Assessing the risks of state collapse in Iran

While Iran’s multi-ethnic makeup is often overstated as a vulnerability, years of political repression and economic strain have deepened local grievances, particularly in border regions.

In the event of state collapse, regional instability could spread, involving neighbouring countries and causing a humanitarian crisis with global repercussions. Pro-regime forces and fragmented opposition groups would likely vie for influence, limiting prospects for a smooth transition.

This scenario deserves attention due to its potential regional implications and the likelihood of future Israeli/U.S. strikes over the future despite the current ceasefire.

Key lessons learned in previous regime change wars

• Despite public statements, Israel was effectively pursuing regime change by targeting symbols of the regime that are not militarily strategic or by disrupting vital Iranian infrastructure. 
  
• Previous foreign intervention like 2011 Libya had similarly confused objectives with inexistent contingency plans that led to severe unforeseen consequences, not only at regional but also cross-continental levels.
  
• Populations, even if fed up by ruling regimes, do not respond effectively to foreign intervention as the latter takes away any form of agency from the people. Instead of acting toward political transition, populations are forced to react to violence either via migration, survival or at worst, insurgency. 
  
• Foreign intervention negatively impacts central government and public services, thus leading to unruly local entities and a drop in living standards. 
  
• No effective transitional model has been found to minimise violence, corruption, or further foreign intervention by third parties. Neither Libya nor Iraq have achieved democratic transition. 
  
• Foreign intervention severely disturbs regional and global balance of power, thus leading to future conflicts and further uncertainty. Libya’s fall directly impacted the Sahel’s stability and ultimately decreased French influence in Africa while increasing Russia’s and Turkey’s presence. 

Understanding Iran’s sociopolitical makeup

Iran is a multi-ethnic country where politics and ideology have polarised the population over a long time. A strong security apparatus and other factors such as international sanctions have made people resigned to their fate and difficult to predict should there be state collapse.

An online survey of Iranians’ attitudes toward one another, notably within the diaspora, may point to alarming developments in such a case as civility is often ignored in favour of maximalist positions. However, the idea that Iran’s multi-ethnic composition amounts to state weakness has been exaggerated and even utilised by Israeli-linked outlets to gain further means of destabilising the country.

Iran’s ethnic minorities are primarily located on the countries’ periphery and are contiguous to their ethnic kin in different neighbouring states, thus impacting the social fabric of the whole region if state collapse should occur. These regions have generally experienced economic disaffection, important illicit trade networks, and a heavier security presence both due to border control and anti-rebellion imperatives.

When Iran was growing unhampered by major international sanctions up to 2012, protest movements were generally led by the middle-class in large urban areas, principally Tehran (i.e. Green Movement of 2009).

Since sanctions impoverished the population and resigned the urban middle-class to focus on economic survival, Iran’s periphery and lower classes have spearheaded protest movements (2017, 2019, 2022-3), which faced ever greater repressive methods by the state. Those directly affected by the repression have an appetite to seek revenge against the state and its security apparatus, which raises the risk of localised civil unrest. 

Iran’s Kurdish regions and the Balouch province of Sistan-Balouchestan were most notable in the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement and linked the country’s western-most and eastern-most provinces in a show of solidarity and support.

Far from being Persian-centric, Iranian nationalism subsumes various ethnicities, and the multi-ethnic composition of the country is visible in countless families that have for instance Kurdish, Persian and Azeri members.

This means that a clean break by a minority-led province is unlikely as infighting within minorities would occur, between those wanting to break away from Iran and those wanting to defend it. 

A breakdown of potential ethnic and political fault-lines is necessary for decision-makers to understand the potential fall-out of an Iranian state collapse. 

Ethnic identities on the rise

Buoyed by the lack of prospects for Iran-proper under a sanctioned Islamic Republic and sectarian rhetoric from growing diaspora-led online networks, there has been over the last 15 years a solidification of local-level identities via the relay of symbols, historical narratives, and grievances.

These identities have been given greater platforms by opposition-led media (Manoto TV, Iran International, VOA Farsi, BBC Farsi) where calls for federalism have been echoed – if not plain demands for secession.

Since Iran’s minorities can also be found in neighbouring countries, identity politics have a regional dimension and the backing of non-Iranian groups – if not states.

The extent to which people within Iran can rally around local identities is difficult to assess and should not be exaggerated for several reasons, including the fact that local leaders have rallied around the flag and prefer not to further cause chaos. Yet, the risk of ethnic strife should remain a concern for whomever is interested in regional stability.

Kurdish identity (“Rojhelat”) 

Dispersed in Iran’s western provinces but also in north-eastern Khorasan, Kurds have a long history of militantism and armed-struggle bypassing borders. Since 2003, Kurdish Iraqi migration to Europe as well as the formation of an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq have boosted a sense of Kurdish nationalism which has reverberated in Iran.

Iran’s Kurdish militants remain divided as to whether they should fight for “Rojhelat” (eastern Kurdistan located in Iranian borders) to be subsumed in a Greater Kurdistan or campaign for autonomy in a democratic Iran. Most of the organised groups, i.e Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran or Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) seek autonomy and not secession.

