The Houthi presence in Iraq can no longer be viewed simply as a political or media presence linked to what is known as the “Axis of Resistance”, but something more developed. Information accumulated over recent years, together with recent military developments in Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, indicates that this presence has gradually evolved into a more complex form of security, military, and logistical coordination with Iranian-aligned Iraqi armed groups.
These developments have become more significant following recent attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure launched from Iraqi territory, which occurred alongside Houthi advances along Yemen’s western coast and their movement toward strategic positions around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
From political presence to an operational role
Houthi-Iraqi engagement became more visible in 2016, when Houthi officials visited Baghdad and held meetings with Iraqi officials and political figures. Houthi-linked offices and media platforms subsequently emerged, while their activities expanded further after the Gaza war in 2023 and the regional escalation that followed.
An October 2025 report by the United Nations Panel of Experts for Yemen noted the growing Houthi presence in Iraq and the role of Houthi figures in arranging procurement, training, and visits, as well as engaging with armed groups, tribal figures, and Iraqi officials. The report also identified cooperation between Iraqi armed groups and the Houthis in areas including training and military and financial support, as well as the development of coordination mechanisms among groups operating within the broader “Axis of Resistance.”
This is significant because Iraq can provide the Houthis with capabilities that are more difficult to develop from Yemen alone: strategic depth away from the main conflict zone in Yemen, access to armed groups with experience in drones and missiles, and a large geographical area extending toward Saudi Arabia.
Is there a link between the attacks on Saudi Arabia and the Houthis?
Answering this question requires distinguishing between three different levels: the party launching the weapon, the party conducting the operation, and the party providing political, technical, or operational support. For the 11 September attack on the Saudi East-West Pipeline, Baghdad and Riyadh stated that the attack originated from Iraqi territory, while no group immediately claimed direct responsibility.
The Iraqi government also took security measures and dismissed a military commander following investigations into the origin of the attack. Therefore, there is currently insufficient public evidence to conclude that every attack launched from Iraq was directly carried out by the Houthis.
However, there are indications of increasing coordination between the Houthis and Iranian-aligned Iraqi armed groups. Intelligence and analytical reports have suggested that the Houthis and Iraqi armed groups may operate through a broader coordination mechanism in which the group carrying out an attack is not necessarily the same actor that provides the decision-making, technical expertise, or strategic direction.
This makes the Houthi presence in Iraq more significant. The Houthi role does not necessarily mean that Houthi personnel directly launch every attack. Rather, they may form part of a transnational operational network that shares technology, expertise, information, and planning capabilities.
Sending a message
The importance of the latest attack lies partly in the nature of the target itself. The Saudi operated East-West “Yanbu” Pipeline extends for approximately 1,200 kilometres and transports oil from Saudi Arabia’s eastern region to Yanbu on the Red Sea.
