Scenarios shaping the future of the Israel-Iran conflict

As Israel and Iran continue their most direct confrontation ever, Tehran’s diplomatic corps is striving to score regime survival but comes under stress from geopolitical isolation, the executive’s confusion and threat of U.S. military involvement.

The Iranian foreign ministry has adopted a calibrated two-track strategy: combine public escalation with private diplomacy to avoid a full-scale regional war while preserving strategic credibility. However, it remains behind events on the ground and risks at any moment of being blindsided by a U.S. strike on the Fordow nuclear site and strategic targets in Tehran.

A closer look

As expected, Iran is relying on regional mediators who are striving to prevent a full-blown regional war by keeping the U.S. President Donald Trump in check and maintaining the option of broader Iran-U.S. talks. However, Iran is wary not to be too desperate and is as a result wasting diplomatic windows and not fully utilising mediation offers from countries like Turkey or Russia.

Its condition that Israel must first agree to a ceasefire before initial talks happen is limiting considering Tel Aviv’s resolve to decimate the Revolutionary Guards’ upper echelons. Iranian diplomats are bewildered by the West’s lack of condemnation against Israel and stance toward the Islamic Republic.

Amplifying rhetorical threats are part of the traditional Iranian playbook to change this situation and deter U.S. involvement, but the rules of the game have changed so much that the following warnings are likely to be ineffective: 

1. Raising the threat of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a dramatic step designed to increase global urgency and giving more credence to an elusive nuclear breakout. A parliamentary bill is therefore in the initial stages of the legal adoption process.
2. Hinting at the military involvement of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and Yemeni Houthis if the U.S. joins militarily.
3. Maintaining an ambiguous threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical energy chokepoint.

This asymmetric posture is consistent with Iran’s historical playbook: using layered deterrents and controlled escalation to gain diplomatic space while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States unless absolutely necessary.

However, this calculation may be worthless as Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu seeks to convince Trump he can reshape the Middle East as never done by any U.S. President. 

Go deeper

Iran has gradually calibrated its retaliatory strikes on Israel to avoid picking a fight with Western powers and give itself the option of pounding its enemy on a daily basis by conserving its arsenal through small-scale launches.

So far, both Israel and Iran have targeted civilian and military targets, with a visible focus on security sites in recent hours as both have demonstrated capability to strike vital energy and economic interests and may not want to go down this escalatory route for now.

The decision not to go all-in has saved Iran from overwhelming damage but runs the risk of removing its option to make a last-stand since the longer the war drags, the more it is poised to suffer from leadership deficit and the loss of missile launchers or other critical military assets. 

Most striking for Iran is the fact that a sizable part of physical attacks inside Iran are not direct IDF operations but carried out by covert networks operating under Israeli direction or facilitation. These attacks, increasingly targeting lower-level targets but also random sites, are designed for psychological disruption and overwhelming the security apparatus while the IAF’s strikes pursue strategic destruction.

Israeli cyber-attacks against digital infrastructure are also becoming more common as it is for now a better alternative to disrupt Iranians’ daily life without doing so via strikes on physical vital infrastructure that would fully antagonise them. 

This approach provides Israel with several strategic advantages:

• It degrades Iran’s internal security without requiring overt military escalation or causing international backlash as these operations can be attributed to local groups.
• It creates sustained pressure within Iran’s security infrastructure, amplifying public discontent and strategic distraction.
• Ultimately, it opens the way for domestic uprising by showing that people are fighting against the regime in Iran. 

These tactics are also notable given the resilience of Iran’s air defences which are not entirely undermined and still represent a threat for the IAF, which can rely on small drones to overwhelm and deplete them in a less visible, less costly and more widespread manner.

However, the fact remains that the ultimate goal of these domestically-launched attacks, i.e. popular uprisings, is ill-fated and the IDF will continue to rely on advanced strikes on leadership to pursue that goal. 

Sources in Iran say that a sizable part of the population is secretly welcoming the demise of top officials but hold that there is no bandwidth for uprising. Depending on the popular reaction of Iranians, Israeli leadership will oscillate between significantly weakening the regime or looking to dispose of it.

