In a much-anticipated ceremony within the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) compound in Tripoli, smiling delegates from the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) signed the 4+4 Agreement, a framework intended to finally unlock national elections.
The agreement, which was intended to reconstitute the board of the High National Election Commission (HNEC), which had been damaged by political infighting, and resolve issues over who could run for President, was met with genuine acceptance from both the GNU and LNA and widespread backing from much of the international community.
All that was needed was for the High Council of State (HCS), an institution aligned with the GNU, and the House of Representatives (HoR), a body aligned with the LNA, to ratify the agreement. However, while representatives from both bodies stood on the sidelines of the agreement and even added their names to the document, neither could guarantee that their respective legislature would do so.
Hopes for a quick ratification were quickly diminished, and both the GNU, LNA and international observers were left stunned when the head of the HCS, Mohammed Takala, and the Speaker of the HoR, Aquila Saleh, stood in Ankara and announced they would revive the defunct 6+6 negotiations instead of accepting the 4+4 Agreement.
Yet, shortly after arriving back in Libya, Saleh announced a rushed meeting of the HoR with no official agenda. The next day, only 30 of the nearly 200 members of the HoR gathered and declared the 4+4 ratified, with Saleh blessing the agreement. This left many even more confused and wondering what struggles were going on behind the scenes.
The HoR dissected
The HoR, like the HCS, is a body that has long gone beyond its legitimacy. Through political changes and wars, Saleh has been able to keep the HoR somewhat relevant, often through obstruction and attempts to spoil political change.
This navigation of the political scene, however, is only possible due to Saleh’s control of the HoR, which has lasted for over a decade. Over the past year, growing dissatisfaction with Saleh among many members of the body led to the formation of a new political bloc, backed by Saleh’s two deputies and other eastern political figures, who have sought to remove him.
Saleh has remained however, mainly with the backing of Saddam Haftar, and to a minor extent his own political maneuvering. This anti-Saleh bloc had also generally opposed the 4+4 Agreement, and wanted a return to the old 6+6 negotiations, and Saleh likely went to the meeting in Ankara to both delay the 4+4 process and buy time with the bloc opposed to him.
