DRC DESK
Despite repeated peace initiatives, fighting in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) shows no sign of slowing.
The U.S.-brokered Washington Peace Deal (27 June 2025), Qatar’s parallel mediation, and Kinshasa’s appeals for U.S. security assistance have all failed to halt clashes between the Congolese army (FARDC) and the Rwanda-backed March 23 Movement (M23).
The Washington talks were framed as a state-to-state negotiation between the DRC and Rwanda, with Washington avoiding direct engagement with M23 to prevent legitimising the rebel group. Instead, the U.S. expects Kigali to rein in its proxies, while direct dialogue with M23 remains confined to the separate Doha Track.
M23, excluded from the Washington accord, has made clear its intent to push westward and directly challenge President Félix Tshisekedi’s government. Washington, meanwhile, has celebrated the deal as a diplomatic win but appears increasingly focused on securing access to Congo’s mineral wealth rather than guaranteeing peace.
The result is grimly familiar: civilians in eastern Congo once again endure displacement, executions, and sexual violence on a massive scale. The UN now estimates more than 7 million people displaced nationwide, most in the east.
Diplomacy on Paper
The Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) was created under the Washington Deal to manage troop withdrawals, monitor ceasefires, and neutralize rebel groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
At its second meeting in Washington (17–18 September 2025), delegations from Rwanda, the DRC, the U.S., Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the African Union agreed to:
- Begin implementation on 1 October 2025.
- Oversee the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from eastern Congo.
- Neutralize the FDLR.
- Suspend Rwanda’s “defensive measures” inside Congolese territory.
- Complete the process by the end of 2025.
Yet credibility issues loom large. M23, the main belligerent on the ground, remains absent from the deal. Kinshasa has since insisted that it will not finalize the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) with Rwanda until at least 90 percent of Rwandan forces are withdrawn.
Officials privately acknowledge that the scheduled withdrawal under the CONOPS timeline of 21–31 October has not begun.
In mid-October, the DRC government also publicly called on the FDLR to disarm and surrender to Congolese authorities or to the UN mission (MONUSCO), a symbolic but unconfirmed step toward reducing the pretext for Rwandan incursions.
Tshisekedi, still navigating a contested post-2023 re-election, has turned to alternative security arrangements, including renewed talks with U.S. private contractor Erik Prince over mineral corridors and logistics. These moves underscore Kinshasa’s skepticism that diplomacy alone can stabilize the east.
The Washington and Doha tracks also reflect a broader fragmentation of peace efforts. The East African Community’s Nairobi Process, the Southern African Development Community’s deployment, and the Luanda talks have all faltered amid competing regional interests and a lack of enforcement power.
Doha’s Parallel Track
Talks resumed in Doha under Qatari mediation in early October, with mediators insisting both Kinshasa and M23 are “positively engaging.”
On 14 October, the parties signed a new Doha Agreement, establishing a joint mechanism to monitor ceasefire violations, with MONUSCO providing logistical support and representatives from the AU, Qatar, and the United States serving as observers.
The agenda focuses on transforming prior declarations into a verified ceasefire, prisoner releases, and the phased withdrawal of foreign forces. Yet violence on the ground continues to undermine trust.
Fresh clashes have been reported in Shabunda (South Kivu), where FARDC and allied Wazalendo militias resisted M23 advances into the mineral-rich Kibandamangobo forest. Heavy fighting has displaced thousands, with reports of looting and summary executions.
Parallel to this, FARDC has begun withdrawing heavy weapons and military equipment from the strategic city of Uvira, fearing that it could fall to the AFC/M23 alliance if negotiations collapse.
The equipment is reportedly being transferred to Burundi’s Mudubugu military camp via the Kavimvira-Gatumba border crossing. Regional defense officials described the move as a “strategic withdrawal” meant to preserve assets after the loss of Goma earlier this year, but one that risks conceding another major city to the rebels.
In a new twist, Burundi has welcomed two FDLR generals fleeing from the M23/AFC frontlines. Analysts say the decision reflects both ideological alignment between Kinshasa and Burundi’s ruling CNDD-FDD party and an emerging rear-base dynamic that could regionalize the conflict even further.
Fighting on the Ground
Events since July highlight how little traction diplomacy has gained:
- July – Reports emerged of M23 executing hundreds of ethnic Hutus during offensives against the FDLR.
- 17–19 September – M23 attacked FARDC positions in Chanzikiro, Nkambi, and Sisa. Kinshasa threatened retaliation.
- 19 September – M23 accused FARDC of bombing its positions in Bibwe, Chytso, Hembe, and Nyange.
- 21 September – After clashes with FARDC and the Wazalendo militia, M23 captured Nzibira, a cassiterite- and gold-rich town in South Kivu, displacing thousands.
- Late September to October – Fighting spread across Masisi, Walikale, and Shabunda. Both sides used heavy artillery and targeted civilians.
Both FARDC and M23, alongside allied militias, continue to commit atrocities: executions, rape, forced recruitment, and disappearances.
Minerals and Motives
Behind the fighting lies a deeper struggle: control of Congo’s estimated $24 trillion in mineral reserves of copper, cobalt, coltan, gold, and rare earths.
- M23’s offensives in Nzibira and Shabunda directly follow mineral corridors.
- Rwanda and Kinshasa both frame their actions as “security measures,” but trade routes and export control remain the true prize.
- External actors are heavily invested. The U.S. seeks cobalt security for its EV industry, the UAE is tied to gold and coltan smuggling networks, China remains the largest buyer of Congolese output, and Europe’s tech sector depends on these supply chains.
Tensions with Europe have deepened after Kinshasa condemned the EU’s new mineral agreement with Rwanda as a “double standard,” accusing Brussels of indirectly legitimising smuggling and financing Rwanda’s war economy.
The $24 trillion figure is often cited but disputed. The World Bank and U.S. Geological Survey rank Congo’s deposits among the richest globally but warn that conflict and corruption prevent this wealth from reaching state coffers.
Leadership Fatigue and International Friction
In mid-October, President Tshisekedi publicly urged Paul Kagame to “choose peace over escalation,” calling on Rwanda to implement agreed withdrawals and cease hostilities. Kigali swiftly pushed back, accusing Kinshasa of “escalatory rhetoric” and of sheltering hostile militias such as the FDLR.
For Washington, Doha, and regional actors alike, the back-and-forth highlights the absence of a shared narrative, with each side claiming compliance while preparing for renewed confrontation.
What Next?
Qatar’s mediation continues, with M23 signaling conditional participation if Kinshasa agrees to prisoner releases. Yet the bigger questions remain unresolved: Rwandan troop withdrawal, credible monitoring, and linking peace to investment.
Two root drivers still define the conflict:
- Ethnic violence that has fueled eastern Congo’s wars for three decades.
- Competition over minerals that finances militias, invites foreign meddling, and corrodes governance.
Until these are addressed, Rwanda and the DRC will keep mobilizing, external powers will keep extracting, and eastern Congo’s civilians will remain trapped in cycles of violence.
The reality is stark: as long as Congo’s minerals are secured by militarized corridors rather than transparent governance, every peace deal will remain little more than paper.