What really happened in Suwayda?

Syria’s prospects for a peaceful transition looked unexpectedly bright when Assad fell. The regime had collapsed without major bloodshed in a ten days offensive, pro-Assad forces disbanded with little resistance, and the country avoided large-scale sectarian violence in the first months.

Nowhere did hopes run higher than in Suwayda, in southern Syria, where the Druze community — long respected for its patriotic history as well as its Anti-Assad peaceful movement — seemed poised to help steer a stable future.

But just seven months later, and especially over the past week, that fragile optimism has fully unravelled.

A ten-day episode of fighting erupted across Suwayda on 12 July 2025, shattering months of fragile negotiations between the Syrian state and the Druze leadership. What began as a local clash between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribal armed groups (which form around 10% of Suwayda's population) has spiraled into a full-scale tribal war on a national level.

These two neighboring communities have a long and uneasy history, made worse by competition over control of traffic routes to Jordan. The conflict has triggered mass mobilization among all Syrian tribes. Meanwhile, the Druze of Suwayda, backed by Israeli airstrikes, have pushed the Syrian state out of the governorate.

The result is the most dangerous escalation in Syria since the fall of Assad.

From fragile dialogue to total collapse

This explosion of violence comes after nearly seven months of promising – though difficult – dialogue between the new Syrian government and Druze religious and military leadership. With the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, a new political space opened in Suwayda.

While many Druze factions (such as Sheikh al-Karama led by Laith al-Balaous or Ahrar al-Jabal under Suleiman Abdelbaqi, as well as religious leaders like Hannawi and Jarbou') sought a constructive partnership with Damascus, one man remained firmly opposed from the outset: Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri.

Immediately after the fall of the regime, Hijri, the most influential Druze spiritual figure in Syria, rejected the legitimacy of the post-Assad authorities, labeling them as extremists and "terrorists."

Though subtle at first, Israeli support came swiftly, driven by its interest to carve out a new buffer zone around its northeastern border with Syria. Hijri's symbolic authority extended also over a Druze militia composed partly of former regime officers, the "Military Council of Suwayda", established after the fall of Assad.

Though initially a minority voice in the Druze political spectrum, Hijri's influence grew over the past months, fueled by intercommunal tensions.

Despite this, the Syrian government, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, pursued for months a careful policy of mediation, seeking to create political space for central authorities by empowering the Druze current favourable to Damascus, and keeping canals open with all factions.

In April, a Druze minister was appointed into the government –sparking outrage among Suwayda Bedouin tribes, who felt unrepresented.

Figures like Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakkour (who was kidnapped twice by Hijri’s partisans) and security chief General Ahmad Dalati led relentless efforts to strike a comprehensive deal despite recurring tensions.

In May 2025, a broad agreement was reached: state forces would enter the governorate through Druze leaders and local militias affiliated with the Ministry of Interior, while the region would retain partial de facto autonomy.

The kidnapping that triggered a war

The arrangement fell apart in mid-July, when a Druze civilian was kidnapped and robbed at a checkpoint operated by pro-government Bedouin fighters near Suwayda.

The incident triggered a tit-for-tat cycle of retaliatory abductions between Druze and Bedouins, culminating in deadly armed clashes.

In an effort to prevent further bloodshed and to reassert control over a governorate slipping from its hands, Damascus decided to intervene militarily to stop the infighting. General Ahmad Dalati secured agreement from most Druze factions, including Hijri, to allow Syrian forces to re-enter Suwayda.

At first, it appeared to work. Dalati was welcomed by several Druze groups loyal to the agreement. But the State's intervention was, to say the least, ill-prepared and hastily implemented and two simultaneous events set up the crisis.

Some undisciplined units committed grave violations against Druze civilians and captured fighters. Simultaneously, Hijri reneged the agreement while his forces launched coordinated ambushes on Syrian units across Suwayda, killing dozens of soldiers, with some reportedly being executed after capture.

It is unclear which event preceded the other, but this double mutual betrayal triggered widespread combat. Many Druze elements previously aligned with Damascus took up arms against the Syrian army, driven by communal solidarity and anger.

Syrian forces, in turn, retaliated with force, leading to documented cases of abuse and destruction of properties. Trust evaporated. The breaking point came when Hijri issued a public call for Israeli intervention.

Images quickly spread of Sheikh Muwafaq Tarif, the Druze religious leader in Israel, addressing Israeli generals and demanding immediate action.

