The race to unlock eastern Congo’s economic future

On June 27, 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed the Washington Agreement, a landmark peace deal brokered with U.S. mediation aimed at halting hostilities in eastern Congo’s mineral-rich provinces. 

It is the most significant diplomatic breakthrough in the Great Lakes region since the 2013 Addis Ababa Framework.

How sustainable is this?

More than just a ceasefire, the agreement establishes joint security mechanisms, a roadmap for the mutual withdrawal of troops from contested zones, and a framework for cross-border cooperation on demobilization and economic recovery. 

The deal follows months of high-stakes shuttle diplomacy involving Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and Angolan President João Lourenço, who has emerged as a key regional mediator.

It also builds on earlier initiatives such as the Luanda Roadmap (2022) and the Nairobi Process, both of which failed to halt recurring violence. 

At the local level, the conflict in eastern Congo has pitted the fragmented Congolese army (FARDC) against a mosaic of armed actors, including M23, Mai-Mai militias, and foreign rebel groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). 

According to reports from the UN Group of Experts, Rwanda has continued to back the M23 militia, which re-emerged in late 2021 and seized key territory in North Kivu, triggering mass displacement and further destabilizing an already fragile region.

Provincial governors, civil society coalitions, and traditional authorities in Tanganyika, South Kivu, and North Kivu have played critical roles in coordinating humanitarian responses and lobbying for international engagement. 

However, the underlying drivers of the conflict remain complex: unresolved grievances over Tutsi representation, refugee return, smuggling networks, and most importantly control over lucrative mineral trade routes.

Restoring investor confidence

With security gains slowly taking root, international investors are recalibrating their risk outlook.

The DRC’s southeastern provinces (especially Tanganyika, Haut-Katanga, and Lualaba) are once again attracting the attention of major mining firms. 

U.S.-based KoBold Metals, China’s Zijin Mining, and Switzerland’s Glencore have all resumed or expanded operations, reflecting a cautiously optimistic return of capital to high-potential zones. 

KoBold, for instance, has committed over $200 million in new investment following renewed access to exploration zones in Lualaba, while Zijin is advancing plans to expand its refining capacity near Kolwezi.

Political risk insurance providers like MIGA and Africa-focused development banks have expanded their coverage in the DRC, while Fitch recently revised the country’s credit outlook to stable. 

This resurgence is driven by global strategic demand. The International Energy Agency projects a fourfold increase in cobalt demand by 2030, while lithium and copper are essential to global electrification and defense supply chains.

Strategic resources and renewed potential

At the center of southeastern Congo’s mineral resurgence is Manono, a town historically known for its tin and tantalum production but long cut off from international markets by conflict and decaying infrastructure. 

Today, Manono is gaining new attention as a global lithium hotspot. It hosts one of the world’s largest known hard-rock lithium deposits, with over 400 million tonnes of spodumene-bearing ore, making it a critical node in global EV and battery supply chains.

For years, industrial development in Manono was stalled by a bitter legal dispute between AVZ Minerals and the Congolese state over control of the lithium concession.

In early 2025, the DRC’s Ministry of Mines issued a long-awaited decree recognizing AVZ’s majority ownership, clearing the way for the $6 billion Manono Lithium and Tin Project. 

However, the African Development Bank and World Bank have both flagged severe infrastructure deficits as a key constraint to growth.

Without reliable transport corridors linking Manono to regional hubs and export ports, extraction will remain expensive and logistically precarious.

Connecting Manono

Efforts to link Manono to national and regional infrastructure networks are accelerating, with road construction and multimodal integration now a central focus of development planning. 

Priority initiatives include paved access roads to Kalemie (a port city on Lake Tanganyika) and Kamina (a strategic railway hub connecting to southern DRC and beyond), as well as improved road links to Kolwezi and Likasi, two major industrial centers in the Copperbelt.

The integration of road, rail, and lake transport is part of a broader strategy to establish an interconnected logistics backbone across southeastern Congo. 

These plans align with continental priorities under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and regional visions advanced by COMESA and the Tripartite Free Trade Area, aiming to turn the mineral-rich provinces into fully integrated trade corridors. 

But this remains a monumental task.

According to the World Bank, DRC’s logistics costs are among the highest globally, up to 60% of export value in some cases, due to poor road quality, bureaucratic delays, and fragmented governance.

Likewise, the IMF’s 2023 public investment assessment flagged critical weaknesses in project appraisal and execution capacity.

Tanzania’s role in regional development

Across Lake Tanganyika, Tanzania is advancing logistics upgrades designed to position the country as a key transit hub for eastern DRC’s mineral and agricultural exports. 

Central to this strategy is the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) extension from Kigoma to Dar es Salaam, which is now fully funded through a combination of Tanzanian government spending and concessional finance. 

The SGR is expected to significantly cut transit times and lower the cost of bulk cargo transport to the Indian Ocean, positioning the Dar Corridor as a competitive alternative to Zambia’s Copperbelt routes.

Kigoma Port is also undergoing modernization to improve docking, loading, and customs efficiency, while barge operations across Lake Tanganyika, particularly between Kigoma and Kalemie, are being revived. 

According to the Lake Tanganyika Authority, these upgrades are expected to increase regional cargo throughput by over 60% within two years.

