Trump’s razor-sharp rhetoric has caged the global audience in a binary of “deal or kneel” with Iran. 2025 is presented as a pivotal year for the Islamic Republic as it can either give in to a stringent yet relieving agreement with Washington or face near-destruction through war. The reality should be, however, more nuanced. Neither a sharp turn to a thriving Iran nor a quick fall into regional chaos are the most likely scenarios ahead. Instead, it is important to consider the more protracted ways in which a deal can unfold and the more intricate ways in which military escalation can be pursued.

The Fragile Architecture of a Nuclear Deal

“So far, so good” sums up the positive atmosphere in which indirect Iran-U.S. talks have occurred since April 12, taking Vice President J.D. Vance verbatim. However, despite goodwill from both sides and expert-level talks taking place, the prospects of a durable deal are threatened by inconsistencies within Washington, the Islamic Republic’s readiness to die on symbolic hills[1], and third parties feeling left out such as the E3 and more importantly Israel. While differences are not insurmountable, aversion to the JCPOA – at least in format – make a swift grand bargain difficult to achieve as disagreements are broader than they were in 2015.

Since both Washington and Tehran want a deal, differences may be brushed aside with an interim deal, which can be spun as more than it is by a Trump administration seeking diplomatic wins. Deals negotiated by Trump are often prematurely announced, have their content exaggerated or misrepresented, and require amendments down the line. This would not necessarily anger Tehran as the latter is primarily focused on creating a wedge between the Americans and Israelis.

💡 Insight: Trump-era deals are often prematurely announced and exaggerated—Tehran sees these as opportunities to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Israel.

Despite calls for quickly reaching an agreement, the sequencing and verification steps required to validate it will take time and can face roadblocks down the line. As a result, an interim deal would allow both sides to gain time to figure out differences and seek further avenues for potential cooperation on broader files.

While Tehran relies on Washington to rein in an Israel looking to sabotage a deal, it uses diplomacy to manage its relationship with European powers. This is complicated by Iran-Russia ties and escalating human rights dossiers whereby European capitals, notably London and Paris, are adopting a more muscled approach[2] to pressure Tehran into releasing their nationals. However, Tehran can only compromise as France and Britain hold a crucial role in initiating sanctions snapback at the United Nations, which would be a stone thrown into the negotiations’ window, risking Iran’s withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), Europe’s potential intermediary role, and nuclear talks altogether.

Comparative Table: Iran-U.S.-Israel Positions

Issue United States Iran Israel
Uranium enrichment Prefers Iran to import enriched uranium and remains wary of low-level domestic enrichment due to JCPOA precedent. Does not recognise Iran’s strategic attachment to the domestic fuel cycle. Ready to reduce enrichment rate[3] and ship out stockpiles in a sequenced manner but insists on maintaining domestic fuel cycle at minimum 3.67% enrichment rate[4]. Feels secure only if Iran entirely dismantles its nuclear programme and infrastructure.
Centrifuge operations Oscillates between total removal of centrifuges or maintaining obsolete models like IR-1. Open to reducing the number of centrifuges[5] but unwilling to go below the IR-4 model. Calls for removal of all centrifuges.
Nuclear infrastructure Prefers Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan be shut down. Sees strategic necessity in maintaining and controlling domestic fuel cycle. Calls for total dismantlement and Iran to follow Libya, Iraq, Syria.
IAEA verification Advocates for expanded and intrusive inspections, including by U.S. inspectors. Accepts IAEA verification and could return to Additional Protocol, though distrusts IAEA. Sees verification as too risky and suspects hidden operations.
Sanctions relief Offers phased sanctions relief. Accepts phased relief in exchange for phased enrichment reduction. Prefers maintaining stringent sanctions to achieve regime change.
Missile programme Wants more than JCPOA-era commitments and limitations on missile capabilities. Rejects negotiations, sees them as attempts to block tech advances (e.g. SLVs[6]). Strongly opposes missile program.
Sunset clauses Seeks to extend or eliminate. Open to extending but not eliminating. Opposes any deal with sunset clauses.
Guarantees against withdrawal Cannot provide binding guarantees due to internal divisions. Requires assurances and prefers sequencing. Will sabotage or encourage withdrawal if dissatisfied.
Military action threat Diplomacy preferred, but threats used. Sees threats as bluff; prefers diplomacy but ready to defend. Keeps military options ready.
End proxy assistance Wants regional issues addressed after nuclear deal. Denies proxy control; open to compromise if Israel contained. Opposes anything short of Resistance Axis defeat.
Confidential

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