Israel enters the fray —and faces the consequences

The Israeli action was swift and devastating. Airstrikes targeted Syrian positions across Suwayda and beyond, including a Ministry of Defense headquarters in central Damascus. Over 200 Syrian soldiers were reportedly killed.

These casualties were drawn from across the country—Daraa, Homs, Aleppo, Deir Ezzor, and Idlib—turning Hijri’s war into what many Syrians perceived as "national treason" and a national vendetta.

For many in the Druze community, however, Druze blood was spilled for no reason by rogue elements in Damascus who sought to exterminate their community. For many Syrians, on the other hand, the blood of their sons had been spilled by a man, Hijri, who happens to be the spiritual leader of the Druze community.

Beyond perceptions, what is certain is that decision-makers in Damascus underestimated the presence of undisciplined elements within their armed forces and failed to anticipate the Israeli strikes, deluding themselves with false guarantees after the discreet Syrian-Israeli talks which took place in Baku just days earlier.

Tensions increased when Syrian forces were forced to withdraw from Suwayda after Israel’s strikes and ultimatum, leading to Hijri's men taking full control of the city and committing executions against Bedouins civilians in reprisal. In response, protests erupted nationwide and calls spread for an economic boycott of the Suwayda province.

Bedouin mobilization and a sectarian domino effect

In Syria, targeting Bedouins carries grave consequences. Tribes span the country—from Idlib and Aleppo to Daraa, Homs, and the northeast, up until Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Within 24 hours following the retreat of Syrian government forces and the arbitrary killing of Bedouins, over 40 Syrian tribes declared general mobilization and launched attacks on Druze militants in Suwayda from multiple directions.

And just like that, what began as a local militia dispute escalated into a full-blown nationwide tribal war. The State, already absent from Suwayda, was totally incapable of stopping it.

After several days of clashes and mounting international pressure, central authorities proclaimed a truce and obtained a partial withdrawal of tribal forces from Suwayda's neighbourhoods.

To add fuel to the fire, on July 21, Suwayda's Bedouins were "evacuated" from the province after being held hostage by Druze militias. The move has sparked anger among Bedouin tribesmen across the country, who saw this as an attempt at ethnic cleansing.

This episode marks an unprecedented breakdown.

Druze communities have historically shown loyalty to central states, whether in Syria, Lebanon, or Israel. Even during the Syrian civil war, most Druze militias avoided confrontation with Damascus as well as with the rebellion, opting instead for neutrality or peaceful protests.

Hijri’s gamble, backed by Israeli airpower and dreams of a Druze autonomous pro-Israeli buffer zone, breaks sharply from this tradition.

Israel, meanwhile, has played the role of social chemist in an already fractured Syrian society. By militarily shielding Hijri, it has exacerbated sectarian fragmentation, empowered non-state actors, and deepened Syria’s post-war tensions, pushing Syria to the brink of chaos.

A province in ruin and a state in crisis

Today, Suwayda is a martyred province. Infrastructure has collapsed. There is no electricity, water, fuel, or access to border trade with Jordan. Calls of boycott fueled by tribal and sectarian anger will likely aggravate the situation.

The governorate, now encircled by hostile Sunni tribal regions, is economically strangled and socially isolated.

On the other hand, the intra-Druze divisions that Damascus has been counting on are no more.

Faced with mounting adversity and external pressure, the community has instead closed ranks and united against the Syrian state – with the exception of Laith al Balous, who has been abandoned by what was left of his men and has left Suwayda to avoid reprisals from his kin.

International efforts have fallen short. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Joumblatt (the first foreign figure to visit Syria after Assad’s fall) has tried for months to mediate between the warring factions.

His efforts, like those of the Syrian government and moderate Druze leaders, now lie in ruins.

Yet despite suffering a major blowback, Damascus still holds cards. It has retained international backing — including from the U.S., who was angered by Israeli airstrikes, and from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey, who were all frustrated by Hijri’s reckless policies and Israel's interference.

The state's absence has shown the dangers of a power vacuum —namely, instability, ethnic or tribal warfare, and wider regional escalation. There is a growing realization that state presence, however flawed, remains a necessary buffer against total disintegration.

This partly explains the mounting pressure on the U.S. Special Envoy to Syria, Ambassador Thomas J. Barrack, to swiftly integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian army.

But Damascus is also deeply weakened.

Non-state actors (tribal militias) have taken the lead. Trust between the Druze and the State is irreparably broken. Both Druze and Bedouins local communities blame the government for failing to protect them.

Syrian tribes blame it for withdrawing too quickly and exposing their Bedouin relatives to retaliation. Syrians in general blame it for bowing to Israeli pressure.