GULF DESK
Since their inception in the 20th Century, Gulf countries have enjoyed a secure existence first made possible through Britain’s regional influence and then sustained by the U.S. via an unparalleled regional security architecture. American presence shielded Gulf countries from much of the Middle East’s volatility – with vivid examples such as the first Gulf war – and allowed them to grow into economic powers with global outreach.
However, this world is now changing. The U.S. is seeking to remove itself as a global security guarantor, and regional countries are becoming more willing to use hard power to achieve their goals. Characterised by well-equipped and yet weak militaries, in addition to deep security reliance on Washington, Gulf countries are not built for this future.
Israel’s attack on Palestinian militant group Hamas’ political team in Doha was a wake-up call for the region, putting into question the deep-seated assumption that national interests would always closely align with Washington’s. Gulf countries now realise that U.S.-backed security is neither reliable nor favourable as it imposes geostrategic vulnerability and impairs policy independence.
The American hegemon
Nearing the end of the Cold War, the United States solidified its position as the main security backer in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf. It helped in containing the Iranian threat, boosted military-industrial cooperation with NATO-ally Turkey, enforced Kuwaiti independence against a revisionist Iraq, and enabled long-term peace between Israel and Jordan.
Notably, this arrangement allowed the U.S. to not only freeze the Israel-Palestine crisis but also effectively abort the Arab-Israeli conflict. An unspoken rule emerged in which Arab countries would not challenge Israel in exchange for U.S. security guarantees. However, this dynamic created a disconnect between Arab states and their populations, who were angered by the treatment of Palestinians and their governments' quiet acceptance of Israel.
This divide was further reinforced during the first Trump administration (2017-2021), when Washington pushed for the adoption of the “Abraham Accords”, which encouraged Arab states to formally recognize Israel in exchange for continued U.S. support and regional integration.
The shift to a hard power world
The first Trump presidency marked the start of a U.S. pullback from global security guarantees. In the Middle East, he resisted full disengagement— due to lobbying from Egypt and the Gulf—but mixed selective aggression with restraint: ordering the 2020 strike that killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in Iraq while declining to answer Iran’s retaliatory missile barrage on Ain al-Assad base or the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities.
America remained militarily present, yet its posture moved from promoting a “liberal international order” to a more Realist reliance on hard power to protect core interests. That shift became stark after Hamas’ 2023 assault on Israel. Israel’s far-right government used the crisis to pursue annexationist aims, and Washington largely shielded it even under the Biden administration which only offered muted criticism even as Israeli actions breached international norms. The message was clear: the U.S. may shrink its regional commitments, but it will still wield selective force—or tolerate Israeli force—when its own strategic priorities are at stake.
From a regionally-integrated Israel to an Israeli region
The arrival of the second Trump administration (2024-2028) all but confirmed the shift to “might makes right,” as Trump campaigned on national strength and withdrawing from foreign conflicts. Free from the complaints of the Biden administration, Israel has now firmly attempted to take on the role of military hegemon in the Middle East, gradually replacing its reliance on a weakening Hasbara in favour of hard power.
The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have severely weakened Iran’s “Resistance Axis” by decapitating Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, in addition to undermining Syria’s new transitional government by diminishing its military hardware and enabling pockets of opposition to Damascus by intervening in the country’s southwest.
Houthi-controlled Yemen continues to be battered by Israeli strikes that severely damage already strained vital infrastructure. Even Tunisia, where the IDF launched airstrikes against the Palestinian Liberation Force’s HQ in 1985, is believed to be recently targeted with some boats from the Gaza-bound Global Sumud Flotilla mysteriously catching fire on its shores.
Netanyahu knows he does not need to turn his ideal of a “Greater Israel” into a territorial reality, instead he just needs to push for a new region where each state is vulnerable to strikes should it reject Israeli security dominion and strategic initiatives. Even Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government has now engaged in serious negotiations with Israel to reach a settlement with his all-powerful neighbour.
The U.S. may see itself as the strongest military power in the region, but it is increasingly playing catch-up behind its client state Israel. In June, Netanyahu launched a brazen attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran, seeking to unseat a 46-year-old regime known as Israel’s arch-rival. The U.S. only joined in strikes against Iran after Israel had acted and, in an effort to reduce tensions, agreed to a choreographed tit-for-tat retaliation by Iran which struck the biggest U.S. military base in the region: al-Udeid in Qatar.
Doha reluctantly accepted this violation to ensure regional peace and was quickly assuaged by Tehran’s apologetic stance and the U.S. military’s almost perfect interception of Iranian missiles. Yet, Israel’s strikes in September went far beyond any potential pre-arrangement for regional peace. They not only crossed a redline but were also accompanied by the U.S. military’s inaction and hubris on the Israeli side, despite their apparent failure at killing high-ranking Hamas officials.
The Trump administration denied prior knowledge, which was contradicted by Israeli sources, thus not only losing control once more over its Israeli ally but also betraying a clear lack of interest for Gulf security. While the White House strongly condemned the attack and stated that it will not happen again, no action was taken to reprimand Israel. This comes after trillions of dollars in future U.S. investment commitments by Gulf countries - money that clearly does not buy security.
A region on high alert…
The attack has sent shockwaves across the Middle East, revealing that the general U.S. security infrastructure in the region is severely diminished – not due to technical limitations but because of political choice. The optics of State Secretary Marco Rubio standing next to Netanyahu in Jerusalem when the latter renewed threats against the region on September 15 says it all.
