It could hardly have been more symbolic. Prime Minister Carney of Canada, a man who almost embodies the globalised order itself, having served as central bank governor of both Canada and the UK, sounded the alarm on the closing chapter of the world’s rules-based order.
That he did so exactly a year after U.S. President Donald Trump’s inauguration only sharpened the moment. The speech will likely endure as a footnote marking both an ending and a beginning: the quiet close of the old order, and the uneasy opening of what comes next.
It was a rare demonstration of agency that punctured the state of denial under which most Western countries have operated over the past 12 months, as well as a moment of clarity that highlighted a potential solution to many of the problems currently facing global politics.
Not necessarily because the situation has improved, but because it is finally being addressed openly.
Carney did not lament the collapse of the “rules-based” world order or romanticise what was lost. He acknowledged something far more sobering: that the old assumptions no longer work, that pretending otherwise has actually become a liability and that continuing to perform belief in a broken system is itself a risk.
For middle powers, that recognition restores agency. It creates an opportunity to turn what Carney identified as a “rupture” into a recalibration.
Europe remains in denial
Despite this opportunity for a strategic recalibration, Europe continues to behave as if the rules-based international order merely needs defending, rather than acknowledging that it is no longer working - let alone admit that it never truly functioned as advertised.
For decades, Europe has outsourced its national strategies to this notion of Atlanticism, taking for granted that the system would hold indefinitely even though Atlanticism was designed around the needs of Washington only. Europe dressed up its dependence on this system as a principle.
In this context, the performance of deference and restraint became a form of virtue signalling that existed mainly to reinforce an imperfect but functional political status quo. The arrangement worked, until Trumpism entered the political ecosystem, and suddenly the assumptions that underlied the previous system started failing.
Today, most of the threats that Europe has traditionally ascribed to China and Russia (economic coercion, weaponised interdependence, political pressure through trade, and threat to territorial integrity) are actively being posed by its closest ally.