Around 10% of Iran’s population is said to be Kurdish. Like all identities, being “Kurdish” is hotly debated with various regional differences and at times an attempt to subsume other western Iranian groups such as the Lors and Laks. Nonetheless, only the small province of Kurdistan, with Sanandaj as its capital, has a strong sense of Kurdish nationalism while other Kurds dispersed elsewhere are less prone to defending local-level identities.

Kurds belong to various religious denominations, including minorities like the Ahl-e-Haq, but the majority is Sunni. Iran’s Kurdish regions have proven to be a fertile ground for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s preaching and represent a potential risk of terrorism, mixing Jihadism with ethnic grievances.

Marxist-leaning ideology has also been strong in these regions, with militant groups like Komala (Society of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan). Trans-border illicit trade networks have allowed a higher-than-normal gun ownership rate in the region, thus enabling insurgency.

Tehran’s fight with Kurdish militants has brought many problems with neighbours, notably Iraq which has been hit by Iranian missiles several times over recent years to attack Kurdish groups hiding there. The two countries now have an understanding, but the situation remains volatile.

Tehran recently asked neighbours to take care of this problem and a potential counterinsurgency in Kurdish regions could upend not only Iraqi but also Turkish and Syrian politics:

Balouch identity (“Greater Balouchistan”)

Living in Iran’s most disadvantaged and less-integrated province, the Balouch people also have a long-history of cross-border armed militantism, which has recently caused tensions between Iran and Pakistan.

The province is potentially strategic for logistical reasons as it bypasses the Strait of Hormuz and is seen by Tehran and New Delhi as a key node of the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) via the Chabahar port. The same is true for Pakistan’s Baluchistan, where China is having a hard time operationalising Gwadar port as it faces militants’ attacks.

At 5% of Iran’s population, the region is in majority Sunni and militantism there has generally mixed Jihadism with ethnic grievances. Both Jaish-al-Adl and Islamic State in Khorasan have a solid footing in the region and have in recent years increased attacks on police stations and military barracks.

The former maintains a more Balouch identity with separatist claims and sees Israel’s attack as an opportunity. Tehran has accused the U.S. and Israel of backing the group to destabilise its southeastern borders.

Insurgency in this area at a time of war with Israel would stretch Iranian security forces geographically and create regional problems:

Arab identity (“al-Ahwaziya”)

Representing a minority of 3% of Iran’s population and being in majority Shia, ethnic Arabs have a history of political militantism seeking local-use of their oil-wealth and even secession. However, there is no major armed movement, and most political leaders are in European exile.

Khuzestan province, where most ethnic Arabs live, experienced severe repression in 2019 following fuel price hike protests. Yet, Shia identity as well as attachment to Iran remains strong, thus making the region a lower-risk locality for insurgency.

Nonetheless, the rise of pan-Arabism could have severe consequences for regional security:

Azeri identity (“south Azerbaijan”)

At around 30% of the population, Turkic-speakers of northwestern Iran are the biggest but also most-integrated minority in Iran. They are in majority Shia and have a long history of participating in Iran’s state and nation-building. Plenty of officials, from the Supreme Leader to the President are Azeri speakers.

Nonetheless, in recent years, pan-Turkic sentiment has grown significantly with militants feeling closer to Ankara and Baku than Tehran. Turkey’s double-talk on this subject and the Republic of Azerbaijan’s almost open-support for annexation are major risks for the region.

While there is no armed Azeri movement, an attempt by local population to draw closer to their Turkic brethren in case of further instability in Iran could lead to major repression and the involvement of neighbours:

Afghans and Islamic State

Estimated at around 6.1 million, Afghan migrants represent a large undocumented population which has for long faced discrimination from the state and the population, and represents a fertile ground for radicalisation.

The most recent Islamic State attacks in Iran were carried out by Afghan nationals. Eventual pogroms could also happen as Afghans are scapegoated for many of the country’s problems - including “infiltration” by Israeli agents. 

A descent into chaos for Iran could allow Islamic State in Khorasan to gain solid ground in the country, which would not only impact Afghanistan where the Taliban continue their fight against the group but also Central Asia, notably Tajikistan, where disaffected youths continue to join the Jihadists’ ranks – some already arrested within Iran in recent years.

Political polarisation and ideology

State collapse in Iran doesn’t mean total chaos with the total elimination of the Islamic Republic and countless militias roaming around freely. In fact, even if the regime’s state functions falter, pro-regime elements who are best-organised and have best access to resources will continue to be a formidable force to be reckoned with.

In foreign media, ethnic divisions are probably overexaggerated while there is not enough focus on Iranians’ polarised worldviews. This means that if Israelis manage to topple the Islamic Republic, Iran faces important risks of being plunged into civil war led by ideological elements and causing massive population displacement akin to post-2011 Syria. 

Pro-regime forces

Albeit a minority of Iranians, hardcore supporters of the Islamic Republic which are organised in a para-statal way will continue to exist even if the regime ends. If the state that fuelled their worldview collapses because of their worst-enemy’s attack, i.e. Israel, their resolve to continue defending it will be bolstered and cause serious problems for any political transition.

