The Blue Nile capital of Ed Damazin sits in the southeast corner of Sudan, finding itself within striking distance of both Ethiopia and South Sudan. This remoteness has been both a curse and a blessing, as while the 500km distance between Ed Damazin and the capital Khartoum puts the city at the far end of any economic development in Sudan, it also shields the city from most national crises stemming from the capital.
This proved to be the case when war erupted on the streets of Khartoum in 2023, as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) turned their weapons on each other and plunged the entire country in a brutal civil war. In the initial months of the conflict, Blue Nile state proved too remote and irrelevant for the war, which centered between the RSFโs heartland of Darfur and the capital Khartoum.
But the tides of the war gradually turned. The RSF was defeated in Khartoum, and ended up on the defensive as a revived SAF went on the move towards the west, setting its sights on returning to Darfur. As RSF defenses were faltering and the front seemed completely stuck, the paramilitary group looked east for a weakness to exploit. It found one in Blue Nile, where SAF defenses had been neglected as the army focused on other fronts.
An old front renewed
Despite its remote position, Blue Nile was no stranger to conflict. After South Sudanโs independence in 2011, rebels left on the northern side of the new border formed the Sudan Peopleโs Liberation MovementโNorth (SPLM-N) and took up arms against Khartoum.
The government managed to confine the fighting to the stateโs southern periphery, and the rebels never seriously threatened the regional capital. For the next 14 years, Blue Nile remained at an impasse: the government held the capital firmly, while the rebels stayed isolated in the far south. That changed when the RSF approached the SPLM-N with an offer of alliance. The SPLM-N accepted, and the Tasis coalition was born.
The RSF was eager to commit forces to a new campaign in Blue Nile but there was one problem: 500 kilometers of enemy territory stood between the RSF and this new theatre. If the RSF wanted to deploy forces to the southeast, they would have to travel through a foreign country. Ethiopia opportunistically presented a solution.
A new offensive
By late 2025, military camps started to appear in the west of Ethiopia, close to the borders with Sudan. Reuters analysed satellite imagery and concluded these camps were constructed to house thousands of RSF fighters, flown into the country by Emirati cargo planes.
The same Reuters investigation also noted that new military facilities were being constructed at the airport of Asosa, a regional hub in the west of Ethiopia. Investigators suspected the new hangars that were being built were meant to house advanced military drones. In Khartoum these reports set off alarm bells.
In January of 2026, the war reached Blue Nile. RSF and SPLM-N fighters poured over the border and outgunned SAF troops in the area. The border town of Kurmuk was taken within a day, and another district called Geisan, which was thought to be located far away from any rebel territory, found itself under attack as well. The SAF scrambled whatever forces it could muster and set up a defense south of Ed Damazin. Khartoum was aware that once the rebels took the regional capital, the east would be wide open to them.





