Algeriaโs interest in the Sahel is not new, as the region has always been considered an existential piece of Algerian national security. With multiple military coups, a revamped Islamist insurgency, and the proliferation of armed groups and militias in western and southern Libya, Algiers has long believed that the Sahel would inevitably become a new hub of terrorist activity, with strategic reverberations for the entire region.
Since the first years of the Tuareg insurgency and the return of instability to the region, Niger was considered a key strategic pillar of Western policy in the Sahel. In 2016, the U.S. began the construction of Airbase 201 in Agadez, while in 2014, France integrated Niger into its Operation Barkhane, utilising the countryโs Airbase 101 on the outskirts of the capital, Niamey. When Mali forced out French soldiers after the 2022 coup, France moved the headquarters of Barkhane and its Mali units to Niger.
Nonetheless, Western states were not the first to engage with the Sahel, with Algeria even being ahead of their initiatives, at least at the intelligence-sharing level. In 2010, Algiers contributed to the establishment of the Joint Operational Chief of Staff Committee (CEMOC), incorporating Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania into a unified counter-terrorism operating room. The scope of this cooperation remained limited, however, with Algiersโ role mainly relegated to intelligence sharing, mediation, and the management of shared borders.
Algerian influence via CEMOC would take a hit in 2014, as the body was somewhat superseded by the French-backed โG5 Sahel Forceโ, a multi-country operating framework including Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Mali.
Although excluded, Algiers retained a voice in the region primarily through diplomatic initiatives and tribal links, although Parisโ military manoeuvring represented a competitive challenge for Algeriaโs regional influence. This status quo would, however, only last about a decade, as the early 2020s saw a wave of coups hit the region and create deep concerns in Algiers.
A 2021 coup in Mali eventually led to a 2022 coup in Burkina Faso, with both countries later expelling French forces and withdrawing from the G5 Sahel Force. When a coup broke out in Niamey in 2023, which saw Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum ousted by General Abdourahamane Tiani, Algeria decided to react, potentially sensing an opportunity to deepen its ties with Niger again.
Algeria strongly rejected ECOWAS and French plans for military intervention to counter the coup and instead offered its mediation services on the condition that the return to civilian rule must be enacted within six months.
This outreach, based on Algeriaโs decades-old mediation approach, somewhat backfired, as Niamey rejected Algeriaโs timeline and instead joined the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the junta-led, Russia-aligned confederation formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in opposition to French and ECOWAS influence in the region. Following its Malian ally, Niger would keep Algeria at armโs length and would withdraw its ambassador in 2025 after Mali accused Algiers of downing one of its drones within the formerโs territory.
This incident forced Algeria to re-evaluate the old parameters governing its relations with Niamey and to realise that any inroads with the country would require a new model of cooperation.
2026: The year of reset
Difficult and tense relations between Algeria and Mali, which extended to the greater AES, continued for the next three years, but increasing failures on the battlefield and the growing strength of regional insurgencies forced a reopening of relations.
In early February 2026, General Abdourahamane Tiani, leading an important ministerial delegation, visited Algeria in his first high-profile state visit to the country in years, marking a major step in reconciliation efforts.
