In March of this year, the UN Secretary-General appointed American-Lebanese Stephanie Koury as deputy SRSG to Libya for Political Affairs. This appointment was widely seen as a prelude to the resignation of SRSG and Head of UNSMIL Abdoulaye Bathily, after the latter’s failure to garner the necessary national support for his political initiative, which was supposed to bring Libya’s five main institutional parties to the negotiating table and resolve outstanding differences in the electoral laws.

Since 2019, no UN envoy to Libya has succeeded in fulfilling their mandate. The failure of former SRSG Ghassan Salamé to hold a National Conference in Ghadames in 2019 — a result of the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) assault on Tripoli — was followed by the failure of former SRSG Stephanie Williams to implement the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum’s (LPDF) roadmap to national elections on December 24, 2021, and finally the failure of SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily to reconcile the differences between Libyan factions and move forward with the political process.

These successive shortcomings underscore a lingering crisis in the UN’s approach to Libya and suggest that the tactics used by Libyan politicians to cling to power have not only been successful, but are much more effective than efforts by the UN and a divided international community to break the status quo.

Indeed, most initiatives put forward by the UN Mission in Libya since the political division in 2014 have largely been superficial solutions that failed to address the underlying issues of division. These stemmed from the refusal of the former General National Congress (now the High Council of State, or HCS) to transfer power to the elected House of Representatives (HOR), challenging its legitimacy. From the Skhirat Agreement in 2015 — which framed the power-sharing between the HOR and the HCS and created the Government of National Accord (GNA) — to the roadmap issued by the LPDF in 2020 — which replaced the GNA with the current Presidential Council (PC) and the Government of National Unity (GNU) — these efforts have merely formalised Libya’s political division rather than resolving it.

In her first official appearance as Acting Head of the UNSMIL, Stephanie Koury pledged her commitment to “supporting Libyans in preventing the country from sliding into further division, violence and resources depletion, and supporting the holding of comprehensive and free national elections through a comprehensive Libyan-led political process.”

The challenges facing Koury as she steps into her new role

Amid the ongoing political deadlock in Libya, characterised by widespread corruption, resource mismanagement, a struggling economy, and a devalued dinar, attention is now focused on Koury as she takes up her role of Acting Head of the UN Mission. Her main challenges can be summarised by growing United States-Russia competition in Libya, the UNSMIL’s lack of credibility, and a divided international community.

Koury has now been in Libya for the last two weeks, which has given her the opportunity to accompany her predecessor Abdoulaye Bathily on his final tour. After announcing his resignation last month, Bathily drew a poor picture of Libya’s political class, accusing them of selfishness and intentionally delaying elections indefinitely. In turn, Libyan politicians have not held Bathily in great esteem, notably Osama Hamad, the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS) Prime Minister, who accused the former SRSG of undermining reconciliation efforts by ignoring the GNS in his political initiative unveiled in late 2023, which was supposed to see the LNA, HOR, PC, GNU, and HCS gather around the negotiating table.

This tense atmosphere leaves Koury in a difficult position, especially since the UNSMIL has suffered from years of failed initiatives as mentioned above and has increasingly been viewed in a negative light by everyday Libyans. She is tasked with reviving the political process and renewing political legitimacy in Libya. To succeed, she must learn from her predecessors' experiences and engage with all factions equally, recognizing that they have lost legitimacy and their terms have expired, irrespective of their backgrounds or how they came to power.

Additionally, she needs to renew international support for the UN mission's mandate and put an end to unilateral interventions in Libyan affairs, while swiftly launching a political process and preventing violations to the ceasefire agreement. This might be easier said than done given that her current role may not grant her sufficient authority to achieve significant progress at this time. The prospect of her transitioning from Acting Head of UNSMIL to SRSG – or Special Adviser, as her predecessor Stephanie Williams did – seems unlikely amid the ongoing tensions between Western states and Russia. As a veto-wielding power, Russia is expected to block an American from leading the UN mission in Libya without first establishing trust.

Koury will have to smartly face such challenges before being able to successfully deliver on a political solution for Libya.

