GOVERNMENT & DIPLOMACY
The UNSMIL’s problem is not just political fatigue; it’s existential.
Libyans remember the Skhirat Libyan Political Agreement (2015) not as a peace deal that ended a war, but as the starting point of a legitimacy crisis that never ended. Each process since has layered new institutions on old fractures, chasing an impossible consensus that diluted accountability.
Every major political actor in Libya now fears a new process, not because of what it might achieve, but because of what it might expose. The fragile “unity” within each camp is an illusion. Once the UN opens a serious political track, rivalries within factions will surface and alliances will collapse. Ironically, Libya’s elites are most “free” during UN processes; each sees a chance to climb higher, but collectively they resist the ladder being rebuilt.
Internationally, the mission inspires little confidence. Major capitals support the UNSMIL only when the outcome aligns with their own interests. Add to that the mission’s chronic blind spots, shallow understanding of Libya’s social power networks, internal bias, and poor coordination, and the result is a mission stranded between Tripoli’s cynicism and foreign hesitation.
What Tetteh Must Do Differently
The UNSMIL does not need another roadmap. It needs credibility. That starts with three strategic shifts.
- Rebuild Communication and Allies:
- The SRSG has struck the right tone but not the right chord. The UNSMIL must break through the social-media vacuum and talk to Libyans, not at them. A broad media offensive, appearing on local TV, answering questions publicly, and engaging influencers and journalists, would do what Libya’s politicians fear most: face the people.
- More importantly, Tetteh needs a coalition of trusted intermediaries, Libyan figures with institutional memory, local reach, and credibility across divides. Without them, she will keep walking into the same traps. - Design the “120” and Mean It:
- The proposed 120-member dialogue forum could be the UNSMIL’s strongest instrument if it is not a repeat of the 2021 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum’s tokenism. Selection must be surgical, diverse, and rooted in Libya’s real social and political hierarchies. Done right, it could create a political and social mass powerful enough to counter entrenched elites and reset the national conversation. Done poorly, it will become another diplomatic exercise lost to cynicism.
- True representation means choosing not just who embassies approve of, but who Libyans actually respect: the tribal elders, technocrats, reformist politicians, community leaders, and young voices who can move opinion and navigate Libya’s informal networks. - Set the Standard:
- The UN cannot demand integrity from Libyan leaders if its own process lacks transparency. Invite the media into the halls. Announce vetting criteria. Punish corruption or manipulation publicly, not quietly.
- The best way to shape the government that emerges is to model the governance you want it to embody.
A Rebirth for Civil Society
If executed well, this process could give oxygen back to Libya’s suffocated civil sphere. Many of the country’s most capable figures, from journalists to local mediators, have been sidelined, co-opted, or silenced. A credible UN track can offer protection and legitimacy for them to re-engage.
Libya’s camps—east, west, and south—are more alike than they admit. Each has its philosophers, its fixers, its soldiers, its technocrats, and its opportunists. The challenge is not to erase these divides but to extract the best from each. A carefully chosen 120 can do that if guided by competence, not comfort.
The bottom line: the UNSMIL’s problem is not capacity. It is courage.
If Tetteh can face Libya’s public, rebuild trust through action, and design a process that is seen as fair, she may achieve what none of her predecessors could: make Libyans believe the UN is finally on their side.