Algeria's 2026 legislative elections ended with the country's two main establishment parties, the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the National Democratic Rally (RND), coasting to the top of the results, with other pro-presidential parties ensuring a comfortable majority. This meant that Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, technically an independent politician but former long-term member of the FLN, would likely face no surprises within the legislature.
Yet, the elections demonstrated a deep malaise within the Algerian population, as turnout was the lowest in Algerian history. Though victorious, the establishment parties had to grapple with the implications of the vote, and Tebboune announced that in his government, he would prioritise competence and efficiency instead of partisan allegiance.
Tebboune had to choose between a complete overhaul of the cabinet and minor adjustments until the next government cycle, expected late this year or early next year. The president decided to go with the latter, a pattern that has become common under his leadership, in which anticipated major reshuffles end up as minor adjustments.
The main reason for this is that, while the FLN and RND are the two main establishment parties in the country, the system is not homogeneous or dedicated solely to the figure of the president. The various ruling factions within the establishment, including military, economic and media power centres, have different aims, objectives and desires, and although Tebboune belongs to the establishment, he needs to gain consensus for shifts from multiple parts of his government.
Balancing Act
With the Sahel region continuing to face constant changes, and the domestic situation still difficult for many people, the decision to avoid major change was a calculated one for Tebboune.
With the recent Algerian-Nigerien détente, Algiers is looking to consolidate its partnership with Niamey across multiple strategic sectors, and it worries that any major change in the government could accidentally upend any of these projects before they materialise.
Additionally, the country was entering its normally sensitive post-summer period, usually characterised by heavy socioeconomic and syndical tensions, and a major reshuffle could have worsened national tensions, especially as the country was preparing for local-level elections in November.
On the other hand, the massive wildfires that ripped across the country at the end of the summer, which killed at least 150 people according to local tallies, demonstrated the weakness of the current government. Weeks later, the official toll still stands at a dozen, with no consolidated figure published, and a change in government could allow the Tebboune administration to demonstrate that it is trying to adapt to public dissatisfaction.
However, with expectations of a government reshuffle growing after the election, multiple ministers in the government scrambled to save their posts through intensive media campaigns. Within Algeria, news outlets play a major role in influencing the appointment and dismissal of ministers, and political actors and lobbying groups use these outlets to try to exert pressure. This increased coverage gave the appearance of fast-paced and concrete action by Tebboune, allowing him to make smaller changes that appeared much larger than they actually were.
Stability prevails, with consequential exceptions
While demands for change were high among the political class, Tebboune, using the fast-paced media environment, only made a handful of changes that left much of the current government intact. Important figures close to the president, such as Prime Minister Sifi Ghrieb, were left in place and most of the country’s critical sectors were maintained.
