Over its two decades of rule, the Afghan Republic lost the support of the people it governed. It had granted rights to women, but this sat alongside a bloated apparatus of corruption, an economy that never escaped aid-dependency, and a political elite too disunited to meet its citizens' needs, ensure security, or to build a functioning state. Washington propped it up throughout, unwilling to acknowledge its structural failure.
When the U.S. began its pull-out in 2021, the Taliban launched their final offensive, and the entire façade began to unravel. Some Americans quickly blamed the Afghans themselves for their embarrassment, writing that Afghans did not want to fight for their “freedom.”
In actuality, Kabul had given its people very little reason to believe the state was worth fighting for. Afghans across the country dreaded the Taliban, but instead of fighting for a dying government, many soldiers went to seek out their families and prepare for what came next.
Five years since the Taliban's triumphant march into Kabul, the various factions of the former Mujahideen can proudly claim to be the sole authority in the country, 25 years after their initial ousting. Yet the Taliban face the same issues as their predecessors.
Their leadership, commanders and clerics who remain resistant to reform, is struggling to build a state that meets the needs of its people. As the economy continues to struggle and clashes with Pakistan along the border persist, small armed groups that linger on the sidelines of the state will continue to find support, utilising the Taliban's own playbook against them.
A void state
The Afghan economy is growing at a headline rate of 4.8%, according to the World Bank, but this is growth driven by sheer population pressure rather than the result of any real government policy or productivity gains by the Taliban.
Approximately 6 million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan since mid-September 2023, per the IOM, driving strong demand for goods and services. Many returnees are finding neither jobs nor housing, fuelling unemployment and insecurity, even as the end of the civil war has brought its own benefit to market stability.
There is little real investment in the economy, or any plan to actually meet the needs of a rapidly growing population. The country is still mainly rural and heavily reliant on resource extraction, particularly gold mining, though revenues from these goods are suppressed as local Taliban leaders mostly pocket the profits themselves. Inflation is rapidly rising, reaching 7.6% year-on-year in March, driven by high demand from the growing population and supply issues, including food, in an isolated country with little domestic industry.
The Taliban seemingly have no real plan to address this, driven by their own fundamentalist ideology, political fragmentation, and corruption. Their ban on women participating in almost all aspects of public life has made them an international pariah, and while regional states such as China, Iran and Turkmenistan have increasingly built relations with the Taliban, it has been an immensely slow process with Beijing being the only major investor in mining projects albeit offering a fraction of its pledges.