An attack on the Hamas delegation—a group Israel and the United States had explicitly asked Qatar to host from 2012 onwards—raises critical concerns about the safety of future negotiating teams operating in Doha. Muscat, the other major Gulf negotiator which acts as an intermediary between the U.S. and its enemies in the Muslim world, also fears for its security.
With the United States unwilling to defend Qatar, questions are now being raised about the security of other U.S. allies in the region. Turkey, which has recently taken a more confrontational stance toward Israel, having cut off trade with Israel and banned Israeli-flagged ships from its ports, could be the next target.
In recent months, Israeli social media has been filled with threats falsely accusing Turkey of keeping Hamas afloat. In fact, Turkey and Israel are on a collision course, which may not happen directly but will certainly materialise in Syria and covertly elsewhere if Israeli current policies continue. At worst, a direct confrontation would put NATO into an unforeseen crisis, with Western countries likely to turn a blind eye on mutual defence clauses for the sake of Israel.
….but allergic to confrontation
Despite sounding the alarm, reactions by Gulf countries have been underwhelming. Gulf leaders have been good at creating the optics of togetherness, with the swift travel of UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman – the architects of the 2017 Qatar blockade – to Doha is a case in point. Such shows of solidarity underlined strong and healthy intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ties whilst pointing at the council’s original raison-d’être, i.e. security.
Yet, despite deep-pockets, these states have their hands tied and can only defer to the international community to confront Israel, as seen in the Arab-Islamic Emergency Summit’s final communique’s Article 14 and 16, the latter which called for considering Israel’s suspension from the UN. This can be explained by the fact that Gulf leaderships remain divided, including within their own domestic polity, regarding key regional issues such as Palestine.
Many Gulf leaders have shed crocodile tears regarding the fate of Hamas leaders killed over the last two years. Abu Dhabi as well as Manama have no desire to walk back on the Abraham Accords as their worldview is not so dissimilar from Israel’s hard right and the cost of doing so is deemed too high – in the form of U.S. cutting access to high-technologies, investments and security which would in turn upend the UAE’s economic fundamentals.
This should not come as a surprise. Gulf monarchies have historically been risk intolerant and seldom adopt a confrontational stance. Instead, leaders are likely to double down on satisfying U.S. demands so as to ensure continued security umbrella, going as far as supporting behind closed doors plans to at least temporarily displace Palestinians from Gaza.
This begs the question of how long such rulers can ignore the lingering drivers of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They are increasingly facing a difficult decision regarding normalization with Israel. If they choose to maintain it, they risk escalating public anger. The Arab Spring proved that no regime is truly immune to public uprising. On the other hand, if they walk back normalization, they will likely face backlash from the Trump administration, which has consistently promoted the Abraham Accords as one of its major foreign policy achievements.
Boosting self-reliance as an alternative to confrontation
Ultimately, as Israel asserts itself as the dominant military power in the region, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that other states will be able to ignore its whims. Netanyahu’s headlong rush into ever expanding regional strikes and tapping into dreams of a “Greater Israel” will eventually alienate the region and potentially accelerate an American revision of ties with its closest Middle Eastern ally.
However, before this happens, the shift to dominant Israeli power threatens to undermine the perception of stability that has underpinned Gulf states’ success. As the United States retreats and Israel fills the vacuum, these nations are likely to face mounting challenges.
Frustration over the Gaza war could combine with longstanding grievances about corruption and a lack of job opportunities. While the Gulf states may weather short-term unrest due to their small, wealthy populations, other nations—especially Egypt and Jordan—are already facing severe economic pressure and rising public dissatisfaction.
To weather the storm, Gulf countries will further put efforts into their state-owned military enterprises like Saudi Arabia’s SAMI or the UAE’s EDGE so as to boost their military hardware self-reliance. However, this won’t tackle the short-term challenges arising from an overzealous Israel and an uncommitted U.S. Iran’s wartime shortcomings have also shown that focus on domestic armament cannot cut it against the world’s most advanced militaries and requires leaning on the other great powers.
The Gulf’s comparative advantage is that they do not have a pariah status and can deepen security ties with U.S. alternatives such as France, Russia and China – although none has America’s strength. Moreover, non-Western security providers remain unlikely for the Gulf as boosting arms purchases from China would anger Washington while Beijing and Moscow also do not view Gulf capitals as committed to their views on global order.
Iran, which has since the GCC’s establishment been perceived as the central threat to the Gulf, now increasingly shares common security considerations with Gulf capitals. In a Middle East where Israel runs amok, any counterforce is welcome and a strong Iran suddenly becomes not so much undesirable.
While Iran’s HOPE initiative for Gulf security still has low chances of materialising, Israeli overextension and U.S. weakness opens the door for greater security cooperation between the Gulf’s two shores. The secretary of Iran’s top security body, Ali Larijani, was in Riyadh on September 16 to meet with Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman, ending his trip by saying “defence cooperation would become institutionalized in the future.”
Greater interest in intra-regional defence cooperation and security frameworks also encompasses the recent Saudi-Pakistan mutual defence pact, which elevates close military ties and sends a strong message to Washington that Riyadh can find alternative security backers that are even potentially willing to include a nuclear umbrella. The GCC members are also pressed to build upon their joint defence agreement reached in 2000.
However, for now, these steps remain empty positioning that need to be stressed-test in conflict time. Gulf countries may be showing disagreement with Washington, but they ultimately have no clearcut alternative to go through Trump and Netanyahu’s whims unscathed. As such, they are likely to continue blindly following the U.S. in the hopes of keeping the security benefits of a bygone era, thus risking to lose the cake they had for so long and which they were also eating.