This Partner Insights piece was written by Khaled Mahmoud.
Mahmoud is an Egyptian journalist and political analyst based in Cairo, specializing in Libyan affairs, regional politics, and security developments across the Middle East and North Africa. He has nearly 25 years of experience covering Libya and has reported extensively on its political transition, competing power centers, and regional dynamics
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Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaibaโs visit to Cairo is not merely an economic move or a bilateral meeting aimed at strengthening relations.
It is a political visit taking place at a particularly sensitive moment, as the head of Libyaโs Government of National Unity seeks to secure his hold on power amid US-led efforts by U.S. Senior Advisor Massad Boulos to reshape the Libyan political landscape and negotiations over a possible deal to redistribute power and influence among the rival factions.
Cairo should be asking itself a fundamental question: Is Egypt dealing with Libya as a country in need of genuine stability and unified institutions, or primarily as an oil and economic opportunity to be exploited, even if that means strengthening the position of one of the parties to the conflict?
Several years ago, I criticized Egyptโs opening to the GNU government, particularly following Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madboulyโs visit to Tripoli and the signing of dozens of agreements and memoranda of understanding.
At the time, I warned that these agreements would never be implemented and were not worth the ink used to draft their preambles.
Egypt should not place its bets on economic opportunities and reconstruction while treating the government in office as the gateway to Egyptian interests, without adequately assessing its alliances and its position in Libyaโs internal conflict. Today, the same pattern appears to be repeating itself, even if some of the circumstances have changed.
Entrenching the status quo
There is no dispute that Egypt needs Libyan oil, employment opportunities, reconstruction projects and expanded trade. But economic interests should not become the sole compass guiding Egyptian policy, nor should they lead Cairo to grant Dabaiba political advantages he has not necessarily earned.
Dabaiba is not a neutral actor in the Libyan crisis. He is one of its principal parties. He came to power through a transitional process whose political mandate expired long ago, while elections remained stalled amid the country's continuing divisions. His government faces a host of domestic problems involving resource management, public spending, corruption and its relationship with armed groups that exercise real power in western Libya.
More importantly, beyond being widely regarded as Turkeyโs man in Libya, Dabaiba is part of a complex domestic network of interests involving armed groups in Tripoli and Misrata, economic and financial elites, and influential political currents.
This network is what sustains his hold on power, perhaps more than any external relationship.
The most sensitive aspect is that this network is strategically connected to Turkey, which has entrenched its military and security presence in western Libya since 2019 and reshaped the balance of power there.
Managing expectations
These are considerations Cairo cannot afford to ignore, particularly given its view of Turkish influence as a direct challenge to its regional and security interests in the Mediterranean and along its western border.
Meanwhile, US efforts led by Massad Boulos, Trump's senior adviser, are taking shape. They include possible arrangements to redistribute power, potentially allowing Dabaiba to remain prime minister in exchange for bringing figures from the eastern camp, including Saddam Haftar, into a new power structure.
These arrangements still face major obstacles. There is a real risk that they will end up managing Libyaโs division and redistributing influence among existing power brokers rather than bringing that division to an end.
Egypt is not required to boycott Dabaiba or confront Turkey or the United States. Maintaining contact with the authority that controls Tripoli, its ports and western Libyaโs financial institutions is a practical necessity.
But there is a fundamental difference between necessary engagement and granting open-ended political legitimacy.





