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The networks behind Libya’s instability

Through corruption and opportunism, 111st Brigade commander Abdulsalam al-Zoubi has recently become a dominant figure in western Libya, but in the country's cyclical politics of violence, it's unclear how long he could remain.

The networks behind Libya’s instability
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The Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba, acts not only as the regional government for western Libya but also partly as a criminal enterprise. Public corruption is endemic throughout the system and affects large swathes of government operations.

These public-criminal networks operate largely through a patronage system in which western Libyan security leaders place allies in government agencies and public companies, then use these networks to launder money, manipulate payrolls, secure kickbacks, and provide benefits to family members and their private businesses.

For years, one of the most powerful leaders within these networks was Abdulghani al-Kikli, also known as Ghneiwa, who led the influential Security Support Apparatus (SSA). Using the power of his armed forces, Ghneiwa was able to install allies in important government offices to enrich himself and his family.

However, there are only so many government offices available, and western Libya’s various security and political factions often compete for control of them. This competition makes the system inherently unstable, and former allies and partners frequently turn on one another.

Ghneiwa eventually became one of the most powerful men in Tripoli, creating tensions and concerns among other security and political leaders in western Libya. Dabaiba, constantly worried about his own position in the capital, used these fears to build a large coalition aimed at toppling Ghneiwa.

In May 2025, this coalition of regional security forces and influential local actors surrounded Ghneiwa’s positions across Tripoli. Ghneiwa was lured into the camp of the 444th Brigade, an ally of Dabaiba, where he was killed, and his SSA was rapidly overwhelmed and dismantled.

Dabaiba later claimed the operation was designed to increase state control over independent actors, but in reality it amounted to a hostile takeover.

While Ghneiwa’s security assets were absorbed into other regional units, his network of contacts inside government offices came under the control of Deputy Defence Minister Abdulsalam al-Zoubi. Al-Zoubi had previously been an ally of Ghneiwa, and the two had a long history of cooperation. However, the pursuit of power overrode that partnership, and al-Zoubi participated in the operation that led to Ghneiwa’s death.

Al-Zoubi has since taken over Ghneiwa’s role as one of the dominant figures in Tripoli and has established himself as the new face of western Libyan security. Yet while al-Zoubi and Dabaiba claim to be strengthening the government, they are in reality further weakening it.

In his efforts to consolidate control, al-Zoubi is currently seeking to regain authority over the Vital Contracts Review Office, but he is being blocked by Audit Bureau head Khalid Shakshak. Despite claims of bolstering state institutions, an attempt by al-Zoubi to seize this office could plunge Tripoli into another round of fighting and instability.

Building his network

A major source of power and influence for al-Zoubi was his control of the Administrative Control Authority (ACA), along with its authority over the important Contracts Review Office.

Al-Zoubi likely gained control of the ACA through cooperation with the House of Representatives (HoR) in Benghazi and with assistance from Ghneiwa. Sources told THE GEOPOLITICAL DESK that al-Zoubi bribed the head of the HoR Parliamentary Committee for Oversight and Regulatory Bodies, Zayed Hadiyah, to appoint his ally Abdullah Qadarbouh as head of the ACA.

Qadarbouh’s appointment never received an official sign-off from HoR Speaker Agila Saleh, but Saleh likely gave informal approval. The legal uncertainty surrounding Qadarbouh’s position provided the HoR with the option to remove him if necessary.

While al-Zoubi secured his chosen candidate, he lacked physical control over the actual ACA headquarters, which remained under the authority of Ghneiwa. The two reached an agreement: Ghneiwa would relinquish control of the institution in exchange for al-Zoubi granting him future benefits related to contracts. Additionally, Ghneiwa was permitted to place his own ally, Khaled Daw Aloulou, as the deputy head of the ACA.

The HoR soon passed Law Number 2 - 2023, which transferred control of the Contracts Review Office from the Audit Bureau to the ACA. This gave al-Zoubi an unparalleled level of influence, and he worked in an alliance of convenience with Ghneiwa to exploit it.

Contract King

The Contracts Review Office is important because it approves and executes all contracts associated with the government. This means that whoever controls the office can ignore official oversight or due process in order to push through any contract they choose.

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