Removing the perception of U.S. bias

Evidently, the appointment of Koury in her current position raised many concerns in Moscow as Russian diplomats remember a previous American Deputy SRSG, Stephanie Williams, as following a line close to Washington’s. This is particularly important now that tensions between Russia and the U.S. are high, with clear indications that Libya may become a new arena of competition between the two states — notably in the military field. Fortunately, Koury seems to be aware of these geopolitical considerations and is making sure that Russia is aligned with her mission.

For instance, she recently met with the Russian ambassador Aydar Aganin and is signalling that she is serving her role as a United Nations official and not as an American citizen or agent. Koury’s career, which was spent at the UN instead of Williams who was a career diplomat at the State Department, helps her assuage fears that she may pursue U.S. interests instead of her UN mission. This is positive news as it will be crucial throughout her mandate to protect the UN’s neutrality in the budding U.S.-Russia competition. This will help avoid any unnecessary complication that Moscow can create, notably at the UN’s headquarters in New York where the Russian delegation could make her mandate renewal difficult.

Raising the UNSMIL’s credibility

The most difficult task at hand for anyone at the helm of the UNSMIL is to recover the institutions’ credibility, not only in the eyes of Libyans but also of regional actors. A lingering issue will be her predecessor’s unwillingness to deal with the GNS, which was perceived by actors like Egypt as a spoiling attempt that eventually led to the downfall of former GNS Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha. For many Libyans, previous actions by the UNSMIL have created a negative image of the mission which is now seen alongside Libyan status quo actors as an not only incapable but also ill-intentioned entity.

Koury will need to find a balance between dealing with the GNS and not legitimising them to an extent that they will in turn block a political process toward a new unified executive authority and general elections. The political process led by the HOR and HCS, now known as the Cairo talks, is so far the best way to advance the political process. However, a smart strategy will need to be deployed to ensure that this political process does not fall into new roadblocks as it has in the past few years. Finally, any solution brought ahead by Koury will need to be careful not to repeat errors of the past, notably ones seen during the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), when corruption and unethical dealmaking were highly visible and which put to shame the UNSMIL in the eyes of the wider public.

Dealing with a divided international community

Koury will need to address a divided international community, with many foreign actors having vested interests with the Libyan political elites, thus making them support - directly or indirectly - the status quo. These countries will need to come to the conclusion that this status quo is simply unsustainable and that cooperation is necessary to get Libya out of a downward spiral - which can only be negative for business and political opportunities. In other words, internationals need to be shown that there is no other alternative than supporting the political process and warned that spoiling attempts will not only be exposed but also punished. The current rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo offers a good opportunity for Koury to get these two important nations on the UNSMIL’s side and view cooperation as a better way to benefit from Libya’s economic opportunities than competition.

Moreover, Koury will not only need to escape the growing geopolitical tensions between Washington and Moscow but also decrease them in Libya. These two countries are increasingly viewing Libya under the military guise, which can only be detrimental to the country’s future. Changing such dynamics will be crucial to avoid the worst consequences for Libya. European powers remain a potentially positive force to advance Libya’s political process, but they will need to review their currently narrow-minded policy toward Libya and adopt a European perspective to motivate democratic transition in the country. Libya needs a new “Berlin moment” in which all relevant foreign countries gather to lay aside differences and commit to a political process as well as work together to deliver it. Some regional countries, prime of which being Saudi Arabia, have the diplomatic ability and the political credibility to act like Angela Merkel’s Germany did in 2020 and 2021.

A sense of urgency

Unfortunately, Bathily’s mandate was characterised by a lack of progress and further alienation of the UNSMIL in the eyes of Libyans. There has in fact been no major political breakthrough in the last few years and, instead, Libya has seen regression in many fields, including security and the economy. As a result, there is not much time left for Koury to work on a winning strategy to advance Libya’s political process. There are multiple fault lines in Libya, notably in the west, and tensions could escalate very quickly as they did in 2011, 2014, and especially in 2019 — when the international community was downplaying the urgency of the situation.

Get early access with the Political Risk subscription
This article was originally featured in our flagship Political Risk report, a weekly publication that is delivered to clients ahead of time. For exclusive insights and a head start on the biggest stories in Libya each week, email us at editor@libyadesk.com.

Share this article
The link has been copied!