Used heavily during repression, the Basij may have questioned themselves over their actions against ordinary Iranians, but they now see themselves as justified since there is daylight proof that Israel actively supports regime change.

Apart from a few border regions with high illicit trade like Kurdistan and Sistan-Balouchestan, the Iranian state has achieved a monopoly of violence and pro-regime forces would retain overwhelming force even if the Islamic Republic falters, thus leading to severe repression and later attempts at recovering the regime.

These forces are also likely to be helped by Islamic Republic armed allies in the region, primarily the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Front. 

Divided opposition led by out of touch diaspora

Diaspora-led opposition groups are highly divided and recent attempts at a coalition during the 2022-3 protests miserably failed as they could not agree on a manifesto.

While the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) has a covert armed presence in Iran and could foment violence on the ground, monarchists around Reza Pahlavi have much higher popularity, with die-hard supporters abroad and curious youth inside Iran.

However, the self-proclaimed crown prince may see his hopes of leading a transition, and possibly ruling Iran, cut short by his inexperience of Iran and the fact that curiosity among the domestic population does not mean active following.

People have nostalgia for pre-1979 Iran and support in part his progressive agenda, but his alignment with Israel and life in exile are enormous liabilities. His premise that 1979 revolutionaries would switch allegiances to guarantee peaceful transition if given pledges rests on wishful thinking and does away with 46 years of political tradition that Iranians lived through – even if reluctantly for some.

If allowed back in Iran, these diaspora groups could soon fall into infighting with the MEK having the edge in terror-tactics, while they would also inevitably have to face armed remnants of the Islamic Republic.

Opposition brought from outside has rarely managed to bring positive domestic change as seen in the case of Libya where the Europeans’ plan of relying on foreign-based opposition to take over and ensure a smooth transition failed. No one who has lived decades cut from their home country should be expected to make sense of local dynamics and be good at state-building. Instead, as seen in Libya, they are likely to elicit opposition and lose the country to other dangerous forces before disappearing from the political scene. 

Reformists emerging from the shadows as a pacifying force

Most Iranians have over the last decades sought to slowly but surely reform the Islamic Republic without seeking to topple it. They faced major headwinds from both Iranian hardliners and Western powers choosing the worst-time possible to act tough on Iran.

Since 2009, their reform-prone political leaders have been ostracised by the Iranian establishment and have gradually lost popular support due to their inability to deliver on economic promises and pledges for greater freedoms. These figures are now isolated and constantly under pressure from each side looking to reinforce the regime or remove it.

Nonetheless, they remain the best reflection for Iranians’ aspirations and could be a pacifying force in case of state collapse. They have extensive knowledge of how the state has been run and its shortcomings, maintain an inclusive agenda for all Iranians, and are primarily concerned with avoiding chaos. However, they may also crumble from the animosity of die-hard pro and anti-regime supporters, who see them as moles and would push for armed conflict instead of political talks. 

Global effects of state collapse in Iran

A new migratory wave into Europe and humanitarian crisis

Emigration has for long been seen as the best option for many Iranians who could afford it.

A severe internal conflict would motivate a far larger portion of the population to seek shelter in less dangerous provinces and in neighbouring states, possibly pushing toward Europe. Iran has already faced supply challenges from energy to basic goods and a fall into chaos would bring tens of millions in need of humanitarian assistance, thus requiring major international action. 

Turkey, which still reels from the Syrian crisis, will be profoundly affected and have to resort to stringent measures that could prove highly controversial in controlling population flows. Iraq would be next, with the Popular Mobilisation Front likely to step up to host numerous displaced Iranians which will over the medium to long-term cause backlash in Baghdad.

Smaller countries in the Caucasus would likely close their borders entirely and face a new challenge from illegal entry by Iranians. Europe would not remain unscathed as millions of Iranians have family there and could seek to join them during a period of high instability at home.

This time, the EU would be far stricter than a decade ago while a new wave of refugees would further cement far right politics and anti-immigrant sentiment. 

Nuclear and arms proliferation risks

While critical weapons and nuclear material is likely to remain at the hand of regime remnants, there is still the risk that geographic over-stretch may force them to relinquish some of their assets. This could mean ballistic missiles, fissile material, drones and plenty of automatic weapons roaming freely around the Middle East.  

Terrorism revival in West Asia 

Islamic State in Khorasan would have a greater geographic reach and become one of the greatest Jihadist threats in the world, with attacks planned against Western interests across the region. 

Iranian militants, from political groups to ethnic rebels, could foment terror attacks not only at home but also against one another in the West. 

Geopolitical confrontation and an endangered global order

Western-backed regime change and outright violation of international law would severely anger BRICS members and accelerate faultlines within the new multilateral order.

Many in the West might see the conflict as Israel’s war, but elsewhere this is a Western-backed conflict which further demonstrates Western hypocrisy and American desire for hegemony. China and Russia notably will take note and accelerate their confrontation with the West.

Global energy shock and recession