Iranian monarchists around Reza Pahlavi and the Islamist-Marxist Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) - the only organised opposition movements - are actively working with Israel to push for the latter option, but may find their hopes cut short unless Washington joins Israel’s military campaign.

This is why Netanyahu is mobilising all efforts to get Trump on board and may look to soon assassinate Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as a way to offer Iran on a plate to the American President. 

Iran retains substantial striking force but the multi-pronged challenges caused by Israel have significantly weakened its position. Control over information has significantly tightened over the last 48 hours to minimise the risk of chaos inside Iran while the focus is on making effective use of psychological fear to put Israeli society under pressure and convince the world collapse isn’t near. Despite the odds, this time-bound strategy could work in Iran’s favour as long as the regime raises domestic crackdown and upgrades its security measures. 

As of Tuesday, officials and their entourage are no longer allowed any connected device that isn’t part of a domestic communication network. It is also likely that Iran will be cut off from the global internet and rely on its own network, since Israelis have made extensive use of data-gathering through international apps - including Israeli-made ones like Waze, a popular way of getting around for Iranians.

Another point to note is that Tehran’s objective in Israel is less complex than the opposite side’s: it seeks to strike fear and raise societal exhaustion in Israel while the IDF needs to balance the goal of weakening Iran and avoiding hatred from Iranians. 

The big picture

Several risk vectors are now crystallizing:

1. Israel moving toward regime-targeted strikes, including leadership figures (i.e. Khamenei) to motivate full U.S. support and achieve regime change. 
2. Direct U.S. bunker buster strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly the Fordow facility to complete the Israeli campaign’s stated goals. This option could be accompanied by regime-targeted strikes if Iran fails to show any force against the U.S.
3. Iranian retaliation to U.S. involvement by targeting maritime transit (Strait of Hormuz) and U.S. bases via asymmetric means, which would risk major escalation and international involvement, including China. The goal there would be to harm the global economy and demonstrate force to make Trump consider more peaceful options.
4. Iranian retaliation to U.S. involvement by targeting Gulf energy infrastructure with its large arsenal of easily deployable short-range missiles and drones. This is Iran’s “nuclear option” to cause long-term global damage and would inevitably be the Islamic Republic’s last stand. 

Gauging the tipping point for U.S. involvement

At this stage, the United States is expanding its regional military posture with carrier strike groups, refuelers, Patriot and THAAD batteries, and enhanced intelligence operations deployed. While Trump and his “America First” rhetoric have denied any propensity for conflict with Iran, U.S. involvement remains a possibility whose likelihood could grow under the following conditions:

1. A major Iranian strike on Israeli civilians or critical infrastructure (like Dimona or Knesset), which would turn the UNSC fully against Tehran and make Congress back Trump in direct strikes. – 30% likelihood as Iran seeks to prevent that but mistakes could occur.
2. Israeli strikes on Iran’s political leadership, potentially triggering uncontrollable escalation and convincing Trump that a new Middle East is right around the corner. – 60% likelihood as this is Netanyahu’s real aim.
3. Iranian miscalculation that harms regional energy infrastructure . The more Iran’s military leadership is undermined, the more the risk of some units seeking symbolic yet backfiring hits on neighbours deemed too complacent. For instance: Israel’s allies like the UAE and Azerbaijan. - 10% likelihood as Iran’s military command is not yet crumbling.
4. Uncontrolled proxy attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq, Syria, or the Gulf, with American casualties. - 40% likelihood as proxies have so far said the U.S. needs to fire first before they get involved, but the risk of a minor incident unnerving Trump is real. 

U.S. military entry is increasingly plausible. Tehran’s strategy of restraint plus rhetorical pressure seems ill-conceived in this new arena and the weaker Iran is perceived, the more Trump will seek to strike points for his geopolitical legacy. 

The main barrier to U.S. escalation remains cracks within his administration, with many “America First” supporters and Congresspeople strongly opposing war with Iran - even if the latter may not be a “forever war”.

Ultimately, the decision remains with Trump if he wants to be a peacemaker or history-maker as well as his calculation about whether Iran can or cannot cause many American casualties. His next steps could cause irreparable damage to his domestic standing and cost him in the midterms.

Scenarios