beneath it. A new assembly with its first female speaker sits atop a system built well before polling day to deliver a predetermined outcome.
The World Energies Summit is the global meeting place for upstream leaders. Hosted in London, it brings together governments, investors and innovators from every energy-producing region.
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