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For years, Turkey and the Libyan National Army (LNA) have been caught in an increasingly uncomfortable position. Once bitter enemies, the two have gradually come to recognise that they may be each other’s most valuable strategic partners in Libya. Yet, despite considerable progress in their relationship, neither had been willing to take the final step towards a full strategic partnership.
That impasse has now been broken.
Libya’s House of Representatives (HoR) has approved the controversial maritime demarcation agreement with Turkey, marking a major development in relations between Ankara and eastern Libya.
The decision comes amid a wider political realignment in eastern Libya, where Saddam Haftar is moving to consolidate support for the American-backed political initiative and the 4+4 agreement, while dismantling obstacles that have complicated the LNA’s pursuit of a unified Libyan state.
The approval represents a significant concession to Ankara, which has long sought the eastern parliament’s endorsement of its maritime arrangements. It also removes one of the principal obstacles to a strategic partnership between Turkey and the LNA.
The implications extend well beyond Libya, potentially reshaping the geopolitical balance in the Eastern Mediterranean and creating new opportunities for political and military unification within Libya.
From enemies to indispensable partners
Turkey and the LNA have travelled a remarkable distance since 2020, when Turkish military intervention helped defeat Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli.
What began as cautious political engagement has developed into an increasingly substantial relationship spanning defence, commerce and diplomacy.
Turkey has trained LNA battalions, provided capacity-building programmes for officers, supported drone training and supplied military equipment. Commercial relations have expanded just as rapidly. A significant proportion of recent Turkish contracts in Libya have been concentrated in the east, while major Turkish companies have moved beyond reconstruction projects towards establishing industrial partnerships and factories in Benghazi.
At the political level, a particularly close relationship has reportedly developed between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Saddam Haftar, whom Ankara increasingly regards as a reliable and credible interlocutor.
Turkey has spent years supporting successive western Libyan authorities that have struggled to establish effective control over Tripoli, let alone the rest of the country. The Government of National Unity (GNU) remains dependent on fragmented armed coalitions, many of which are increasingly divided among themselves.
The LNA, meanwhile, has consolidated its authority across eastern and southern Libya but remains constrained by the limitations of its traditional regional partnerships.
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates remain important allies, yet neither is particularly well positioned to facilitate the LNA’s expansion into western Libya or provide the full range of military and technological capabilities required to realise its ambitions.
The LNA’s ambition is not a renewed military offensive on Tripoli, but a central role in a unified government and military command negotiated under the 4+4 agreement and the American initiative.
Turkey can help deliver both the political and military dimensions of that ambition.
Ankara possesses considerable influence over western Libya’s political and security landscape, a sophisticated defence industry, and the diplomatic reach to help facilitate institutional and military unification.
Indeed, Turkish policymakers increasingly recognise that the LNA may be better positioned than their existing partners in Tripoli to provide the centralised authority and stability Ankara ultimately seeks in Libya.
The question has never been whether the two sides could benefit from a strategic partnership. It has been whether they could overcome the political obstacles preventing one.
The HoR’s approval of the maritime agreement has now removed the most consequential of those obstacles.
The maritime agreement: Breaking the deadlock
At the centre of the longstanding impasse has been the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement.
Ankara has sought the eastern-based HoR’s approval of its maritime arrangements for years, recognising that parliamentary endorsement would considerably strengthen the agreement’s political standing within Libya.
The LNA, however, had been reluctant to provide such a consequential concession without receiving something equally significant in return.
