What is the point of the UN Support Mission in Libya?

Since 2022, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has dismissed domestic efforts to resolve the country’s political deadlock, citing procedural flaws and the UN’s exclusion from mediation efforts.

At the same time, it has struggled to launch new forums for meaningful political dialogue or sustain a credible political process of its own.

This has created a paradoxical situation on the ground where the UNSMIL protects an unstable status quo and has itself become one of the political roadblocks the UN was meant to oppose.

To remain relevant, UNSMIL must rapidly demonstrate tangible progress on the core goals of its mandate, including enabling an inclusive political process and supporting credible elections in the near future. Without this, its role risks being seen as simply symbolic and called into further question by Libyans.

A closer look

Following the 2019-2020 battle for Tripoli, the UN mission was able to briefly capture lightning in a bottle under the temporary leadership of Deputy SRSG Stephanie Williams.

With the Libyan National Army (LNA) bruised from their defeat in Tripoli and the former Government of National Accord (GNA) reaching its political limit, Williams was able to establish a new status quo in Libya through the 2021 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF).

Despite this initial momentum, the current stalemate between the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the Government of National Stability (GNS) in Benghazi was partially brought about by the UNSMIL after its failure to see through the outcomes of the LPDF.

While the creation of the new GNU offered some hope, it was marred by reports of corruption and vote-buying on behalf of Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba. The UNSMIL swept these issues under the rug, and Williams was eventually replaced by successors who lacked a clear vision or plan for how to enforce the LPDF’s main goal of holding elections.

Failure to hold account

As it became increasingly clear that the GNU and Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba had no intention of holding national elections, the UNSMIL continued to endorse the GNU’s legitimacy and even obstructed Libyan-led efforts to establish a political alternative.

Under Ján Kubiš, UNSMIL declined to hold the GNU accountable for failing to organize the elections that had justified their mandate under the LPDF agreement.

Kubiš resigned a month before the planned election date in December 2021, likely anticipating its failure. In his place, Stephanie Williams was reappointed, this time as Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, resuming a temporary leadership role at a pivotal moment.

When the GNU failed to deliver elections, the House of Representatives responded by appointing a parallel government, the GNS, led by former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha.

Although imperfect, the formation of the GNS marked the first genuinely Libyan-led political initiative in years, uniting a range of competing factions around the shared objective of removing the GNU from Tripoli.

Although Williams return had initially raised hopes that she would correct the failures of her predecessor, she quickly rejected the GNS on the grounds that its creation did not meet international standards – despite similar flaws in the earlier UN-led LPDF.

As such, her tenure saw Libya revert to institutional fragmentation, with the GNU in Tripoli and the GNS in Benghazi.

UNSMIL remained without a permanent head until September 2022, when Abdoulaye Bathily was appointed. By then, the divide between rival administrations had hardened.

Over the next two years, Bathily repeatedly promised a new political roadmap but failed to deliver.

During this period, UNSMIL continued to sideline Libyan-led initiatives and refrained from holding the GNU accountable for targeting parliamentarians, suppressing civil society, and violating nearly every key agreement reached under the LPDF.

Maintaining a status quo

UNSMIL has gradually shifted from facilitating a political solution to entrenching an increasingly unsustainable status quo – whether by design or as a result of institutional paralysis and leadership shortcomings.

Under Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily, negotiations stalled and failed to generate any meaningful momentum. Libyan stakeholders waited for a new national roadmap from the UN mission, but by April 2024, they were met only with Bathily’s resignation and no plan to replace the process he had promised.

Following his departure, Deputy SRSG Stephanie Khoury briefly revived the mission’s role. Her engagement was notably effective in resolving a high-stakes crisis at the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), working swiftly with key political and financial stakeholders.

Yet this brief window of action quickly closed. Khoury’s mandate was interim, and with the appointment of Ghanaian diplomat Hannah Tetteh as SRSG in January 2025, momentum was once again lost.

Tetteh took several weeks to consult with actors on the ground and familiarize herself with Libya’s complex political terrain, thus delaying any further movement on Khoury’s initiatives.

Since then, UNSMIL has reverted to its familiar pattern of hosting high-profile consultations without translating them into actionable political outcomes.

The mission’s latest round of “forever photo ops,” as they are derisively described by many Libyan observers, has failed to produce a coherent national process.

Local initiatives have been sidelined, and domestic efforts to shift political dynamics have repeatedly been diluted by international mediation.

During the most recent crisis in Tripoli, UNSMIL reportedly played a behind-the-scenes role in persuading the Presidential Council to delay its withdrawal of recognition from the GNU.

Yet once again, the mission did so without offering a viable alternative, effectively stalling what many Libyans saw as an organic political recalibration led by domestic actors rather than international frameworks.

A new political roadmap was expected during Tetteh’s July 2025 presentation to the UN Security Council. Instead, she requested more time, citing the need for further consultations.

To date, no clear proposal has been put forward, and it remains unclear whether UNSMIL is any closer to forging consensus or is simply managing Libya’s ongoing political stagnation.

Mission not accomplished