The UNECA-backed Lake Tanganyika Master Plan has identified this axis as a priority trade route under both the EAC Infrastructure Strategy and AfCFTA implementation frameworks.

The broader goal is to establish a seamless, multimodal corridor linking eastern Congo’s resource-rich provinces to global export markets, while integrating Tanzanian and Congolese value chains. 

Long-term infrastructure planning

For these investments to translate into inclusive, durable growth, infrastructure planning must move beyond an extractive logic. 

The World Bank notes that while resource corridors can accelerate development, their long-term success depends on how well they are designed to serve broader social and economic goals.

In this context, southeastern DRC presents both a high-potential test case and a high-risk challenge.

Future transport networks in Tanganyika, Haut-Lomami, and Lualaba should also enable:

• Access to healthcare, education, and clean water services, especially in under-served rural zones where health and education indicators remain among the lowest in Africa.
• Improved mobility for rural populations, supporting seasonal labor flows, market access, and social cohesion.
• Integrated economic corridors, where mining coexists with agricultural processing, small enterprise growth, and essential public services.

Risks and Structural Fragilities

Despite recent momentum, multiple structural risks could derail long-term development in southeastern DRC or reproduce familiar patterns of exclusion and volatility.

1. Fragile peace and risk of relapse into conflict

For one, ceasefire deals in eastern DRC have historically failed without credible disarmament mechanisms, localized reconciliation, and strong civilian oversight.

Armed groups remain active in parts of Tanganyika and North Kivu, and could return to violence if political commitments unravel or local grievances are ignored.

2. Weaknesses in the mining sector

The DRC’s mining sector remains structurally bifurcated between industrial-scale projects and artisanal/small-scale mining (ASM), a reality that could undermine the reputational and ethical standing of the entire regional supply chain.

According to the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), ASM accounts for 15–20% of cobalt output and employs over 200,000 people.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF have raised persistent concerns over child labor and hazardous working conditions in artisanal mines, particularly in Kolwezi and Manono.

3. Risks of malign foreign competition and elite capture

Infrastructure development has become a geopolitical battleground. Chinese state-owned firms dominate mining logistics across Katanga, while Gulf and Western players are seeking entry through energy-transition narratives.

Opaque deals, barter agreements, or infrastructure-for-minerals swaps often circumvent public procurement norms, entrenching elite capture and bypassing local benefit-sharing.

4. Institutional capacity constraints

The DRC's Ministry of Infrastructure and provincial governments often lack the technical and financial capacity to manage large-scale infrastructure rollouts.

A 2024 IMF public investment management review noted significant inefficiencies in project appraisal, budgeting, and monitoring, increasing the risk of delays, cost overruns, or misalignment with development priorities.

Financing and Execution

Major infrastructure investments in southeastern DRC are entering a critical execution phase, with multiple large-scale projects currently under review by international financial institutions and bilateral partners. Priority projects include:

• The Manono–Kalemie road and proposed railway, which would provide year-round access from lithium deposits in Manono to Lake Tanganyika and the regional trade network
• Expanded port capacity at Kalemie and Kigoma, designed to handle increased mineral, agricultural, and container traffic on Lake Tanganyika
• Intermodal logistics platforms linking mining centers like Kolwezi and Likasi to regional urban hubs and export corridors

According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), these interventions are essential to reducing logistics costs and improving regional competitiveness. 

The AfDB’s Country Strategy Paper for DRC (2023–2027) prioritizes eastern corridor development and has earmarked technical assistance funding for the Manono–Kalemie axis under its Transport Sector Development Program.

Financing discussions involve a mix of multilateral, bilateral, and state-backed actors.

The Fonds pour la Promotion de l’Industrie (FPI), a Congolese public fund, has committed to co-financing logistics infrastructure with both Chinese and Gulf-based partners. 

The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) is reportedly exploring investments in inland port terminals and dry ports, part of a wider Gulf strategy to expand influence in African mineral supply chains. 

Meanwhile, Chinese state-owned banks, including China Exim Bank, are in advanced talks to finance vessel rehabilitation and new barge construction on Lake Tanganyika, drawing on the China-DRC cooperation framework established under the 2021 minerals-for-infrastructure accords.

Several initiatives are already moving into early implementation. Port privatization tenders are underway in Kalemie and Kigoma, supported by TradeMark Africa and the East African Community (EAC). 

Dredging and dock modernization have begun, and contracts for modular port facilities are being finalized with support from development partners.

These early-stage projects are viewed as essential "market-making" investments, creating the logistical conditions necessary to crowd in private capital and anchor regional trade flows.

Bottom Line

The Washington Agreement marks a rare moment of alignment between diplomacy, security, and development in eastern DRC.

Yet the risks remain real. Conflict relapse, governance weaknesses, and opaque deal-making could quickly derail progress. The mining sector still leans heavily on informal labor and underregulated supply chains. 

Foreign actors are moving fast to shape the landscape in their interest. Without transparency, coordination, and strong institutions, today’s momentum could reinforce old patterns of exclusion and extraction.

With the right mix of planning, safeguards, and inclusive design, the infrastructure emerging in southeastern DRC could become the backbone of long-term stability, and a foundation not just for exports but for serious socioeconomic transformation.