Whether wilfully or accidentally, water infrastructure was targeted multiple times throughout the U.S.-Iran war. On 7 March 2026, Tehran accused the U.S. of bombing a desalination plant on Qeshm Island, disrupting water supply to some 30 villages. The following day, Bahrain reported material damage to one of its own desalination facilities from Iranian drones.
Within weeks of conflict, U.S. and Israeli strikes had damaged what Tehran said were "dozens of water transmission and treatment facilities" across Iranian territory, while Gulf states accused Iranian missiles and drones of striking desalination installations in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE, charges Tehran denied, attributing the attacks to "false flag" operations without providing further proof.
The pattern persisted into the ceasefire period: on 10 June, U.S. precision munitions struck two concrete reservoirs in Iran’s Sirik, leaving an estimated 20,000 villagers without access to water until alternative supply was established within twelve hours.
Both sides have in practice damaged water infrastructure while pulling back from strikes that would make the conflict disastrous, following the same logic that has governed the upstream oil sector throughout the war.
In doing so, water has emerged as a previously neglected constraint on escalation: an asset that can be threatened for coercive effect, but whose widespread destruction would impose costs that neither side can easily absorb.
Two Worlds of Water Security
The GCC and Iran inhabit radically different water realities. The Gulf Cooperation Council holds around 60% of global desalination capacity and produces approximately 40% of the world's desalinated water, despite representing less than 1% of the global population.
