Despite a lack of media attention, activity within Libya never stopped. The countryโs security, political, and economic institutions have continually degraded over the past couple of years, while the instability that has dominated the country has mostly remained under the radar.
Libya has come a long way from the period of civil wars between 2012 and 2021, trading active violence for status quo degradation. As long as the National Oil Corporation (NOC) slowly increased its export capacity and violence remained minimal, the international community was content to deal with two competing administrations.
Yet this could not last forever. Over the past few months, Libyaโs economy has started to face imminent ruin, fighting has intensified in western Libya, the capital Tripoli has faced near-constant political reshuffling, the countryโs electrical grid is facing failure, and political protests are becoming more common.
Renewed international efforts to solve the crisis, first from the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), and then from the United States under U.S. Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos, have sought to create a new status quo by taking advantage of the worsening situation in the country.
Yet, as efforts are made to move the country beyond its current stalemate and momentum builds for another unity government, elements within Libyaโs status quo are trying either to keep things the same or to ensure their power in any new unity government. This intense push and pull is testing the countryโs limits and pushing it to the brink.
A dying economy
The week began with the Governor of the Libyan Central Bank (CBL), Naji Issa, announcing that he would resign. Immediately following the news, the Libyan dinar, which had held steady due to high oil prices, took a nosedive. It also sent a shockwave across the political spectrum. The High Council of State (HCS) and the House of Representatives (HoR), the two bodies that would need to approve the resignation, quickly called for Issa to reconsider.
Issa then held a flurry of meetings with the head of the HCS, Mohammed Takala, and the Planning, Finance, and General Budget Committee of the House of Representatives to discuss financial issues and the matter of his resignation. After a few days, Issaโs official resignation never materialised, as both bodies said they would not accept it, and it has become increasingly likely that Issa might not have had any intention of resigning.
The CBL governor, a rare consensus candidate between eastern and western factions, had tried to both reform Libyaโs weak economy and appeal to the powers that put him in charge. This meant he could only implement minor reforms, such as increasing liquidity, centralising letters of credit, and digitising payments.
These measures mainly managed the crisis without addressing its main issue, overspending by rival governments. Issa had managed to get a unity budget finally signed, but he likely struggled to get the agreement actually enforced.
Issa had likely leaked threats to the press that he would resign in the past as a way to pressure eastern and western factions, but finally decided to take the step further by officially registering his resignation. It is one of the few tools Issa has to try to force both chambers to follow the rules, as the appointment of a new CBL governor would require another consensus between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Libyan National Army (LNA).
This could take a long time, leaving Libyaโs perilous economy without a captain for weeks or months, especially as the dinar would have likely collapsed in value if the resignation was accepted.
Libyaโs economy would likely have already collapsed without the U.S.-Iran war keeping global oil prices high, but this is only a temporary fix, and Issa knows it. A foreign war is not a long-term solution, and unless a unity government is formed or an agreement is actually followed through, Libyaโs economy will face ruin, war or not.
An unstable security sector
Shortly after Issaโs announced resignation, the western town of Zawiya witnessed some of the worst attacks it has seen in years. For two days, the Zawiya refinery, the largest in western Libya, was attacked by small commercial drones equipped with explosives, which targeted refinery equipment, fuel storage tanks, and local power stations. This caused massive fires across the complex that threatened to spread, leading to emergency efforts to put them out.
The attacks were met with widespread condemnation from Zawiyaโs main political and armed groups, as well as rival groups in Tripoli and the GNU. No group claimed credit for the attack, which significantly disrupted production at the facility and worsened an already extensive fuel shortage across the country.
Zawiya has long been a divided city, with various groups fighting for control over the refinery in what have normally been small or contained skirmishes that last only a few hours. These attacks were the most extensive in recent history, as they did not appear to target military forces but instead sought to cause massive damage to the refinery itself.
This has also caused confusion over who exactly carried out the attacks and what factions stand to gain. Armed groups that have been fighting to gain control of the refinery would have an incentive to damage their enemiesโ financial resources, but it also makes little sense, as these factions generally want to avoid damage to the refinery because they themselves want to profit from it if they take control.
There is also the possibility that senior levels of the GNU were involved, namely actors such as Ibrahim Dabaiba, the nephew of and senior adviser to GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba, and Deputy Defence Minister Abdulsalam al-Zoubi.
The GNU has long desired to control Zawiya and the refinery directly, and so far, the attacks have caused a rally among the normally antagonistic factions of Tripoli, with increasing rumours that the GNU will attempt a large military offensive to โliberateโ the city and finally gain control.
However, it would be risky for Ibrahim or other senior GNU leaders to take this action, as the worsening economy, power outages, and growing corruption have increased public anger and protests against the GNU. Attacks like these, which only worsen public issues such as fuel shortages, risk further inflaming tensions and public anger against them.
If the GNU does move ahead with an offensive, many of the armed actors in the west have connections with the LNA and other armed factions across the west, and an invasion could also threaten to trigger a domino effect across the country.
Whoever conducted the attack, the reasons are likely the same. Controlling valuable assets such as the refinery before a potential unity government is agreed is vital for the survival of various groups. Since oil is Libyaโs main lifeline, possession guarantees power and influence, and armed factions, whether local or national, are increasingly willing to take dangerous risks to secure these assets.
This means that if any national agreement gets closer, the potential for increased attacks against Libyaโs critical infrastructure could become more likely. The risk of increased adoption of cheap explosive drones could also see unprecedented damage across the country.
Questions in the east
While western Libya faced political and security tensions, Benghazi was rocked by its first major violent incident in years. Unknown assailants assassinated LNA Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Fawzi al-Mansouri, by detonating a bomb in his car as he was leaving a mosque in Benghazi.
Al-Mansouri was a commander of Salafist forces that aligned themselves with the LNA during Operation Dignity and had long held senior positions within the LNA, building ties with LNA Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar.
No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, which is a rare incident in Benghazi. Whoever carried out the attack, the intention appears to be to create an image of instability in the east, especially just before the city is visited by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and shortly after the United Kingdom recategorised Benghazi as safer to travel to.
The goal of creating this image of instability is likely to scare off current international efforts, such as the Boulos process, which currently favour the LNA due to its consolidated control in the east. Pushing away international efforts would also help retain the status quo, which raises questions about who benefits from promoting instability and maintaining the current system, especially as the LNA makes increasing strides towards pushing forward a unity deal.
Bottom Line
This pattern did not emerge in isolation. It followed the UK's downgraded risk assessment on Libya, and preceded a scheduled visit from Fidan, both signals of accumulating international momentum.
